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Abstract 
 
 
Considerable research has been conducted on the Canadian north over the past few 
decades.  This research has focused on resource development (mining and forestry), on small 
resource towns, and on mega-projects such as the James Bay Hydro Project.  To date, little work 
has been produced on the relationship between military activity in the north and the landscapes, 
communities and people affected by such activity.  
This study examines the impact of the Cold War on the community of Moosonee, 
Ontario. By the mid-1950s Moosonee had become a shipping centre for northerly radar base 
developments.  Further growth occurred as a result of the construction and operation of a Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) radar base adjacent to Moosonee from 1961 to 1975.  Moosonee 
adapted to two types of development: population growth generated by military construction and 
activity, and redevelopment initiated by the closure of the RCAF base. Community adaptation to 
growth included major changes to local infrastructure and the evolution of local government. 
Once the radar base closed, the town’s residents seized the opportunity to use the housing and 
infrastructure on the RCAF base to fill local needs. Furthermore, local people worked with 
neighbouring communities to ensure that the RCAF base was transformed into a regional high 
school.  
The initial purpose of this study was twofold: to understand the impact of military 
development by examining how Moosonee changed from 1955 to 1975, and to report back to the 
residents of Moosonee on research results. Near the conclusion of the interviews and data 
collection stage it became clear that the broader purpose of this study was to join the 
conversation on community development models and to develop a model which fit the 
Moosonee experience. The thesis concludes with an explanation of the stages of development in 
iv 
 
Moosonee as compared to theoretical development stages, the impacts of the Cold War, and the 
way that impacts varied depending on the social status of individuals.  It also demonstrates how 
Moosonee’s residents transformed community planning from provincially driven to local citizen-
driven planning. 
Keywords: Cold War, interdisciplinary, Indigenous, community development, Northern Canada, 
Pinetree Line, radar bases. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
 Considerable research has been conducted on the Canadian north over the past few 
decades.  This research has focused on resource development (mining and forestry), small 
resource towns, and mega-projects such as the James Bay Hydro Project.  To date, little work has 
been produced on the relationship between military activity in the north and the landscapes, 
communities and people affected by such activity. My research examines the impact of the Cold 
War on the community of Moosonee, Ontario.  
Moosonee is a small northern Ontario Cree community located south of James Bay, 
directly across the Moose River from Moose Factory Island (see Map 1.1).  Statistics Canada 
indicated the town’s population was just over 2,000 in 2006, but the town itself records its 
population as closer to 3,200 people.
1
 The town’s website states that 85% of its residents are 
Cree, and that the languages spoken are English, Cree and French.
2
 Moosonee is most commonly 
accessed by rail (Ontario Northland Railway) and by aircraft from Timmins. It is the only one of 
Ontario’s 445 municipalities that cannot be accessed by road. Water transportation to and from 
the town is affected by the fact that the Moose River is a tidal river with two tides per day.
3
 
Moosonee is within the Hudson’s Bay Lowland geomorphic region and is surrounded by boreal 
forest (mostly black spruce, tamarack, and poplar) and wetlands.  
                                                 
1
 Statistics Canada showed 2006 people as the population in 2006 but it recorded only 1,725 people in 
2011. The Town’s own estimate of 3,200 is shown in the 2010 Ontario Municipal Directory, published by the 
Association of Municipal Managers Clerks and Treasurers of Ontario (AMCTO), Toronto.  Note: this directory 
relies on municipal estimates from its member municipalities. 
2
 The Town of Moosonee website indicates that the residents are about “85% Cree” and it is this site that 
provides the languages spoken by residents. http://www.moosonee.ca, accessed January 19, 2016. In this dissertation 
I use the terms Indigenous and mixed ancestry, in addition to Cree. This use of terms is guided by Sheila Coté-
Meek’s writing. See Sheila Coté-Meek, “Exploring the Impact of Ongoing Colonial Violence on Aboriginal 
Students in the Postsecondary Classroom,” PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2010, 20-22. Chapter Three has 
further discussion on terminology. 
3
 Frederick Close, All Aboard the Polar Bear Express: The Lure and Lore of the Land (Simcoe: Morris 
Printing, 1966), 38. 
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Map 1.1: Moosonee and Area 
 
 
Moosonee’s closest neighbour is Moose Factory Island, which was the original Cree 
settlement in this area and the location of the first Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) fur trading 
post in northern Ontario (1673).  Another key Moose Factory development was the building of 
the Bishop Horden Residential School, which housed Cree children from both northern Ontario 
 3 
and Quebec from 1860 until the 1960s.
4
 Moose Factory is now commonly referred to as Moose 
Cree First Nation, which is a part of the Mushkegowok Council. 
Unlike Moose Factory, Moosonee experienced little development until the Temiskaming 
and Northern Ontario Railway (T. & N. O.) connected the town to Cochrane in 1932.
5
 By the 
mid-1950s Moosonee had become a shipping centre for northerly radar base developments.  
Further growth occurred as a result of the construction and operation of a Royal Canadian Air 
Force (RCAF) radar base adjacent to Moosonee from 1961 to 1975.  This study examines the 
ways that Moosonee adapted to two types of development: growth caused by military 
construction which began in 1955, and transformation initiated by the closure of the RCAF base 
in 1975.  
What was the impact of the Cold War on the community of Moosonee? 
6
  The Cold War 
decades from 1950 to 1990 represent the time when Canada, the United States, and other 
Western countries faced perceived and real threats of Communism and nuclear war with the 
Soviets. During the early years of the Cold War, three massive radar lines were constructed 
across the north:  the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, the Mid-Canada line, and the Pinetree 
line. As noted above, Moosonee became the site for a Pinetree radar base.  
                                                 
 
4
 See the Anglican Synod overview of the Horden residential school at http: 
//www.anglican.ca/relationships/files/2011. This brief mention of the residential school is not meant to diminish the 
huge impact of the school on Indigenous people, but the full range of residential school development is beyond the 
scope of this project. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada has one of the most comprehensive lists 
of resources on this topic at their website: http://www.trc.ca. 
5
 The Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway was renamed Ontario Northland Railway in 1946. The 
railway will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
6
 The term ‘impact’ refers to the consequences for the community of Moosonee of hosting a radar base. See 
William Freudenburg. “Women and Men in an Energy Boomtown:  Adjustment, Alienation, and Adaptation.” In 
Rural Sociology 46, no.2 (1981): 220. Freudenburg linked the terms impact and consequences in his work on small 
resource towns. 
 4 
Land use planners describe human impacts as those that affect “individual people, 
groups, and social institutions.” 7 Furthermore, they define the physical community as 
“buildings, streets, and open spaces,” or simply as “the built environment,” a term that includes 
infrastructure.
8
 My original goal had been to assess the human or personal impacts and the 
community or infrastructure impacts as separate elements, but my research has shown that 
human and structural changes are intertwined and interactive. The discussion of change will 
document this interaction throughout this dissertation. Kerry Abel has written that “The 
experience and symbolism of community … [plays] a major role in the human experience.”9 I 
support her observation, but I also contend that a community is ultimately influenced and shaped 
by the condition and variety of its infrastructure and services. These in turn shape the human 
experience.  
The initial purpose of this study was twofold: to understand the impact of military 
development by examining how Moosonee changed from 1955 to 1975 and to report back to the 
residents of Moosonee on research results. The latter approach is modelled on Indigenous 
community-based research that requires researchers to provide community members with 
findings that they have participated in and/or have an interest in because of where they live. My 
research is informed by both non-Indigenous and Indigenous research methods which will be 
explained in detail in Chapter Three. 
This project joins the conversation on community development models and develops a 
model that describes the Moosonee experience. Normally the resource town literature would 
provide a sufficient model of growth and decline or ‘boom and bust’ for small resource towns. I 
                                                 
7
 Gerald Hodge and David Gordon, Planning Canadian Communities: An Introduction to the Principles, 
Practice, and Participants (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), 174. 
8
 Ibid. 
 
9
 Kerry Abel, Changing Places: History, Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s U. Press, 2006), xiv. 
 5 
concluded, however, that Moosonee did not fit within resource town models and that a new 
model of development was needed.  
Chapter Two of this study is a literature review which helps to place the Moosonee 
research in context. Chapter Three describes the methods that were used for this research.  The 
evolution of personal, structural, and community change is described in the next six chapters. 
Chapter Four examines Moosonee as a railway town and looks at its early Cold War years.  
Chapter Five, “A Different Kind of Townsite,” describes the conflict between provincial 
planners, who wanted to integrate the town of Moosonee and its radar base, and officials from 
the Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) and RCAF who lobbied for a separate radar base.  
Chapter Six examines life on the radar base and demonstrates the ways that social and 
recreational activities linked the base and local people. Chapter Seven, “Water, Fire and 
Moosonee,” examines the development of local infrastructure. It shows how infrastructure and 
services, especially water distribution and fire protection services, created a symbiotic 
relationship between the town and the radar base. Chapter Eight examines the evolution of local 
government in Moosonee. This chapter documents how, initially, local governance had very little 
to do with local people. Chapter Nine closes the results section of this paper by demonstrating 
the ways that local people stepped forward and seized the opportunity to transform abandoned 
radar base facilities into town and regional assets. The thesis concludes with Chapter Ten, which 
proposes a new model of community development based on the stages observed in Moosonee.  
 6 
Chapter Two: Literature Review  
 
 This chapter has two major components: a discussion of interdisciplinary research and a 
review of literature on the Cold War and radar bases. Both components are significant and 
interrelated. For this study, interdisciplinary research significantly shapes the understanding of 
the Cold War’s impacts.  The impacts of change are not limited to one field of research and 
therefore the assessment of such impacts needs to be examined from a variety of standpoints. 
The specific thesis topic – Moosonee as a Pinetree radar base – is part of the Cold War era and a 
major military build-up that occurred in Canada and elsewhere throughout much of the world. 
This chapter also includes a discussion of the impacts of military development on Indigenous 
peoples and it closes with a review of community development models. 
 
Interdisciplinarity 
 Interdisciplinary research has been defined as “any form of dialogue or interaction 
between two or more disciplines.” 10  Julie Thompson Klein, a frequent author on 
interdisciplinarity, has compared interdisciplinary work to multi-disciplinary projects which she 
argues combines disciplines so that they “speak as separate voices in an encyclopedic 
alignment.”11  In other words, separate disciplines are dealt with in a linear fashion where they 
are “beside” each other, but there is a lack of interaction or integration among them. Klein has 
suggested that the concept of “integration of disciplines” is the “litmus test” of 
                                                 
 
10
 Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity (New York: Routledge, 2010). Also see Allen Repko, Interdisciplinary 
Research: Process and Theory (Los Angeles: Sage Publishing, 2012), 14.   Angelique Chettiparamb, 
Interdisciplinarity: A Literature Review (University of Southampton: The Interdisciplinary Teaching and Learning 
Group, 2007) suggests that the definition of interdisciplinarity includes the process of “…disciplines latching on to 
common elements.” (26). 
11
 Julie Thompson Klein, Humanities, Culture and Interdisciplinarity (Albany: State University of New 
York, 2005), 55.   
 7 
interdisciplinarity.
12
  That is, without integration, any discussion of two or more disciplines is 
sufficiently multi-disciplinary but does not meet the definition of   “interdisciplinary.”   
Within the last decade, a group of research associates at Columbia University conducted 
an extensive literature review and interviews of interdisciplinary researchers in order to develop 
a new definition of interdisciplinarity. This group recommended the use of the following 
definition for interdisciplinary work:  
 Interdisciplinary research is any study or group of studies undertaken by scholars 
 from two or more distinct scientific disciplines. The research is based upon a 
conceptual model that links or integrates theoretical frameworks from those disciplines, 
uses study design and methodology that is not limited to any one field, and requires the 
use of perspectives and skills of the involved disciplines throughout multiple phases of 
the research process.13 
 
While this definition initially appears to be limited to the physical sciences, the Columbia 
researchers explained that their goal was to provide a clear term for use by scholars in health 
sciences, social sciences, business, and education.  This definition is clear and is applicable to 
this dissertation. It is not as esoteric as some other definitions but it uses the terms “links” and 
“integrates,” two concepts which apply to interdisciplinary work. 
 Despite varying opinions on the strengths and weaknesses of disciplinary work, it is 
generally understood that interdisciplinary studies depend on disciplines for their base.
14
 William 
Newell, who edited Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature, emphasized that 
                                                 
12
 Julie Thompson Klein, “A Taxonomy of Interdisciplinarity” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity, eds Robert Frodeman, Julie Thompson Klein, and Carl Mitcham (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 16-17.  Also see Karen Messing, “Easier Said Than Done: Biologists, Ergonomists, and Sociologists 
Collaborate to Study Health Effects of the Sexual Division of Labour,” In Liona Salter and Alison Hearn, eds. 
Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 95-102.  
 
13
 Sally Aboelela et al., “Defining Interdisciplinary Research: Conclusions from a Critical Review of the 
Literature, Health Sciences Research 42, (February 2007):341. 
14
 For writing that is particularly critical of mono-disciplinary research see Edgar Morin, On Complexity 
(Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2008) and Allen Repko, Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory (Los Angeles: 
Sage Publishing, 2012). For writing that emphasizes the positive aspects of interdisciplinary research layered with 
disciplinary research refer to the next footnote.  For an insightful perspective on Canadian views on the positive and 
negative aspects of interdisciplinary research see Jill Vickers, “Thirty-five Years on the Beaver Patrol: Canadian 
Studies as a Collective Scholarly Activity,” in Outside the Lines: Issues in Interdisciplinary Research, eds. Liora 
Salter and Alison Hearn (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 78-84 
 8 
“interdisciplinary courses depend on the disciplines for their perspectives as much as disciplinary 
courses depend on interdisciplinary ones to provide context.” 15   
This study seeks to integrate data and concepts from fields such as history, gender studies 
and land use planning in order to better understand the impact of the Cold War on Moosonee. Joe 
Moran has written that “interdisciplinarity is always transformative in some way, producing new 
forms of knowledge in its engagement with discrete disciplines.”16  To illustrate, gender studies 
examines the relationships between men and women, and within groups of men and women.  
Further it assists with an understanding of community power structures. Joan Wallach Scott 
writes that “gender” was ultimately about power and that “a scholarly understanding [of] the 
inequalities of power was organized along at least three axes (gender, race and class).” 17 Joy 
Parr echoes this layered approach and indicates that an examination of gender, in particular, 
assists with our understanding of daily experiences. 
18
  Because of the complexities of Moosonee 
during the Cold War, it is useful to examine the differences in the experiences of women and 
men who resided in Moosonee and those men and women who arrived to ‘populate’ the local 
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) radar base. Everyday experiences differed depending on 
whether individuals were military personnel or civilian employees and whether they were 
Indigenous or non-Indigenous. Finally, it is important to examine community power structures 
that existed during the Cold War.  
                                                 
 
15
 William Newell, “Academic Disciplines and Undergraduate Interdisciplinary Education,” In 
Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature, ed. W. Newell (New York: The College Board, 1998), 224.  See also 
Tanya Augsburg and Stuart Henry, eds The Politics of Interdisciplinary Studies, (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 
2009), 251. These authors referred to interaction between mono-disciplinary academics and interdisciplinary 
researchers as “a symbiotic relationship.” They hypothesized that university interdisciplinary programs which did 
not interact with disciplinary programs risked dissolution.  
16
 Moran, Interdisciplinarity, 15.  
17
 Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, no. 
5 (1986): 30.   
18
 Joy Parr, “Gender History and Historical Practice,” Canadian Historical Review 76, no. 3 (1995): 363. 
 9 
Like gender studies, land use planning examines relationships, but the focus tends to be 
on land-based interaction. Jill Grant, the Director of the School of Planning at Dalhousie 
University, states that planning looks at the connections between “key elements,” such as: 
  -people, physical objects, and ecological processes; 
  -problems, subject matters, and specializations; 
  -jurisdictions (federal, provincial, regional, and municipal); (and) 
  -domains (social, economic, political, and physical).
19
 
 
Allen Repko writes that land use problems are “highly appropriate for interdisciplinary inquiry 
and require drawing on insights from multiple disciplines to fully understand them.”20  He cites 
Mathews and Jones’ work on systems theory and land use planning where these authors state 
that: 
Problems associated with land use change include water-quality degradation created from 
developed landscapes, rising property values that lead to a lack of  affordable housing, 
loss of aesthetic beauty …and the uncertainties associated  with new people, jobs, and 
ways of life invading an area.
21
 
 
While employing land use planning methods to assess and map how the physical 
structure of Moosonee changed during the Cold War, this project also examined federal, 
provincial and local (quasi-municipal) jurisdictions that functioned ‘above’ and within 
Moosonee. Gender studies supported an understanding of “personal experience” in the 
community, and planning literature informed analysis of the “community experience”: that is, the 
way the town’s entire landscape and infrastructure changed as it was impacted by military 
                                                 
 
19
   Jill Grant, “Planning Canadian Communities,” In A Reader in Canadian Planning: Linking Theory and 
Practice ed. Jill Grant, ( Toronto: Nelson Publishing, 2008), 9.     
 
20
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activity. As noted in the introduction, the two elements – personal and community experiences – 
tend to be integrated throughout this inquiry. The combination, in particular of history and 
planning, allowed for linked disciplinary perspectives, thus showing the potential for the 
“synergy of multiple perspectives” observed by Shailer.22  
 One of the key steps in interdisciplinary research is the production of a literature review 
of “relevant” disciplines.23  The initial literature search for research on Moosonee followed this 
approach by examining key thematic areas including the Cold War, radar bases, gender studies, 
Indigenous peoples, and land use planning. Thematic areas were not constructed to limit the 
range of disciplinary material reviewed.  Rather these thematic groupings were intended to 
ensure a broad examination of material that could provide perspectives on the question of the 
Cold War and Moosonee. As another example of the interdisciplinarity, the broad literature 
review assisted with a comprehensive integration of insights on both personal relationships and 
community change in Cold War Moosonee.
24
  While the initial approach had been to try to 
separate personal/human impacts from community or structural change, in analyzing the data 
from both archives and interviews, and by using an interdisciplinary lens, it became clear that 
personal and community impacts were inextricably linked.   
 Interdisciplinary research can facilitate the examination of the ways that communities 
change over time, and how localities respond to stressors like mega-projects (e.g. radar bases, 
hydro dams, opening of new mines/industries). Mannell and Ternoway used interdisciplinary 
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language in their discussion of planning when they stated that “daily life is not constrained by 
departmental boundaries” and that a true understanding of a community requires “weaving 
separate parts together.” 25 The “separate parts” to which these planners referred were the 
environment, infrastructure, local government, housing, and socio-economic aspects of a 
community. Recent work by Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) researchers suggests that “an 
interdisciplinary survey of the [DEW] Line … and [its] wider Arctic contexts is long overdue.” 26  
The literature review on Moosonee has shown that neither an interdisciplinary survey, nor any 
comprehensive analysis, exists for Pinetree radar bases like Moosonee. This study of Moosonee 
benefits from an interdisciplinary approach because it places the town in its Cold War context 
and it meshes the “separate parts” noted by Mannell and Ternoway.  
 
The Cold War 
The central question of this study is “What was the impact of the Cold War on northern 
Canada, and specifically on the community of Moosonee?” Understanding the Cold War itself is 
critical to analyzing military impacts on the town.  From 1955 to 1975 Moosonee was a shipping 
centre for more northerly Mid-Canada radar bases (mid-1950s) and it had a neighbouring 
Pinetree radar base (1961 to 1975).   
 Although the Cold War is considered to be the four decades from 1950 to 1990, it 
actually began for the Canadian government in September 1945 with the Gouzenko spy affair.
27
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It is important to examine two specific aspects of the Cold War in order to understand why three 
lines of radar bases were constructed on northern Canadian soil.  These aspects are the fear of 
nuclear war, and the defence and sovereignty issues that forced Canada to accept American 
defence systems and to develop its own defence network.   
 Distrust and fear of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did not begin with 
the Gouzenko affair. Western powers were intensely skeptical of the Soviets as early as the 
signing of the Russo-Germany Non-Aggression pact in 1939.
28
 Despite being Allies from 1941 
to 1945, some members of the American military expected to defend North America from the 
USSR.  During his tour of northern military megaprojects in 1943, Malcolm MacDonald, the 
British High Commissioner to Canada, wrote that some American officers felt that the 
infrastructure they were creating would help them “fight the Russians in the next world crisis.” 29 
Also, during 1943, a war-time advisor to President Roosevelt described Canada’s “almost empty 
northland” as a “dangerous military vacuum” that the Soviets could fill.30 Clearly, the image of 
an ‘empty’ north was problematic for some strategists.  
 Shortly after the Second World War ended, the Canadian-American Permanent Joint 
Board of Defence (PJBD) recommended that Canada and the United States reaffirm their goal to 
work together on the defence of North America.
31
 This recommendation was based on a 
subcommittee report which suggested that if a new war occurred, it would start with the Soviets 
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launching atomic weaponry by air over Canada. Because of the potential for Soviet aggression, 
the subcommittee pushed for the massive development of airfields and radar bases.  This 
recommendation for an accelerated military buildup in the Canadian north was one of the first of 
its kind and it was typical of the pressures generated by the fear of nuclear war.
32
  The Canadian 
government initially deferred construction plans for northern radar bases but it did publicly 
reaffirm its commitment to joint Canadian-American defence of North America during February 
1947.  Less than a month after this affirmation, the official newspaper of the Soviet Union, 
Izvestia, wrote: "the intensive efforts of the United States military circles to transform Canada 
into an advance United States base for imperialist expansion have at last been successful."
33
  
 Kenneth Eyre has suggested that the “watchful eye” of the USSR was one of the reasons 
Canada initially hesitated to build northern radar bases. In his “Forty Years of Military Activity” 
article he wrote that both Mackenzie King and Lester Pearson (as then Minister for External 
Affairs) felt that northern Canadian bases could be used against North America if captured by the 
Soviets. Furthermore Eyre wrote that “Canada elected to develop forces with the capability of 
recapturing a Soviet-occupied airfield in the north.”34 Although the concept of Soviet troops 
capturing parts of northern Canada now seems difficult to believe, it is the type of late 1940s 
belief that permeated government discussions during the Cold War.   
 Three events ruptured the few years of peacetime after the Second World War and 
pushed Canada and Canadian politicians further into what Valerie Korinek has called the “Age 
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of Anxiety.” 35 The three key events were the detonation by the USSR of its first atomic bomb in 
1949, the testing in 1953 of its first hydrogen bomb, and the demonstration of a long-range 
bomber at the May Day parade in Moscow in 1954.  Shortly after the 1949 test, Canada and the 
US started discussing building the Pinetree Radar Line, and after the H-bomb and demonstration 
of a long range bomber, two other lines were initiated -- the Mid-Canada Line and the Distant 
Early Warning Line (DEW Line).
36
  
 Cold War jitters affected more than just government strategies.  The general public was 
placed “on alert” by the extensive news coverage of defence strategies and by the fear of being 
“nuked.” Bryan Palmer discusses the wide range of Cold War advertisements, pamphlets and 
texts which advised the public broadly on defence strategies and specifically on the construction 
of bomb shelters.  In “Shelter from the Storm,” Palmer writes that 1,328 air raid sirens were built 
across Canada and that Canadian officials distributed 10 million ‘survival’ booklets to the 
general public between 1959 and 1962.
37
  He also notes that nuclear survival strategies differed 
in the US compared to Canada.  For example, he writes that, “in Canada, it seems, school 
officials worried about communications, but in the United States the concern was with the more 
extreme scenario of problems of identification should masses of children be lost, wounded, or 
dead.”38   
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 Although American articles about nuclear war focused on the horrors of “the bomb,” they 
usually concluded with the United States winning the war and doing so with survivors.  For 
example, Matthew Farish’s discussion of ‘Anxious Urbanism’ shows young American students 
in the midst of an air raid drill, and describes American families reading about nuclear 
obliteration in Life magazine’s simulation of a nuclear attack on Washington, D.C. 39  However, 
the general message for the public was that survival was possible. Nuclear articles were 
supplemented by full-length texts which implied that Communism would proliferate if the 
Soviets won what seemed to be an inevitable nuclear war.
40
  
 Canadian publications also discussed the possibility of nuclear war. For example, a 
Maclean’s article in 1951 suggested that nine nuclear bombs would hit key Canadian cities 
should nuclear war become a reality.
41
  Apparently emergency measures managers felt the public 
had to be truly frightened before it would actually believe in the value of building bomb 
shelters.
42
  Even Chatelaine, while providing thoughtful coverage on the banning of the 
hydrogen bomb in 1958 and on whether Canada should accept nuclear warheads on its missiles 
in 1961, still managed a few articles such as the 1962, “Can you Protect Your Family from the 
Bomb?” 43  Clearly, the Cold War fear of nuclear obliteration was a significant issue to 
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Canadians.  Korinek notes, in this regard, that Chatelaine, which had a readership of over 
900,000 in 1969, saw its readers switch from women’s health to international politics as one of 
the top topics requested.
44
   
 At the core of public opinion in both Canada and the United States was the demand for 
protection from nuclear destruction.  The fear of nuclear war fueled defence strategies and put 
pressure on politicians to erect defence infrastructure and systems. Whether or not there was a 
need to be afraid was not really the issue over time. Instead, an anxious public became less 
critical about the size of military budgets and more concerned about being forewarned of nuclear 
attack. 
Canadian politicians and civil service mandarins spent most of the Cold War trying to 
reconcile the need for defence with the goal of retaining sovereignty particularly in the north.  
That is, each time prime ministers (from Mackenzie King to St. Laurent, and from Diefenbaker 
to Pearson) had to decide on specific structures (such as radar lines) or specific weaponry (such 
as nuclear warheads) they had to weigh the costs of submitting to the ‘friendly invasion’ of the 
Americans versus the failure to protect Canada from nuclear obliteration. The term ‘friendly 
invasion’ has been used most recently by Steven High in his discerning comparison of the 
impacts of American and Canadian servicemen in Newfoundland during the Second World 
War.
45
 Morris Zaslow adds that even before the end of war, the arrival of huge numbers of 
American troops in the Canadian north caused political angst in Ottawa. He states that: 
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Canadian military planners were expecting to maintain the defensive alliance in the 
North, as much to forestall steps by the United States on its own to  safeguard its security 
as to avert any as yet perceived Soviet threat. The  troubled international situation after 
1945 quickly reversed the American  withdrawal from northern Canada and soon 
American servicemen …were back at some of the wartime bases in the Arctic…raising 
renewed concerns about maintaining Canada’s authority and even its sovereignty. 46  
 
To a certain extent, Canadian political advisors hoped that Canada’s participation in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would give it “some strength in numbers” as the US 
was only one of fourteen member countries. Additionally, Canada joined NATO hoping for an 
organization that would support social and economic interaction among non-Communist 
countries. 
47
 Unfortunately, Canada’s participation in NATO meant that it was pressured to 
provide troops and aircraft to Europe while still maintaining its own defence system in northern 
Canada. Bercuson writes that NATO “would cover virtually all of the defence contingencies of 
its European members but would not protect North America from Soviet air attack.” 48 Another 
writer, Edward Hull, indicated that Canada’s role in Europe as part of NATO was critical and 
that, “its massive Northern wilderness is a vital element of North American defense.”49  Hull 
indicated that an “extensive radar network” was being built and that “on defense, the United 
States and Canada work together.”50  Unfortunately, Canada’s hopes for a broad based coalition 
in the form of NATO ended up linking it even more closely with American military planning.  
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The final pressure point for Canada was its participation in the Korean War (1950-53) at 
a time when its limited military resources were devoted primarily to NATO and Western 
Europe.
51
 Even more significantly, during the early stages of the Cold War, Canada was, in 
effect, seen as a de facto partner of the United States. One of the ways Canada tried to ‘push 
back’ against this partnership was to defer its participation in the DEW Line and to focus instead 
on its own radar line -- the Mid-Canada Line (also called the McGill Fence). But as Reginald 
Whitaker and Gary Marcuse point out, Canada was truly a junior partner in defence: 
The Canadian government was never fully convinced that the DEW Line was in fact 
necessary, and it had hoped, by taking responsibility for the Mid-Canada  Line, to avoid 
the vast expenditures projected [for] installations in the high Arctic. But in the end, a 
glum cabinet faced the reality that if the Americans … wanted such an installation they 
would have it, one way or another.
52
 
 
As the Cold War progressed and radar line construction was completed, Canada became 
even more closely controlled by the US military through the creation of the North American Air 
Defence Command (NORAD). 
53
 Joseph Jockel has written a detailed outline of how Canada’s 
defence system came under the control of the United States.
54
 He shows not only how the 
ratification of the NORAD program sidestepped senior civil servants and Members of 
Parliament, but also how Diefenbaker was ultimately publicly criticized for his rash approval of 
Canada’s participation. After this first ‘speedy’ defence decision, and the fairly abrupt cancelling 
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of the Avro Arrow program in 1959, Diefenbaker’s style changed to one of almost complete 
indecision.
55
   
J. L. Granatsteins’s “Defence Débâcle” outlines this indecision in regard to two critical 
issues: the Cuban Missile Crisis and the use of nuclear warheads on Canadian BOMARC 
missiles. The Diefenbaker government had negotiated with the Americans in 1958 to establish 
two BOMARC missile sites in Canada and to allow the construction of seven additional Pinetree 
radar bases.  Moosonee was the location of one of the new radar bases. As the BOMARC and 
Pinetree sites were being built between 1960 and 1962, Diefenbaker waffled about whether or 
not to fully arm BOMARC missiles.  
The “Defence Débâcle” expanded into a series of discussions in the early 1960s, which 
occurred as President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker played out their extreme 
dislike of each other on the international stage. Their personal animosities potentially risked the 
long term safety of both Canadian and American citizens.
56
 The level of animosity between the 
Prime Minister and the President peaked with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Jockel writes that, 
despite being a partner in NORAD, Canada was not consulted regarding the American approach 
to Russia’s construction of missile silos on Cuba.57 Instead Kennedy phoned Diefenbaker only 
two hours prior to a public television broadcast on the crisis, and Diefenbaker responded by 
hesitating for two full days before going to full national defensive alert (“DEFCON 3” in 
American terms).
58
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Ultimately the public felt that Diefenbaker’s hesitation on nuclear warheads and Cuba 
was threatening its safety.  ‘Dief’ was defeated in the April 1963 election by Lester B. Pearson, 
who immediately arranged for nuclear warheads to be installed on the BOMARCs. Granatstein 
writes that Diefenbaker was defeated due to his inability “to make decisions quickly — one way 
or the other — on the question of acquiring nuclear weapons [from the US] for the Canadian 
armed forces.” 59  However, it did not help Diefenbaker in Parliament and in the 1963 election 
when he was publicly criticized by the US State Department for his indecision regarding defence 
matters. In fact, the American ambassador to Canada stated after the election that Diefenbaker’s 
election loss should be a lesson to “future aspirants to political office in Canada.”60  Clearly the 
Cold War affected everyday citizens, defence strategists and those individuals who would govern 
Canada. Against this background of tension and nuclear anxiety, the Moosonee RCAF radar base 
became fully operational in October 1962. 
 Northern Canadian communities shared in the anxiety about nuclear war which pervaded 
North America. However, certain northern communities had an even stronger sense of military 
impacts because they were the sites for Cold War radar bases which were situated in three 
systems or lines as shown in Table 2.1.  
Literature on radar lines describes some aspects of the construction and operation of radar 
bases across both the Arctic and sub-Arctic. It thus provides the context for the construction of a 
base in Moosonee. Unfortunately, most literature on Cold War Canada focuses on organizations, 
such as NATO and NORAD, and political struggles, rather than on defence infrastructure. Even 
when Canadian academics discuss defence systems they tend to describe defence weaponry (e.g. 
nuclear warheads) and aircraft rather than radar sites.  For example, Bothwell et al provide 
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considerable detail on strategic discussions related to aircraft such as the Avro Arrow, the 
Voodoo, and the Starfighter.  However, these authors make no reference to radar lines or radar 
bases in their text Canada Since 1945. 
61
  
 
Table 2.1 Cold War Radar Lines 
62
 
Name of Radar Line Dates of Operation Number of Stations Cost Sharing  
 
Pinetree Line 1954-1988 Initially 34 stations, 
with 7 more added 
in 1961 
1/3 Canada, 2/3 paid 
by U.S.  
Mid-Canada Line 
(also referred to as 
MCL and/or 
‘McGill Fence’) 
1957-1965 90 unstaffed 
stations with 8 large 
Section Control 
stations 
$200 million, paid 
by Canada 
Distant Early 
Warning (‘DEW 
Line’) 
1957-1988 22 Stations with 4 
Main Bases 
$500 Million for 
construction, paid 
by U.S. 
 
 Three other examples of limited discussion on radar lines include Liza Piper’s The 
Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada, Whitaker and Marcuse’s “Canada in a Cold War 
World,” and Palmer’s “Shelter from the Storm.” 63 Piper discusses the Second World War 
megaprojects such as the Canol Pipeline, but her four references to the Cold War do not mention 
that era’s megaprojects. Whitaker and Marcuse’s text is a detailed analysis of political aspects of 
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the Cold War (they have three chapters on Gouzenko alone) but it has only one page referencing 
the radar lines.
64
 Finally, Bryan Palmer’s discussion of the Cold War has one sentence on radar 
bases that reads “three Arctic radar detection networks built on American initiative between 
1954 and 1957 were the basis of growing tension.” 65   
 In other sources, radar lines have been mentioned but the focus has been limited solely to 
the DEW Line, or only two of the three radar lines have been documented. For instance, Kenneth 
Eyre refers solely to the DEW radar line in his discussion of military development in northern 
Canada and Kenneth Rea writes that “two strings of radar stations were built across the arctic 
and subarctic.”66 Morris Zaslow provides one of the earlier Canadian descriptions of the three 
radar lines in his Northward Expansion of Canada, published in 1988.
67
  He refers to the DEW 
Line as a “far grander system” than Canada’s Mid-Canada Line.68  
Zaslow’s discussion was sourced from a National Geographic article on the DEW Line. 
The article, by Howard La Fay, titled “DEW Line, Sentry of the Far North” includes both details 
on radar systems and information on working conditions.
69
 La Fay refers to “minus 50-degree 
temperatures and blinding white-outs” and notes that 35 men were killed during its construction 
phase.
70
  He also briefly describes the role of the two more southerly radar lines. La Fay writes 
that the Mid-Canada Line (he calls it “the radar fence”) will confirm the “preliminary alert” by 
the DEW stations, and that the Pinetree Line stations will provide “data on height, speed, and 
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direction of enemy bombers.”71 La Fay never uses the term Soviet nor does he refer to the USSR, 
however his writing is similar to the fear of nuclear war articles noted earlier. For example, he 
writes: 
In the event of an enemy attack across the polar ice, the DEW Line would flash instant 
warning…The time thus gained could spell the difference between  national life and death 
for Canada and the United States…Enemy jets, traveling at  the speed of sound, would 
require more than an hour to fly between the DEW  Line and any major North American 
city. Warned of their approach, the civilian  population could seek cover while 
interceptors took to the air. At the same time, retaliatory bombing could commence from 
bases around the world.
72
 
 
La Fay’s message is clear: Be afraid but know that the US government has spent millions to save 
you and that radar lines are not just there to detect bombers, but to ensure that there will be time 
for retaliation.
73
  
In contrast to La Fay’s dramatic article is Farley Mowat’s, High Latitudes: A Northern 
Journey, which is a narration of two trips to the Arctic in 1966. 
74
 Mowat describes workers at 
the Hall Beach DEW station as follows: “The inmates were not a happy lot. Their faces were 
pale and oily like those of people forced to sit up all night in a crowded airport … Too many men 
cooped up in too confined a space for too long.”75  Mowat’s writing is more realistic in 
describing the tedium suffered by isolated workers than La Fay’s adventurous prose. 
 Other articles from the 1950s and 1960s, dealing with the construction of both the DEW 
Line and the Mid-Canada line (MCL), used La Fay’s writing as a template.  That is, they covered 
the difficulties inherent in northern construction and the need to protect the public with what La 
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Fay had called “an alarm system.”76 As an example, one article used Knob Lake, Quebec as a 
case study of construction difficulties amidst Cold War urgency.
77
 The Knob Lake radar base, 
directly beside Schefferville, a mining community, was one of the three control stations for the 
MCL. Later studies referred to Schefferville and Knob Lake as mine sites and did not discuss the 
military infrastructure or operations.
78
 Similarly, a few articles referred to the role of Moosonee 
as a shipping centre for more northerly radar bases, but there are no references to Moosonee as a 
potential Pinetree radar base.
79
 Recognition of the military history of small communities, like 
Schefferville and Moosonee, must be achieved if community dynamics are to be understood. The 
acknowledgement of military heritage is also an important first step in documenting physical or 
environmental impacts to communities.  
It appears that part of the reason for the focus, in publicly available articles, on the DEW 
Line and Mid-Canada lines, rather than the Pinetree line, was the clear nationalistic aspects of 
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projects funded solely by the Americans (DEW) or solely by Canada (Mid-Canada Line). This is 
particularly evident in the number of articles produced by the Royal Canadian Air Force’s 
(RCAF) writers on the Mid-Canada Line.
80
  The main reason for the lack of literature on the 
Canadian-American Pinetree Line could also have been that the details (because they were 
bilaterally negotiated) tended to be buried in classified documents. In this regard, Joseph Jockel 
relied heavily on Freedom of Information requests (in both the U.S. and Canada) to help 
complete his study of the three radar lines.
81
 Jockel’s No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, The 
United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958 was also one of the 
first texts to confirm the financial arrangements surrounding the Pinetree Line bases.
82
 He noted 
that Canada was required to pay one-third of costs for all Pinetree construction and operation and 
that there were 34 initial Pinetree radar bases -- 18 to be staffed by the United States Air Force 
(USAF) and 16 to be staffed by the RCAF. Jockel provided a complete list of these bases and 
indicated which country was in control of each base. For example, the bases in Sioux Lookout 
and Armstrong in Ontario were to be staffed by the USAF, and the Falconbridge, Ontario, base 
was to be managed by the RCAF.
83
 These facts may seem straight forward but they had not been 
documented in any of the radar literature prior to Jockel’s book. 84   
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 Roy Fletcher’s “Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America,” completed 
the radar database initiated by Jockel.
85
  Fletcher wrote that there was a second round of Pinetree 
radar bases constructed between 1957 and 1964, and although he did not list the locations, his 
maps showed Moosonee as one of the seven sites added during that time.
86
 Fletcher’s article was 
one of the few references to describe the number of people at the bases and how they were 
accommodated. He wrote that “in the early years each Pinetree station had 300-400 personnel … 
one third [of the total] were civilians… Automation reduced personnel to 120-200 per station, 
including 50-70 civilians.”87  Fletcher also wrote that: 
Domestic sites had two-storey barracks and a mobile home park accommodating 30-50 
trailers for married personnel. Unless a large town was nearby, there was  also an area of 
30 to 50 transportable, double-width, single family homes. There were separate buildings 
for power, heating, administration, school, library, fire station, recreation centre, 
maintenance, sewage and water treatment. Some stations had a swimming pool and a golf 
course.
88
 
 
 
 The reason for a second round of Pinetree bases is unclear. Fletcher suggested they were 
requested by the USAF to protect its bomber bases. However, other sources suggest that the 
second round of Pinetree bases was part of a broader defence arrangement which included the 
construction of Canadian BOMARC missile bases at North Bay, Ontario, and La Macaza, 
Quebec.  Two key defence agreements were the Continental Air Defence Integration North 
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Agreement (CADIN-1958) and the Triangular Agreement (1961).
89
 These primary documents 
show that the USAF was transitioning out of day to day operations and staffing the Pinetree 
bases and that it was prepared to ‘trade’ interceptor jets to Canada for the right to have the RCAF 
take over certain stations.
90
  The CADIN and Triangular agreements, which established 
Moosonee as a new Pinetree site, appear to be the same ones which eventually ‘brought down’ 
the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker through his reluctance to put nuclear 
warheads on the BOMARCs installed as part of these negotiations. 
 More recently there has been a renewed interest in studying the impacts of northern radar 
lines, as evidenced by a comprehensive DEW Line bibliography and by articles on the 
environmental impacts of bases.
91
   Within the last decade, two articles about the environment 
have documented specific types of damage resulting from the construction and operation of radar 
bases.  Arthur Johnson’s “Cold War Cleanup” documented the huge number of abandoned fuel 
drums left at or near DEW Line sites and the expensive remediation efforts which are still 
underway in the north.
92
 Additionally, McCreanor et al. focused on chemical contamination of 
                                                 
 
89
 Canada, Department of National Defence. Agreement between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the 
United States Air Force for Sharing of Costs of Communications Facilities. CADIN File #2000.55.1. Ottawa, 1965. 
and Canada, DND, A Summary of Canada-United States Agreements on Air Defence Ground Environment. CADIN 
File #1999 24 163. Ottawa, 1968. These papers were accessed at the North Bay Aerospace Museum during 2011. 
The seven new “heavy radar sites” noted in these documents included three for Diefenbaker’s home province of 
Saskatchewan. 
 
90
 The CADIN agreements show that in 1961, the USAF gave Canada sixty-six F101 Voodoo Interceptors 
(jets) in exchange for Canada taking over the staffing of USAF Pinetree sites such as Sioux Lookout and Armstrong 
in Ontario. (pp 13-14) The Americans also agreed as part of these arrangements that Canada would produce 
Starfighter interceptors (the F-104) for the U.S. This appears to be a possible trade-off for cancelling the Avro 
Arrow in 1959. Also see Bothwell et al. (243-246) on the maze connecting the Avro Arrow, Voodoo, Starfighter and 
BOMARCs.  The only aspect missing from Bothwell et al. is the addition of 7 more Pinetree radar sites to the 
defence ‘mesh’.  
 
91
 P. WhitneyLackenbauer, Matthew J. Farish, and Jennifer Arthur-Lackenbauer. The Distant Early 
Warning (DEW) Line: A Bibliography and Documentary Resource List, (Arctic Institute of North America, 2005).  
 
92
 Arthur Johnson, “Cold War Cleanup: Undoing the DEW Line,” Canadian Geographic (March/April, 
2007): 62-72. Johnson quotes one of the remediation managers as stating that $583 million has been spent so far on 
remediation of DEW sites (72). 
 28 
water and soil in their research on former Mid-Canada Line radar sites, such as Site 050 which is 
adjacent to Fort Albany on James Bay.
93
   
 There has been almost no scholarly work on the social and economic impacts of Canada’s 
Pinetree bases. The single study that I accessed during preparation of this literature review was a 
paper called “Social and Economic Impacts of CADIN/Pinetree Radar Units upon their Host 
Communities.”94 While the title appears comprehensive, the paper itself focused almost entirely 
on anticipated local job losses when the federal government prepared to close radar bases in the 
mid-1980s. It did not refer to any social or economic impacts during the operation of the bases, 
and did not include any references to the dozens of bases (including Moosonee) which had 
already closed prior to 1984. 
95
  
 Two publications have added to the rather limited literature on Cold War military activity 
and land use planning.  The first is Joy Parr’s description of the construction of an army base at 
Gagetown, New Brunswick, during 1953. 
96
  Parr combined narratives of local residents with 
detailed mapping and aerial photos in order to examine both personal consequences and 
community devastation caused by the construction of defence infrastructure.  She scrutinized the 
disorientation of local people as they experienced the expropriation of their properties and then 
witnessed (from nearby) the destruction of forests and farms.
97
  Former residents described their 
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return “anniversary” tour of the Gagetown site as virtually “driving in the dark” because they 
recognized almost nothing of their former properties.
98
   
 The second publication was Arn Keeling’s study of Uranium City. 99 Keeling used the 
term “cyclonic activity” to represent both the speed with which Uranium City was constructed in 
1952, and the disorder that was created as people flocked to the town for work.
100
 He also 
indicated that the opening of the uranium mines drew both prospectors and “large numbers of 
Cree, Dene and Métis people [who were] attracted to the new settlement by the prospects of 
seasonal work.” 101 These prospective employees “tended to occupy summer camps at the fringes 
of the town.”102   
 Keeling’s work includes two references that link his work to research on Moosonee.  
Firstly, he refers to “squatters” on the edge of Uranium City and he indicates that this was 
perceived as such a problem that the Saskatchewan government passed “anti-squatting” 
regulations.
103
  He explains that the squatter issue was particularly galling as the province had 
hoped to make Uranium City a “model town.”  Secondly, Keeling’s article is one of the few 
references sourced in this literature review which refers to the creation of a development area for 
managing housing and municipal services after rapid growth occurred. 
104
  Moosonee was also 
referred to as a development area, but this term was coined by local people when they formed the 
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first Citizens Committee in Moosonee in the early 1960s.
105
 This topic is addressed in more 
detail in Chapter Eight as part of the description of the evolution of local government in 
Moosonee. 
Uranium City was informally called the “first and only Cold War City in Canada” 
because its mines provided the key ingredient for nuclear weapons, but it is also an example of a 
Cold War resource town.
106
 Although Elliot Lake was also developed for uranium mining and 
was in theory a Cold War town, it had few similarities to Uranium City due to the latter’s much 
smaller size (one-tenth the size of Elliot Lake) and more isolated location.  
Several publications have described the intersection of military sites and Indigenous 
peoples and it is clear that some of this literature represents racist viewpoints. For example, 
Leslie Roberts, writing about the DEW Line in 1955, indicated that much of the north was 
“frozen, deadly wilderness where no white man has ever penetrated.”107  Furthermore, in 
discussing the construction of a landing strip, Roberts noted that once it had been completed, the 
base superintendent could “turn his mind to small worries, such as straw and Eskimos.”108 A 
Canadian government bulletin also described the north as empty except for small numbers of 
“Eskimos and Indians,” and it suggested that the few people living in the north would eventually 
be assimilated.
109
 Other documents referred to northern “Indians” becoming, over time, “normal 
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citizens of Canada,” and suggested that “Eskimos and northern Indians [would] eventually [be] 
brought into the Canadian community.” 110   
Linda Ambrose has referred to this type of writing, common in the 1950s and 1960s, as 
evidence of a “white settler colonialist mentality” in which “white hegemony was the order of 
the day.”111 Additionally, Ambrose provided an example of white hegemony with her analysis of 
a federal government orientation handbook called “This is the Arctic.” 112 She described the 
1958 handbook, designed for southerners heading to the north for business opportunities, as 
“replete with sarcasm, condescending racist remarks and sexist humour,” in particular in its 
descriptions of everyday Inuit life.
113
 Part of the hegemonic regime, noted by Ambrose, was the 
assumption that Indigenous people were only a temporary phenomenon and that they were being 
assimilated.
114
  
Kerry Abel confirms that in northern Ontario during the 1930s and 1940s, images of 
Native people followed a disturbing pattern. She writes that, “when notice was made of Native 
people, it was either negative (as in a report on a measles epidemic or a comment about dire 
poverty) or a romanticized description of a lost history and culture.” 115 The presence of 
Indigenous people tended to be acknowledged, however briefly, when government bureaucrats 
and southern entrepreneurs desired their natural resources. Ambrose records the common 
assumption that natural resources could be removed without consideration of the rights of 
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Indigenous people.  She writes about the existence of an “imperialist mindset, [where] the 
resources and peoples of the North were simply there for the taking.”116 Historians like Mark 
Kuhlberg and John Sandlos have provided specific examples of this mindset in their discussions 
on the exploitation of resources such as timber and wildlife. 
117
 In both cases, Indigenous people 
themselves, although dependent on land and natural resources, were assumed to be less relevant 
in management schemes than the resources theoretically being protected. 
Ken Coates writes that the early Cold War years (the 1950s and 1960s) were a period 
when “scholars of First Nations topics worked in splendid obscurity,” ignored by the public and 
other researchers.
118
 He hypothesizes that more recent interest has resulted from the numerous 
land claims and resource development disputes. Olive Dickason suggests that northern military 
development has also generated more attention for, and research on, Indigenous peoples, 
particularly those living in the far north. She writes that: 
A turning point in [the] official evaluation of the Arctic was reached during and after 
World War II, when its strategic importance in world geopolitics became  glaringly 
evident. The crucial roles of its weather stations and the Distant Early Warning radar line 
to military operations caused authorities to take another look at the land and its people.
119
 
 
 The impact of military development on Indigenous peoples during the Second World War 
is ably summarized by P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish.
120
 These authors note that 
“the Second World War was a watershed in the militarization of the Canadian North,” and that it 
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had a range of impacts on First Nations people, from displacement to disease. 
121
 They also write 
that “thirty native families” were displaced during the construction of the Goose Bay airport in 
1943, and in western Canada the construction of the Alaska Highway and Canol Pipeline meant 
that “workers brought diseases, from measles to VD, which devastated indigenous 
populations.”122 In that regard, R.A.J. Phillips observed that “in those war-time days, the 
Canadian government had little time, inclination, or knowledge to consider the effects of the 
impact of defence construction on the native population.”123 He did acknowledge that certain 
communities, like Fort Chimo, Quebec, were particularly disrupted by the development of the air 
bases that dotted the north. Phillips stated that: 
Fort Chimo probably created the most difficult problem of all because it was the center of 
a relatively populous Eskimo [sic] area ….the [USAF] base became a magnet for those 
who were finding the living on the land already thin… Fort  Chimo became a community 
of great but transitory affluence. When the boom suddenly ended, the Eskimos could 
neither continue in the new life nor go back  to the old. The results were painful.
124
 
 
In the Fort Chimo situation, the USAF located a major air base beside an existing community.   
In other situations, new communities have evolved due to the migration of Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous people to the vicinity of military bases built where no previous communities 
existed.  Lackenbauer and Farish noted that the clustering of Indigenous groups around military 
bases established during the Second World War , and the subsequent disruption of traditional 
subsistence activities, continued into the Cold War.
125
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Anthropologists working in the James Bay and Hudson Bay areas also discussed the 
migration of Indigenous people to certain military bases in the Cold War period.
126
  John 
Honigmann wrote briefly about the Eskimo and Cree of Great Whale Post and noted that in 1955 
this community “became a military base and received a large influx of native people.”127 The 
base he referred to, on the eastern shore of Hudson Bay, was one of the control stations in the 
Mid-Canada Line (MCL). Unfortunately, Honigmann did not provide much analysis of this 
community, but newspaper reports in late 1955 and 1956 indicated the existence of both 
tuberculosis and whooping cough epidemics at Great Whale Post and nearby locations at about 
the same time that the MCL base opened. One reporter noted that whooping cough “spread like 
wildfire through the population of 185 Eskimos (on the Belcher Islands). It was apparently 
caused by a germ carried to the islands by two families which had visited Great Whale River.”128  
There is no research on the potential links between this radar base and disease, however, these 
records are reminiscent of the literature on epidemics and Second World War megaprojects.
129
  
Honigmann also wrote about migration from Attawapiskat to Moosonee for employment 
related to military activity. He noted that, partly due to dropping productivity on trap lines: 
A number of families and individuals have been induced to leave Attawapiskat and 
trapping to work at unskilled jobs on radar installations, air fields, and in the small 
harbour at Moosonee, the supply depot for the trading posts and military installations of 
James Bay. The regular remuneration that comes from such work exerts a strong pull for 
young men who are, however, often in conflict about leaving their homes.
130
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Additionally, the anthropologist Georg Henriksen commented on migration to radar 
bases, but his work focused on the shores of Labrador rather than James Bay.
131
  In his study of 
the Naskapi Cree at Davis Inlet (1966-68), Henriksen indicated that the Davis Inlet Cree knew 
about Hopedale’s Pinetree base but chose not to seek work there, unlike people from nearby 
communities, such as Nain. Henriksen’s work is unusual in recording the decision of some of the 
Naskapi Cree to refrain from migrating to communities that offered wage labour. By 
comparison, as mentioned earlier about Uranium City and military bases from the Second World 
War, migration to resource towns and military bases was a common occurrence for Indigenous 
peoples. 
 Other literature by anthropologists continued to emphasize both migration aspects and 
disruptions caused by contact with military bases.  Jean Trudeau, an anthropologist and Oblate 
missionary, observed both the transition from traditional occupations to radar base labour and the 
reverse process once radar bases at Winisk and Fort Albany closed.
132
  He wrote that, just as 
Indigenous people were adapting to wage labour, some radar bases closed, “forcing the Indians 
to go back to trapping or to migrate elsewhere in search of work. Several young men and young 
couples chose the latter and travelled to Moosonee.”133 Trudeau’s earlier anthropological writing, 
with Elliot Liebow, had focused specifically on Winisk and its adjacent radar base.
134
 Liebow 
                                                                                                                                                             
did not have a radar base until 1961 but Honigmann recognizes that it was a supply centre for “military installations 
of James Bay.” 
 
131
 Georg Henriksen,  Hunters in the Barrens: The Naskapi on the Edge of the White Man's World (St. 
John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University, 1973): 14.  Henrikson did 
not indicate why Davis Inlet Cree differed from residents of other Labrador communities in terms of migration 
strategies. 
 
132
 Jean Trudeau, "The People of Hudson's Bay: The Cree Indians." In Science, History and Hudson's Bay, 
edited by C. S. Beals. Vol. 1, 127-141. (Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1968): 127-141. 
Note: Trudeau identified himself as “John” in his earlier papers. He changed this to “Jean” by 1968. 
 
133
 Ibid, 139. 
 
134
 Elliot Liebow and Jean (John) Trudeau. "A Preliminary Study of Acculturation among the Cree Indians 
of Winisk, Ontario." Arctic 15, (1962): 190-204. 
 36 
and Trudeau studied Winisk in 1958 and they documented interaction between the Cree 
community (pop.150) and the radar base employees (200 white males, including Bell Canada 
technicians and RCAF servicemen).
135
 The two anthropologists noted that the Winisk Cree had 
contact with whites, such as Hudson’s Bay Company employees and missionaries, in the late 
1800s and that this contact was limited compared to the Cold War, when “700 white labourers” 
constructed the radar base.
136
   
 The comments of the two authors are striking in terms of issues ranging from segregated 
lunch rooms and scavenging for food to liaisons between Cree women and radar base personnel. 
With regard to segregated lunch rooms, Liebow and Trudeau wrote that “Indians [sic] brought 
their own lunches and ate them in their respective headquarters shacks. On exceptionally cold 
days those working for Bell went instead to a small, dark furnace room. All whites ate in the 
mess-hall.”137 On the latter issues, the anthropologists wrote, 
The arrival of a trash or garbage truck brought most people running…Out of deference to 
the Indians, the mess-hall personnel tried to keep garbage separate  from the useable left-
overs,…and set the cans down rather than dump them over  the side. The women, with 
sleeves rolled up, plunged their arms into the cans and began filling their boxes with 
food. ...men who worked at the Base frequently stopped off at the dump to load up with 
building materials or other salvage before making the return trip home. Girls and women 
(forbidden on the Base proper) who had come to the dump to make surreptitious contact 
with whites or to arrange for subsequent assignations were the last to leave….[On 
weekends] white men  came over from the Base either singly or in small groups to 
rendezvous with girls  from the village.
138
 
 
This description of food scavenging shows Third World conditions in Ontario at a time when 
many families were experiencing post-war boom conditions. Despite the detail provided, the 
authors do not indicate if pregnancies or venereal disease resulted from liaisons nor do they state 
if the men involved were Canadian military staff or civilians (e.g. radar technicians). This could 
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have shed some light on military policies and practices concerning interaction with local people.  
In their concluding remarks Liebow and Trudeau wrote that the Cree had “the constant 
awareness that only 5 miles away is an advanced entrenchment of white civilization, a large, all-
male community that has at its command an awesome array of equipment and techniques and 
seemingly inexhaustible resources.”139  
 As a follow-up to their initial Winisk research, Norman Chance and Jean Trudeau 
compared the personal experiences of Inuit people living near a DEW line radar site in Alaska 
with that of the Cree living beside the Winisk Mid-Canada site.  Their study suggested that “the 
number of marriages between Indians (in Winisk) dropped sharply since the young women 
nourished the hope of marrying white men.”140 These authors concluded that the Alaskan 
experience was less intrusive than the northern Ontario (Winisk) case, and they suggested two 
key factors for this difference. First, American government policy enabled the Inuit to restrict 
access of non-Natives to their communities, and secondly, the Inuit were considered as essential 
employees by DEW Line managers. 
141
 P. Whitney Lackenbauer writes that the Canadian 
military did not consider the Cree of James Bay (including Winisk) as essential and in fact 
looked upon them with disdain during the post Second World War period. His discussion of the 
Canadian Rangers (a civilian defence group) includes a racist quotation from a Canadian major-
general who disparaged the James Bay Cree. 
142
 
 Federal defence documents give some indication of the evolution of bilateral agreements 
on military interaction with Indigenous people.  The initial Pinetree Line bilateral agreement 
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made no reference to Indigenous peoples.
143
 However, the 1955 agreement regarding the DEW 
line required the United States to deal with the Canadian government directly on any issues 
related to “Eskimos.” The issue of contact between Inuit and non-Inuit people is specifically 
addressed by wording such as “All contact with Eskimos, other than those whose employment on 
any aspect of the project is approved, is to be avoided except in cases of emergency.”144 Despite 
the caution related to DEW bases, it appears, from the preceding review of anthropologists’ 
reports, that the federal government had little interest in the welfare of Indigenous people living 
near either Mid-Canada Line or Pinetree Line radar bases. This lack of interest increased the 
potential for impacts on Indigenous people who either lived in nearby communities or who 
migrated to radar bases seeking waged labour.   
 
Theory on Development of Small Towns 
Planners and geographers often group the study of impacts according to the stages of 
development observed in resource communities. Two formative authors, Robert Bone and Rex 
Lucas, have presented different templates for development stages. 
145
 Bone describes five stages 
of resource town development as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
146
  Bone’s development steps 
demonstrate what he refers to as the “Classic boom and bust” cycle of resource development, 
namely rapid growth followed by collapse.
147
 The Classic model is extreme because it 
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presupposes that resource communities are created on vacant or uninhabited sites and that after a 
mine closure “all buildings and housing are demolished.”148   
Figure 2.1: Resource Town Cycle 
 
 
While the literature suggests that only a minority of resource communities become ‘ghost 
towns,’ Bone does provide a good example of one such community.  Pine Point, Northwest 
Territories, was built by Cominco Mine in 1962, reached its peak population of 2,000 in 1976 
and then was completely demolished in 1991.149 This closure was particularly unexpected 
because planners anticipated, in 1980, that the town was going to continue to grow and were 
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planning for increased housing, a new school, and a medical clinic for residents.150 Bone also 
uses Schefferville, Quebec and Uranium City, Saskatchewan as examples of resource towns that 
lost most of their population base after mine closures.
151
 
Rex Lucas’s development stages, outlined in his Minetown, Milltown, Railtown, 
collectively provide a template which is closer than Bone’s model to the reality experienced by 
most resource communities.  Lucas’s four stages are shown in Figure 2.2 below.152 The 
construction, recruitment and maturity stages are self-explanatory, but the transition stage needs 
some explanation.  This stage deals with a wide range of issues from working conditions (e.g. 
shift work) to interpersonal communications and even recreation programs. It is also worth 
noting that Lucas’s text is one of the few sources which documents day to day life, particularly 
of males, in resource towns.
153
  
 Figure 2.2 Resource Town Development Stages 
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 Surprisingly, neither Bone nor Lucas included in their development templates the most 
common stage for many resource towns.  It is the “Adaptation Stage,” during which the resource 
industry closes and the community adapts to this dramatic change.154  Bone shows the complete 
obliteration of the resource community as his final stage and Lucas suggests that the typical 
resource community remains in place and matures as a long term resource town.   
 More commonly in many resource communities, municipal infrastructure and private 
housing remain in place even if the mine or mill is permanently shut down. Accordingly, John 
Bradbury and Isabelle St. Martin suggest that the closure of resource operations requires the 
addition of two more stages to the Lucas model. 
155
 These stages, which the authors examined in 
a case study of Schefferville, Quebec, are the “winding down” phase and the “complete 
abandonment of a townsite.” Bradbury and St. Martin focused their work on the “winding down” 
stage and they suggested that this stage held a high degree of uncertainty for employees, 
especially as their jobs changed from permanent to seasonal to no jobs at all.  The authors also 
described the withdrawal of company (Iron Ore Company of Canada) support for municipal 
budgets and infrastructure and the loss of social and recreational opportunities for lingering 
residents as former employees and their families left Schefferville. Bradbury and St. Martin note 
that “the term ‘community development’ infers development in a positive direction, [so] we have 
chosen the term ‘winding down’ to denote the disintegration of community life for residents.” 156 
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  Winding down occurred in Faro, Yukon, a community described by Bone in his resource 
development text. 157  Faro was built in 1969 by the Cyprus Anvil Mine Company. Its population 
peaked in 1981 at 1600 and it then endured several cycles of partial mine closures before final 
closure occurred in 1998.  The community’s housing and infrastructure still exist and residents 
hope to survive by creating a tourist haven.158 This type of situation, in which the community 
remains in place after the resource industry closes, has been observed in numerous northern 
Ontario towns such as Cobalt, Elliot Lake, Manitouwadge, West Nipissing, White River, Wawa, 
and Ignace. 159 
 The development stages work of Bone and Lucas has encouraged other researchers to 
examine community evolution in resource towns. For example, Alison Gill examined what Lucas 
referred to as the ‘Transition’ stage in her study of Tumbler Ridge, a coal mining town in 
northern British Columbia.160 Gill’s research is particularly useful as she compared what was 
planned to what actually occurred.  She also examined a specific piece of legislation, called the 
Instant Towns Act, which was passed by the British Columbia government in 1965. Gill’s work 
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is useful as it describes the construction of virtually “instant” resource towns which can be 
compared to the building of instant radar bases communities. Other researchers, such as John 
Parkins, Richard Stedmen and Thomas Beckley, have written about Lucas’s transition stage in 
their study of community well-being in forestry towns. 161 
Additionally, some researchers have focused on the Adaptation stage that was missing 
from the Bone and Lucas models.  That is, they have examined the impacts of industrial plant 
closures and layoffs on northern municipalities which still exist after a resource company 
disappears.  The community of Elliot Lake has been a focal point, and a model, for this type of 
research. Elliot Lake was built between 1955 and 1959 to serve as a residential community for 
uranium miners employed by Denison and Rio Algom Mines. The community’s population grew 
to 25,000 people within only a few years, but mining operations went through several boom and 
bust cycles until the last of the mine employees was laid off in 1996.162 The Elliot Lake Tracking 
and Adjustment Study (ELTAS) was an extensive review of the impacts of mining layoffs that 
took place over a ten year period starting in 1990. 163   
One of the studies in the Elliot Lake project, “Life after Layoff: Women in a Remote 
Single-Industry Community,” adds a gender studies approach to research on mining employees 
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and the lives of women in a resource town.164  Monica Neitzert, Anne-Marie Mawhiney, and 
Elaine Porter emphasized in the conclusion to this study that resource layoffs affect more than 
just the individual workers and they recommended that adjustment policies take into account 
entire family units in order to be effective.165 Research on Elliot Lake informs land use planning 
aspects of this project because it demonstrates how structural change in a community has wide-
ranging personal impacts. 
Within the last fifteen years, two major studies have examined downsizing in small 
northern towns both in Ontario and across Canada. The Intergovernmental Committee for Urban 
and Regional Research (ICURR) published an extensive report, in 2005, on resource 
communities.  It examined plant closures in small, remote communities and it characterized the 
issues facing economically disadvantaged municipalities by providing sixteen case studies.  The 
report’s authors concluded that “rural communities, especially remote, rural communities — feel 
the impacts [of closures] most severely.”166  Some of the impacts described were job loss, 
reductions in local services, and a “sense of helplessness and a loss of hope in the community’s 
future.”167 The second major research project was a report entitled, Small, Rural and Remote 
Communities: The Anatomy of Risk, which lists critical indicators of “Communities at Risk.” 168 
Some examples of these indicators are: small population size, physical isolation from other 
communities, high production and servicing costs, and lack of economic diversification.169  This 
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report is significant because, unlike other urban planning studies, it focuses on small 
communities that have little ability to deal with impacts.  
 While most studies focus on resource communities such as mining or forestry towns, I 
argue that theories on development stages also have direct application to military base 
communities. The development stages which occurred in Moosonee are described in subsequent 
chapters and compared to the Bone and Lucas development models in Chapter Ten. The tenth 
chapter concludes with a proposed development model for communities, like Moosonee, that 
were affected by military development. 
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Map 2.1: CADIN/Pinetree Line Radar Sites (Source: Nicks, Don, Bradley, John and Charland, 
Chris. "Online Air Defence Radar Museum: Air Defence Radar Stations." 
http://www.radomes.org/museum (accessed April/17, 2011).  
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Chapter Three: Methods 
 
Julie Thompson Klein writes that an interdisciplinary approach combines both theories 
and methods from two or more disciplines.170 The key methods that were utilized in this study 
were the review of archival materials, a history method, visualization or “visual thinking,” a land 
use planning method, and interviews combined with photo elicitation, a sociology method. This 
chapter describes these methods and then discusses how the research was also guided by 
Indigenous research principles. As one of the principles of Indigenous research is to situate 
researchers in their work, I also describe how I situate myself in this research. 
Review of Archival Materials 
Archival research involved the search for and reviews of files at five sites:  Library and 
Archives Canada (LAC), Archives of Ontario (AO), the Directorate of History and Heritage 
(DHH), the Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence in North Bay (CFMAD), and 
Discovery North -- the North Bay Museum. My initial assumption had been that LAC would be 
the most productive source because Moosonee’s radar base was a federal defence project. 
However, there were only twelve files at LAC that appeared to be useful for my research on 
Moosonee.  171   
The primary source for Moosonee files became the Archives of Ontario (AO), which had 
almost 400 files germane to Moosonee. I reviewed the list of files online prior to visiting the AO 
and it was reduced initially by pulling titles within this study’s time frame (i.e. 1955-1975). To 
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ensure that applicable documents were not missed, the time frame was considered flexible and 
some files were added from before 1955 and up to 1977.  For example, files from 1976 and 
1977, referred to the process of transforming the radar base after its closure in 1975. Files from 
the AO had three levels of access: 100 year Freedom of Information (FOI) files which required 
formal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 172 requests, other FOI files which were 
open after the initial 20 year time period, 173 and files with no restrictions.  Four FOI requests 
were filed for 22 titles labelled as 100 year files and a further 16 titles labelled as 20 year FOI 
files were obtained.  The staff of the AO was extremely helpful in the retrieval process and most 
of the 22 FOI titles were obtained in less than a month.  In total, 56 titles, representing 71 files, 
were reviewed at the AO. 174 The Ontario files included some correspondence between the 
federal government and the province concerning the Moosonee radar base, and this helped bridge 
the gap created by the lack of material at LAC.   
The Canadian Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence (CFMAD) had 16 files on 
Moosonee which were primarily the Annual Historical Reports (AHRs) of Moosonee Base 
Commanders for the period from 1961 to 1975. CFMAD staff also provided me with full access 
to documents on government agreements related to the Continental Air Defence Integration 
North (CADIN)/Pinetree line.  These files were invaluable in understanding how Moosonee was 
awarded a military base some years after most of the Pinetree radar sites were in place.175  The 
Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) is a little recognized federal department that provided 
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immediate and thorough assistance throughout my research work. DHH had only a few files on 
Moosonee but these included the full AHRs so that some pages missing from the CFMAD files 
could be obtained. In addition, DHH had a collection of aerial photos of the Moosonee base, both 
in its early stages of construction and at its completion. The last archival agency that was visited 
was Discovery North--the North Bay Museum, which now holds some of the Ontario Northland 
Railway (ONR) files. Staff from this Museum reviewed their electronic database with me and 
then went beyond that resource to recommend some files that had been initially catalogued as 
“Moose Factory Island.”  These files yielded some of the earliest correspondence between the 
ONR and the Canadian military on the potential for a Moosonee radar base.
176
   
Visualization   
Visual thinking or visualization is a land use planning and geography technique that was 
used to examine landscape and structural change in Moosonee. Andrea Frank, in her discussion 
of graphic communication, noted that “much of the data that planners use is spatial …and Visual 
Thinking or visualization” is helpful in interpreting these data. 177   Visualization, or more simply 
put “the review of air photos and maps,” was a significant aid to understanding both structural 
and human changes which occurred in Moosonee.   
In addition, some of the observations of anthropologists, missionaries, and journalists 
were sketched onto archival aerial photos and maps of Moosonee. These visual representations 
of narratives encouraged connections between observations recorded in everything from news 
clips and popular periodicals to scholarly journals and texts. For example, a description of a 
walking tour of Moosonee in 1951 by Soeur Paul-Émile and the description of the community in 
                                                 
176
 In summary, the assistance received from archivists at most locations was extremely helpful and ensured 
that I was able to locate the archival data that I needed for my research. 
177
 Andrea Frank, “Graphic Communication” in The Planner’s Use of Information, ed. Hemalata Dandekar 
(Chicago: Planners Press, 2003), 300. 
 50 
1955 by Don Delaplante, a Globe and Mail reporter, have been compared to aerial photos in 
order to decipher the settlement and infrastructure changes described by these writers.178    Soeur 
Paul-Émile wrote about Moosonee as a sparsely developed, tidy community. Four years later 
Don Delaplante described part of Moosonee’s downtown as a huge construction camp.  A decade 
later, anthropologist R.G. Bucksar called the southern section of town a “Squatter’s village.” 179  
Mapping the narratives of Paul-Émile, Delaplante and Bucksar was critical in terms of 
understanding how development activity resulted in migration and created serious servicing 
issues (e.g. water) in the town of Moosonee. The combination of narratives, aerial photos and 
maps was also merged with observations collected from interviews.  A final aspect of 
visualization was the production of models showing the development stages of resource towns.  
Specifically, two models were developed based on the works of Robert Bone and Rex Lucas.
180
  
At a later stage in the research process, a conceptual model of Moosonee’s development was also 
prepared and this will be discussed in Chapter Ten. 
Interviews  
To complement and add depth to the archival work and visual mapping, interviews were 
conducted with people who either lived or worked in Moosonee during the Cold War.  The 
concept of using interviews to assess the impacts of military   development on communities was 
inspired by Steven High’s work on St. John’s, Newfoundland, during the Second World War.181 
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High’s research included 50 in-depth interviews with individuals who lived in St. John’s during 
its ‘friendly occupation’ by American and Canadian military personnel.182   
Prior to any interviews, an ethics application was submitted to the Laurentian University 
Ethics Committee.  The proposal to this committee was that a small group of individuals would 
be interviewed to develop an understanding of life in Cold War Moosonee. Ethics approval was 
obtained on 23 September 2012.    Interviewees were recruited using a “snowball” or “referral” 
method: a person being interviewed would be requested to suggest names of other people who 
might be available and willing to talk about Cold War Moosonee.183 Interviews included a 
limited number of open-ended questions, which included discussing visual documents (e.g. air 
photos) of Moosonee during the Cold War. The use of open-ended questions in interviews is 
documented in Creswell’s Research Design where he notes that an advantage of interviews is the 
ability of individuals to add to historical information. 184 The questions that were used and my 
introductory information for interviewees are included in Appendix Two. All participants were 
asked to read through the background information on this study prior to any discussion. This was 
critical in order to ensure that the interviews were based on informed consent.
185
 As part of this 
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process, interviewees were advised that they had the right to decline to participate and that even 
if they initially agreed to participate, they could stop the interview at any time.  
Photos were also used as part of the interview process. This approach is ably discussed by 
Douglas Harper, who defines “photo elicitation” as “the simple idea of inserting a photograph 
into a research interview.”186 He described his use of historical photos and aerial photographs in a 
study of farmers and agricultural change.  Harper wrote that this use of photos helped interview 
participants recall the past and focus better on answering the questions being asked.  He also 
noted that the use of photos motivated interviewees to explain to him how his understanding of 
an issue was incomplete, and that “previously taciturn farmers [suddenly] had a great deal to 
say.”187 In concluding his discussion on photo elicitation Harper stated, “when two or more 
people discuss the meaning of photographs they try to figure out something together. That is, I 
believe, an ideal model for research.”188 
Photo elicitation has been a helpful addition to this research on Moosonee.  Archival 
searches yielded aerial and ground photos of the community of Moosonee and the adjacent radar 
base, and these were presented to interviewees.  These photos assisted interview participants 
with recalling the structure of the town during the Cold War, and encouraged them to talk about 
everyday life situations.189  Early on in my interviews, I expanded the concept of photo elicitation 
to include sharing maps, photos, and some documents with my interviewees. Instead of simply 
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bringing items to an interview, I left participants with copies of materials so that they could keep 
these items as memories of Moosonee.   In turn, people I interviewed shared photos and news 
articles with me.   
The research conducted by Emily Faries and Sheila Coté-Meek inspired and assisted me 
in setting up my interviews. Like my research, Faries’ work on education and Kashetchewan 
involved open-ended questions. As she said, “The interviews were open-ended and flexible but 
the researcher had a list of questions which was used as a guide during the interviews.” 190 Faries 
interviewed 10 people who were nominated from the community to represent ten community 
groups (e.g. Band Council, high school students, younger and older elders).   However, although 
the community itself suggested interviewees, Faries did not identify who the individuals were in 
her dissertation, thus preserving confidentiality as much as possible. Coté-Meek’s doctoral 
research on colonialism and Aboriginal students involved 15 interviews including 8 Aboriginal 
students, 5 Aboriginal professors and two Elders.191 She provided some background on 
interviewees in order to set the context for comments and results, but her material was broad 
enough to protect the privacy of individuals. As with my research, Coté-Meek began her research 
with snowball sampling but she also utilized “Invitation to Participate” posters to enlarge her 
interview group. On the interviews specifically, Cote-Meek states that: 
The face-to-face or personal approach is considered the most appropriate and respectful 
way to engage in conversations in many Aboriginal communities. Further, the notion of 
utilizing a conversational interview that was semi-structured offered the opportunity to 
engage in and encourage dialogue. 192 
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Taima Moeke-Pickering et al. echo this approach in the paper “Keeping Our Fire Alive.” 
They state that, with Indigenous research, “Conversational methods are often the way of 
gathering information rather than ‘interviews.’” 193 Although half my interviewees were 
Indigenous people, I found that semi-informal, conversational interviews were the best approach 
for all participants.  This style also suited my own natural interview style. I believe that this 
informal approach was the best approach with interviewees who had taken the time to tell me 
about Moosonee, and in effect guide me on my way. They deserved to be treated as full 
participants in the process rather than feeling as though they were at a job interview or a 
similarly formal event.  
Interview Results 
In total, 28 hours of interviews were conducted with 15 persons.  Interviews took place 
between September 2012 and December 2014. Most interviews lasted about one hour although a 
few interviews took place over several dates and locations and represented several hours of 
conversation about Moosonee.  Fewer than seven hours of these interviews were digitally 
recorded. This shows the preference of most people to converse informally and to avoid feeling 
constrained by knowing that recording was occurring. In all cases where interviews were taped 
the interviewees were provided with detailed typed notes so that they could edit, correct, or add 
to the interviews.  In most cases where interviews were not taped, the interviewees were still 
provided with typed notes for their comments, additions and corrections.194  
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In order to protect privacy and confidentiality the description of interviewees is 
aggregated or grouped. Fifteen people were interviewed either in Moosonee or in other parts of 
Ontario. Seven women and eight men were interviewed, sometimes alone and other times as 
couples, depending on the preference of the people being interviewed. Interviewees included 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.  People were not asked to self-identify as Cree, mixed 
heritage, or non-Indigenous, however the material that people talked about indicated that they 
were from all three backgrounds.  The age of interviewees ranged from about 60 to 90 and they 
either lived or still live in all three areas of Moosonee (the townsite, village and radar base).  
Most interviewees were civilians as opposed to military personnel. As indicated above, it is 
important to protect the confidentiality of all the individuals who were interviewed. For this 
reason more details about interviewees, such as birth places or occupations, have not been 
provided in this thesis.  
Situating Myself in the Research 
 Several authors have recommended that researchers describe or identify themselves in 
order to provide some background for their work.  Kathy Absolon and Cam Willett write that 
“Location of self in writing and research is integral to issues of accountability. “ 195 Although 
Absolon and Willett were primarily directing their message towards Aboriginal researchers, 
Renee Pualani Louis writes that “positioning the researcher in the research” is important even 
when “research [is] done within an Indigenous context using Western methodologies.” 196 
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Finally, as Sheila Coté-Meek stated, “It is important that I introduce and identify myself so that 
people may know and understand the context of which I come.” 197 
 I am a non-Indigenous Irish-Canadian woman.  My philosophy of life, heading into this 
research, was shaped by my Irish heritage, by my experience of the Cold War, and by a lifelong 
fascination with small towns. Although my parents were born in Canada, my understanding of 
my heritage was essentially shaped by the Irish grandparents who shared our family home for 
more than a decade. As an example, while my mother struggled to keep up with the workload of 
six children, my Irish grandmother would help out by telling me Irish tales (and fables) as we 
walked for miles to find the best fishing sites near town.  Through these walks I learned that my 
grandmother had been a maid for English families, but I did not realize until some years later that 
my Irish grandfather had been a batman to a British officer during the Boer War. 198  At some 
conferences over the past few years, I have heard speakers refer to themselves as “the settler 
class” and when I asked them about this they said that was the proper way to refer to yourself if 
you were a non-Indigenous researcher. I find it somewhat difficult to call myself a ‘settler’ when 
my grandparents were the servants of the settler class, however, I fully understand that the 
presence of all of us (the Europeans) in Canada was part of the process of colonialism. 
My interest in the Cold War stems from the experience of living through most of that 
time period and of experiencing Cold War events.  Some events were experienced via television, 
as in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when students, myself included, were sent home to listen to 
American President Kennedy and to wait for nuclear war.  Other Cold War events were 
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experienced at school as we listened to the air raid siren and practised hiding under our school 
desks.  
 I have also had an interest in the Second World War since childhood because my father 
served in the Canadian Army Occupation Force (CAOF) in northwest Europe in 1945. Ray 
Heffernan would occasionally tell us about this experience, which occurred before most of his 
children were born. I have had only limited experience visiting an active military base, having 
worked as a babysitter for my brother, Gerry, when he served on the Picton Army Base in the 
early 1960s. At one point during this stint, most of my family celebrated Christmas on this base 
in my brother’s Private Married Quarters (hereafter referred to as PMQs throughout this 
dissertation).199 
  I have been interested in small towns ever since I hitchhiked with two friends through 
much of northern Ontario in the early 1970s. In particular I will never forget driving out of the 
boreal forest and looking down at the clear cut area known as Manitouwadge.  Attending a Geco 
Mine dance and meeting the friendly residents of this town encouraged me to apply for my first 
job ‘up north’ after finishing my Master’s degree.  Working and living in the small community 
of Ignace (about the same size as Moosonee) made me understand that most of the textbook 
learning I had completed did not prepare me for the trials of living so far north in an isolated 
town.200 Trying to figure out how small towns grew and survived continued to be a focal point, 
especially when I began to travel throughout Parry Sound District after moving south to North 
Bay. 
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My interest in Moosonee began when I was transferred to Sudbury in 1993 after the 
North Bay office of Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH) closed. I was a 
Municipal Advisor (or “Field Advisor” as we were called for some years) for MMAH and after 
the move to North Bay I was told that my clients were now Moosonee, the Espanola area and 
Manitoulin Island.  For most municipalities I was called the Municipal Advisor but for 
Moosonee -- because of its legislation (i.e. The Moosonee Development Area Board Act) -- I was 
also its supervisor. This meant that I was responsible for reviewing and approving all 
expenditures, bylaws and minutes. After only one visit to Moosonee I asked my manager why 
we were supervising Moosonee when the town seemed as capable as any other community.  She 
agreed and we started a very lengthy process to withdraw supervision from the area.  
 In the twelve years that I worked with the town I often heard people refer to “the base.”  
I understood from this that Moosonee had once had a military base but I had little time to think 
about its origin. Instead I had to focus most of my energy on the grant and loan applications that 
were needed to replace the base and town water and sewer plants.  Eventually I determined, 
incorrectly, that Moosonee had been a DEW line site. It was not until I started doing research for 
this dissertation that I realized Moosonee was part of a much lesser known line called “the 
Pinetree.” I also did not know the significance of the bridge across Store Creek to long term 
residents of Moosonee, nor did I understand that the numerous water and sewer pipe breaks in 
the base area of the community were likely due to the fact that these pipes were the oldest ones 
in town, having been constructed for the radar base in 1960.  These issues will be further 
discussed in Chapter Seven.  
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Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s writing has been informative and, to use her words, “humbling,” 
and it has caused me to rethink my understanding of Moosonee and my own research. 201 In 
particular Smith’s discussions of colonialism and academic research have helped me better 
understand the work of non-Indigenous researchers who preceded me in studying communities 
like Moosonee.   I now question whether some of the earlier literature, particularly by 
anthropologists, approaches accurate descriptions of places like Moosonee and Winisk. 202 I also 
thought of Tuhiwai Smith’s work when I interviewed participants. In almost every interview I 
was humbled by the life events that people described to me and I did as much as possible to put 
into practice Smith’s recommendations about showing respect for participants and sharing results 
with them.  
 I also followed, to a certain extent, Smith’s recommendation to involve the community 
in the research. This required finding a balance between involving the community while 
respecting Laurentian University’s Ethics protocols that required me to maintain confidentiality 
of interviewees.  Therefore, I could not tell Moosonee’s Town Council whom I had interviewed 
and I could certainly not share any results that might indicate with whom I had spoken.  
Admittedly, in a small town like Moosonee, it is likely that Council and others could be aware of 
whom I had spoken with, but they still would not be able to determine what was said in the 
interviews.  The key point was that I felt it was a courtesy to review what I was doing with the 
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Town Council before I did the interviews so that it would not see me walking around town and 
not know what I was doing. To a certain extent I was still guided by the community as I listened 
carefully to interviewees and took their advice on people to contact for further interviews and on 
the material and issues of which I needed to be aware.  Obtaining direction from the community 
is one of the research protocols Smith outlined. 
203
 Because of ethics protocols, I am not able to 
include the names of the interviewees in my Acknowledgements section, and therefore cannot 
formally recognize how valuable they have been to me and to my research. 
  I intend to share my research results with the Town of Moosonee and its residents with 
the intention that some parts of this work might assist them in both understanding their Cold War 
past and in shaping the community’s future.  In fact, the people I interviewed already understand 
Moosonee’s Cold War era much better than me but I hope that combining their insights with 
long hidden archival documents will help the entire community to see more dimensions of that 
past.  
Terminology  
 While conducting my research and writing this dissertation I often struggled with both 
military and Indigenous terminology. This section is a brief summary of how I handled both 
areas of knowledge and language. 
 Conducting the research for this dissertation was often frustrating because of the need for 
a “Canadian Primer on Cold War Military Language.”  I could not locate such a resource, but 
instead searched in a variety of documents to help interpret some of the acronyms used in 
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archival memoranda and reports produced by the RCAF. Terms are discussed and footnoted 
throughout the dissertation as appropriate. 
Sheila Coté-Meek’s discussion of the use of words like “Indigenous, Aboriginal and 
Mixed Heritage” has helped me to determine the words to use in my own writing.  Coté-Meek 
stated in her PhD dissertation that: 
I have chosen to use Aboriginal peoples as an inclusive term to describe First Peoples of 
Canada including First Nations, Métis, and Inuit regardless of ‘status’ as defined by the 
Indian Act. This is not done to homogenize Aboriginal peoples; rather I utilize one term 
to recognize the shared impact that colonization has and continues to have. … I also use 
the term Indigenous which has become a widely accepted term to refer to First Nations 
Peoples who occupy a country. 204 
Coté-Meek also uses the term ‘mixed heritage’ 205  in her thesis and I have adopted “mixed 
heritage” and ‘Indigenous’ for my writing.  I also use terms such as “Indian” where that term is 
used in quotations from archival literature.  As Coté-Meek indicates “despite the fact that some 
terms are considered dated I use them because they are used in the literature that I draw from.” 206  
The use of Indigenous terms in this dissertation is also informed by P. Whitney 
Lackenbauer and John Long.  Lackenbauer writes: “Any research dealing with Aboriginal affairs 
must grapple with the contentious issue of language. As a general rule, [I adopt] language 
consistent with the contemporary documents, with prevailing bureaucratic and legal discourses, 
and with Aboriginal self-identification in correspondence and public statements at any given 
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time.”  207 More specifically, in relation to the James Bay area, Long has described his use of the 
word “Cree.”  He explains that “I use the term ‘Cree’ knowing that the self-designation Ininiw 
(Moose Cree, Illiliw) … and (O)mushkego are also in use today.” 208 To a certain extent, Long 
suggests that the word Cree is reasonable because there are different opinions on the use of 
Eastern Cree (Quebec) and Western Cree (Ontario) dialects in regard to more current terms (e.g. 
Eeyou versus Ininiw).
209
  Finally, to emphasize the importance of local input, I depended on the 
interviewees for guidance and they seemed comfortable with the use of “Cree” and did not 
suggest that I use other terms.
210
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Chapter Four: Early Moosonee: Railway Town, Meeting Place or Both? 
 Moosonee’s evolution as a community was directed and influenced by the very event that 
created its first major development activity—the construction of the Temiskaming and Northern 
Ontario (T&NO) Railway. The railway ensured that the community acted as a shipping centre 
during the early stages of the Cold War and it was one of the reasons that Moosonee became a 
radar base in 1961. This chapter discusses Moosonee’s early development as a fur trading post 
and railway town and then reviews its history during the early Cold War years before the 
Pinetree radar base was constructed.  It is important to understand and visualize Moosonee prior 
to 1961 in order to understand the impacts of its radar base. Otherwise there is no starting point 
from which to measure change in both personal experience and physical environments.  
Moosonee Before the Cold War 
In 1903, a small company known as Revillon Frères constructed its first store on the 
shoreline of the Moose River at what would eventually become the settlement of Moosonee.
211
  
Moosonee had a population of 99 people, in 23 households, by 1921. Eight of the 23 households 
showed a connection to Revillon Frères, either as management staff or as “servants,” that is, as 
employees.
212
 Revillon Frères was eventually taken over by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) 
in 1936 and thus became the first HBC store in Moosonee, a facility that still dominates its main 
street under its current name The Northern Store.
213
 Some interviewees indicated that 
Moosonee’s residents with mixed ancestry could trace their heritage back to the fur trading days. 
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The English, French, Scottish, and even Norwegian employees of the Revillon Frères and 
Hudson Bay Company operations often married local Cree people in both Moosonee and Moose 
Factory. 
214
 What this meant for the time period for this study (1955-1975), is that fifty years 
after Revillon Frères set up shop in Moosonee, local Indigenous and non-Indigenous people were 
already quite accustomed to socializing and doing commerce with migrants to the community. 
The people who arrived to live and work on the RCAF base were a different kind of migrant – 
military rather than economic – but the situation for Cree, mixed ancestry, and white residents 
was something they had experienced before. Local people were not averse to newcomers. As will 
be discussed in Chapter Six, Moosonee’s residents “hoped the RCAF would not bring its own 
workers.” 215 Moosonee’s residents looked forward to the employment opportunities that 
newcomers and development provided. The following discussion on the construction of the 
railway to Moosonee demonstrates how employment opportunities also drew northern Cree to 
the town from communities along James Bay. 
In 1932, the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario (T&NO) Railway completed its most 
northerly route which connected the town of Cochrane to Moosonee.
216
  The T&NO boasted that 
“to the Sub-Arctic Circle, Ontario’s Northern frontier has been pushed back one hundred and 
eighty-five miles.”217  Prior to the railway it appears that Moosonee was known only as the 
“Revillon or French side” of the river and that although the province picked the name “Moose 
Harbour” during the construction of the railway, the site never became a major harbour due to 
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the shallow nature of the Moose River.
218
  Once construction was complete, the T&NO surveyed 
building lots at Moosonee and, although it attempted to auction these off on 10 June 1932, there 
were no interested buyers.
219
 The combined population of both Moosonee and Moose Factory at 
that time was only 475 people.
220
  
Archival records show that in 1932 the T&NO built a bridge across Store Creek.
221
 It 
appears that the bridge was constructed to provide access to the James Bay Inn, a railway facility 
that burned down in April 1939.
222
 Over time, Store Creek Bridge became the link between the 
area south of Store Creek, known as the “Village” or “Indian Village,” and the more northerly 
area that was the main townsite of Moosonee. The distinction between these two areas will be 
discussed throughout this dissertation.
223
 
Sister Paul-Émile, a Grey Nun who wrote about the James Bay area, indicated that the 
prospect of railway jobs encouraged Indigenous people to migrate to the Moosonee area as early 
as 1929. She wrote that Aboriginal people from Cree villages further north on James Bay were 
"attirés par le travail sur la ligne" [the railway].
224
 Paul-Émile also recorded the words of an 
Oblate priest, who blamed the railway for instilling “false hopes” in the James Bay Cree.  She 
wrote that Père Saindon “voyait avec angoisse les Indiens d'Albany, d'Attawapiskat, et de Winisk 
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descendre vers l'utopique Moosonee. Pendant deux ans et même trois, ils restent là, attendant la 
fortune facile qui doit venir avec les 'chars'. Déception. ” 225 Although there was no exclamation 
point on the word “Déception,” the depressing tone of the priest’s comments are evident in this 
quotation.  Father Saindon’s use of the word ‘chars’ refers to railway cars, or more generally, the 
construction of the new railway to Moosonee.  
Sister Paul-Émile also wrote that the construction of the railway inspired the Oblates to 
establish a mission at Moosonee. She recorded that on 12 June 1932, only two days after the 
T&N.O.’s public auction of building lots, Father Saindon negotiated the purchase of lots, for 
mission buildings, along Moosonee’s main street, between the train station and the waterfront.226  
The Catholic mission started in 1932 and by 1948 the community had a Catholic cathedral, and a 
30 bed hospital on Moosonee’s main street. This work corresponded with the construction on 
Moose Factory Island of a 300 bed federal sanatorium for tuberculosis patients. 
227
   
Early Cold War Years in Moosonee 
Moosonee experienced Cold War change in two phases: first, as a shipping centre for 
supplies to the Mid-Canada radar bases along the James Bay and Hudson Bay coastlines during 
the mid-1950s and second as the site of a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) radar base 
from1961 to 1975.  Several articles about the Mid-Canada Line (MCL) referred to Moosonee as 
a construction and shipping centre for MCL sites. Flying Officer S. G. French described the 
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importance of establishing shipping routes for the MCL’s construction materials. He noted that 
"the first step in the overall transportation planning…was to establish marshalling areas at ends-
of-steel or on major roads running north." 
228
 In Ontario, this meant Moosonee as the farthest 
north "end-of-steel." French then described how survey crews “slowly worked their way west 
through the James Bay region to Moosonee where a new main base of operations was set up 
under canvas. To expedite the operation, fuel caches had been established at a number of points 
by tractor train the preceding winter (1955)."
229
  French re-iterates the role of Moosonee as an 
operations base by noting that, when work was completed farther north, helicopters returned to 
Moosonee.
230
 He also identifies that Moosonee was an aircraft maintenance centre by noting that 
when a survey helicopter broke down in Winisk "a ground crew was rushed from Moosonee in 
an Otter."
231
 This discussion is important as it verifies that Moosonee was part of Cold War 
activities long before it became a formal RCAF base, although French did not indicate the 
specific location of the “base of operations.” In addition to helicopter activity, French described 
winter tractor train operations. He wrote that "during the winter of 1955-56 about 11,000 tons of 
materials were moved ...by tractor train. At their peak, these trains running out of Gillam, 
Manitoba and Moosonee, Ontario used over 400 sleds and over 40 heavy tractors."
232
  
Other authors have confirmed the intensity of the MCL’s shipping efforts during this 
period. Margaret Carroll’s summary of defence operations in northern Ontario noted that “the 
movement of 9,000 tons [of material for the MCL’s bases] out of Moosonee for distances of 300 
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to 700 miles constituted a record in Canadian effort of this sort.”233  Carroll also wrote that 
“small 20-ton ships … [from] Moosonee” were used to off load ocean steamers transporting 
materials to the Fort Severn, Winisk and Great Whale River radar bases.
234
 Robert Surtees 
reported that the Mid-Canada Line’s construction also caused a surge in employee hours at the 
Ontario Northland Railway (ONR) train station in Moosonee. He noted that “tons of supplies and 
equipment, all sent as express, flowed through the Moosonee station.”235   
Some of the articles on the MCL’s shipping process help complete the picture of the new 
infrastructure constructed in Moosonee during this period.  Don Delaplante’s article "Moosonee 
Booms with Construction of Airfield," describes an extensive clearing just to the west of the 
ONR train station.
236
 Delaplante’s description of the 1955 airstrip location is significant as it is 
one of the few early references which explains a huge clearing, still apparent on a 1989 air photo 
of the town. (The current airport is at a completely different location—just north of the former 
radar base).  The 1955 airstrip continued to be used after defence installations were completed.  
When the ONR applied to the federal government for funding for an all-weather airstrip, its 
report included the following: 
The basis for an all-weather strip already exists at Moosonee in the form of a winter 
landing strip … This strip 7,000’ X 400’ was built by Austin Airways during the 
construction of the D.E.W. line in the mid 1950’s. It is still maintained and operated by 
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Austin Airways as a winter strip. … [It] was completely cleared of tree growth and 
ditched with explosives to a depth of eight feet along three sides …” 237  
Delaplante’s article also assisted with pinpointing the location of the main base of 
operations noted by Flying Officer French. The reporter described a large prefabricated 
construction camp set up by Carter Construction Ltd. on Moosonee’s main street “near the 
Moose River.” 238 This camp was being used by workers constructing the airstrip and it appears 
that the second major Mid-Canada Line contractor, Bell Canada, also used this work camp.
239
 
The construction camp would likely have dominated downtown Moosonee.  It can be clearly 
seen on a 1960 air photo of Moosonee and appears to consist of at least a dozen huge, multi-
person accommodation trailers and other buildings.
240
   
The same year that the construction camp and airstrip were built (1955), Store Creek 
Bridge was “completely reconstructed.” 241 Interviewees stated that gravel for defence contracts 
was stockpiled just to the south of the bridge and transported across the bridge to construction 
sites. It is likely the bridge was upgraded in order to handle the weight of construction vehicles 
filled with aggregate.  Interviewees also described how Store Creek Bridge became a common 
route for people who lived south of the creek to come into town for work or supplies.  Store 
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Creek Bridge ultimately became a critical link for fire protection for residents of the Indian 
Village.  This topic will be covered further in Chapter Seven in the discussion on infrastructure.  
It is difficult to confirm the impact of the Mid-Canada Line’s shipping activities on 
population levels.  Delaplante had suggested that Moosonee “jumped” from 700 to 1700 people 
during airport construction in 1955.
242
 However, the population boom may have been solely 
seasonal construction workers as the 1956 census showed the population of the community as 
only 247 persons (see Table 4.1).   
Some archival materials suggest an element of segregation in Cold War Moosonee and 
they also indicate that sub-standard living conditions existed for some Indigenous people. This 
material is included as part of newspaper articles about Moosonee.  For example, Globe and 
Mail reporter Don Delaplante provided a detailed narration of his trip in January 1956 on the first 
tractor train to travel from Moosonee to a more northerly, unnamed MCL site.  He wrote that the 
Cree employees on the tractor train construction crews “worked like slaves” to fix a snow 
covered bridge in the middle of the night. He also noted that the Moosonee-based shipping 
superintendent, Alex Hennessey, “ordered the Indians to come back [to work] after supper at 
their camp.”243 This seems to indicate that Indigenous workers did not live at the same work 
camp as other workers and likely illustrates segregation in living quarters.  
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Table 4.1: Population Records for Moosonee: 1911-1976 
Census Year (Data is 
from Canada 
Census unless 
otherwise noted) 
Moosonee 
(or Moose) 
Moose 
Factory  
Total Population 
of Moosonee 
and Moose 
Factory 
Notes: Some Moose Factory numbers have 
been included in this chart, although the 
focus of thesis work is Moosonee. 
1911   468 Population for “Moose Fort” (appears to be 
both communities-Moosonee and Moose 
Factory). Tallied by adding census sheets. 
1921 99 340 439 Population for “Moose River and Moose 
Factory.” Tallied by adding census pages.  
1931   475  
1941   949  
1951244 124 399 523  
1956245 247 447 694 Airstrip constructed. 
1961246 975 689 1664 Moosonee radar base opened. 
1966247 1,110 800 1,910  
1971248 1,325    
1976249 1,349    
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 Fred Bruemmer, a geographer, also described two distinct areas in Moosonee in the mid-
1950s. He wrote that “the poverty of the Indian village, standing somewhat apart from the white 
settlement, is in harsh contrast with the latter's prosperity. Most of the Indians still live in tents. 
Some of them have built crude little shacks." 
250
 As a further contrast, Bruemmer noted that 
Indigenous people on Moose Factory Island tended to have houses and "there are few tents." 
251
 
Breummer also wrote that there were approximately 460 people in Moosonee in 1957 -- “60 
white people and 400 Indians,” although the accuracy of his population numbers cannot be 
verified. 
252
 
Bruemmer’s description of Moosonee is in stark contrast to the scenes narrated by Sister 
Paul-Émile in her walking tour of the town.  Paul-Émile wrote that the houses of Indigenous 
people in the pre-Cold War town were located within "deux villages indiens." 
253
 Paul-Émile 
further described the two villages, located at the south end of town “vers le sud, de l’autre côté 
de Shore [Store] Creek” and suggested that the location and appearance of the dwellings differed 
depending on the owner’s religious upbringing. She wrote that "les protestants, métis et Indiens, 
sont groupés en direction de la rivière Moose. Les catholiques habitent plus à l'intérieur, la 
grande majorité de ces derniers viennent de la côte ouest."
254
 Soeur Paul-Émile then commented 
that the Catholic Indians had built houses that were "très propres a l'extérieur comme a 
l'intérieur" and she implied that this clean and tidy condition was due to the fact the owners had 
received a good education from the Oblate missionaries who worked in the Cree communities 
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along the “côte ouest” of James Bay. The sole concern expressed by Paul-Émile in regard to 
Indigenous housing was that the “deux villages indiens” were located on ground that was 
“marécageaux” (marshy) and she suggested that the area needed “irrigation.” 255 Clearly this 
9terrain was not ideal for housing. 
Paul-Émile provided only a brief description of the central area of Moosonee, with few 
references to Indigenous people and only a small comment that there were “quelque 
maisonnettes” (some small houses) in town for “des métis et des Indiens.”256 She also noted that 
the town had an HBC store, Imperial Oil warehouses at “des quais,” and some tourist cottages.257  
Sister Paul-Émile’s narrative was produced as part of a volume designed to celebrate 
several anniversaries of Catholic missionary work in the James Bay area. For example it 
celebrated the 50
th
 anniversary of the arrival of the Grey Nuns at James Bay (1902 in Fort 
Albany).
258
 Paul-Émile’s prose was therefore likely intended to promote, or publicize, the value 
of the education provided by both the Grey Nuns and the Oblates. Her writing thus appears to 
have been intended to encourage funding for Catholic missions over the nearby competition – the 
“protestants” -- such as the Anglican mission on Moose Factory. This was clearly the kind of 
publication that would focus on success, not failure.
259
  
Despite the bias evident in Paul-Émile’s writing, her narrative still describes elements of 
settlement patterns that can be seen on an earlier, 1940 aerial photo of Moosonee. It is also 
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possible to map her observations on specific streets (e.g. First Street and Revillon Road), which 
still exist in the town of Moosonee.
260
 Many of the archival documents about Moosonee refer to 
it as including two communities, the main townsite and the area “south of Store Creek.”  One of 
these descriptions reads as follows: “Moosonee Townsite is divided by Shore [sic] Creek, with 
the main townsite being on the northeast side and the Indian Village on the southwest side. The 
Indian Village is part of the townsite.” 261 Some interviewees have suggested that the Village was 
not formally a reserve and therefore should not be called an “Indian” Village. For that reason, 
this dissertation will refer to the two local areas simply as “The Village” and “The Town.” Map 
4.1 shows these areas as they appeared in 1959. This map also includes sketches that were added 
during the planning phase for the RCAF radar base. This phase will be discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
Several years after the opening of the Pinetree radar base, anthropologist R.G. Bucksar 
described the same area as Paul-Émile, south of Store Creek, as home to “nearly one thousand 
…migrating Indians” living on the southern edge of Moosonee, in shacks, with outdoor privies 
and no water or sewage facilities.
262
 He also noted that the adjacent Store Creek was “a narrow, 
slimy open sewer.”263  Bucksar’s “Moosonee and the Squatters,” also referred to “500 whites” 
living at the RCAF airbase and “350 whites and 45 Indians” in the town.264 Bucksar suggested 
that the Cree settlement was created due to earlier construction work. He wrote that “migrating 
Indians were attracted to the settlement by offers of high wages for temporary construction 
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work.”265 Bucksar does not specify when the migration and construction work started but Table 
4.1 shows that Moosonee’s population grew during the Mid-Canada Line’s shipping phase, and 
continued with work on the Moosonee Pinetree base.  
Map 4.1: Moosonee Townsite, the Village and the Proposed RCAF Base  266  
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Other scholars have discussed the relationship of squatting to the ‘boom’ stages of 
resource towns. For example, Kerry Abel describes squatting adjacent to northern Ontario’s 
mining towns. Abel explains how the practice of squatting was relatively common to both 
Indigenous and European people who migrated to northern areas for work (e.g. Italians at South 
Porcupine). 
267
  She suggests that, where employment was expected to be temporary, squatting 
was a relatively common practice that made sense to both temporary and seasonal workers. As 
noted previously in the literature review chapter, Arn Keeling discussed squatting issues at 
Uranium Lake, Saskatchewan.  Keeling indicated that the opening of the uranium mines drew 
both prospectors and “large numbers of Cree, Dene and Métis people [who were] attracted to the 
new settlement by the prospects of seasonal work.” These prospective employees “tended to 
occupy summer camps at the fringes of the town.”268 R. G. Bucksar also wrote about squatters at 
the edge of Whitehorse. He stated that “the number of squatters in or around a community 
may…be important in determining policy…the greater the numbers the fewer the chances of 
assimilation (into the community) and the greater the possibility of apartheid.”269 It is unclear if 
Bucksar was promoting assimilation, but at least he suggested that there needed to be more 
discussion of the potential relationship of squatting to potential segregation.  This issue will be 
discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
By 1967, there was an indication that growth that began with the installation of defence 
infrastructure (e.g. the 1955 airstrip and the RCAF base) was continuing.  R. Rivard, a provincial 
civil servant, wrote that: 
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Moosonee is a gathering point and Indians from around the [James Bay] coast come here 
because of the facilities available and, no doubt, hoping for an improvement in their way 
of life. There are presently Indians from the Weenusk [Winisk], Attawapiskat, Fort 
Albany, Moose and New Post Bands in Moosonee as well as a few from the East Coast of 
James and Hudson Bay. 
270
 
 
Work on Moosonee suggests that it was transformed through several key stages. 
Migration from northern communities started during railway construction and continued because 
of the Mid-Canada Line’s construction and shipping jobs. Subsequently, migration from both the 
south (military personnel) and the north (Cree people) increased as the town gained its own radar 
base.  Development activities and issues will be discussed further in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Five: A Different Kind of Townsite: Planning and Construction of the Moosonee Radar 
Base 
 The first part of this chapter focuses on the Cabinet Committee on Townsites (formed in 
1954) and how it failed to convince the RCAF and the ONR to build a model community at 
Moosonee. It outlines the provincial planners’ vision of an integrated townsite with new services 
and facilities constructed for the benefit of both current residents and incoming military 
personnel. Then it shows how the ONR and RCAF ignored planners in order to expedite the 
construction of a typical radar base. The second half of the chapter describes the construction 
process itself and the process of building in an isolated location within the peatlands of Northern 
Ontario.  This is essential in order to understand the fragility of the natural environment in the 
Moosonee area and it helps explain the issues that arose, in particular with water pollution, in 
subsequent years.  
Planning for the Radar Base 
The Ontario Government of Premier Leslie Frost recognized the importance of long term 
planning throughout its term.
271
  The Premier appointed a Minister of Planning and 
Development, William Griesinger, when he formed his first Cabinet in May 1949.
272
  Five years 
later, in 1954, Frost formed a Cabinet Committee on Townsites. The goal of the committee was 
to deal with the potential growth of dozens of small towns related to resource development. 
Robert Robson has stated that the Townsites Committee “was the first provincial government 
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agency designed singularly to accommodate the unique settlement needs of the resource 
community.”273 
 Provincial planners working with the Townsite Committee had a vision of planned 
communities in the north. In referring to ‘community planning,’ a key provincial planning 
director, Don F. Taylor
274, stated in 1959 that “My definition of Community Planning is the 
application of intelligent forethought to the physical development and redevelopment of a 
community.”275 Furthermore, Taylor indicated that: 
The aim of community planning is the securing of a physical community whose parts are 
so related one to the other and so proportioned as to produce the highest degree of 
economy, efficiency, visual attractiveness, and stimulation, convenience and safety 
possible with the human and material resources available.
276
  
Moosonee was the only Ontario townsite studied by the Townsites Committee which did 
not become a mining town. Instead, planners working for the committee identified issues related 
to Moosonee becoming a harbour and potentially a radar base town.  
The potential for the impact of military development on Moosonee was identified as early 
as 1958, three years before the Moosonee Pinetree radar base opened. A director in the Ontario 
Department of Planning and Development, A.L.S. Nash, wrote to Acting Air Commodore 
Whiting of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) on 1 December 1958 to voice his concerns 
about potential development in Moosonee. He said: 
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You will recognize the fact that even though the military installations may be 
geographically separated from the existing community there can be a significant impact 
on the community in terms of population attracted to service the needs of the installation, 
retail sales, power and other utility requirements.  
Any information which you are able to divulge on the number and type of personnel, both 
of a construction and operational nature, would be most helpful. 
277
 
Nash had not been directly contacted by the Canadian military regarding the potential for 
military activity at Moosonee. Instead his staff had heard about the RCAF plans from ONR in 
late November 1958 while in Moosonee to collect data for the Moosonee sea-port proposal. Don 
Taylor noted: 
During the [November24 and 25] meetings in Moosonee Col. Reynolds [ONR] advised 
us that the R.C.A.F. were considering the establishment of a military operation at 
Moosonee … No indication was given at this time of the nature of the operation. Col. 
Reynolds did indicate that the R.C.A.F. wished to purchase land in the Moosonee 
townsite for housing purposes.”278 
Nash wrote in his letter to Whiting that Premier Frost had directed staff to look into the 
“expansion of Moosonee” and that once planners started to study the town they “learned that the 
R.C.A.F. have carried out certain topographical and soil surveys immediately to the north of the 
present community.”279 Nash indicated an interest in sharing data with the RCAF and he offered 
to be available for meetings on military development and on exploratory studies. In responding 
to Nash’s inquiry, the Deputy Minister of National Defence stated that as soon as topographical 
and soil surveys were completed he would arrange a preliminary meeting between provincial 
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planners and his office.
280
 The Deputy Minister did not indicate to Nash that the RCAF had been 
meeting with the ONR since October 1958. However, Nash copied Colonel Reynolds on his 19 
December 1958 letter thanking National Defence and suggesting a meeting in early 1959.
281
 
Clearly Nash was a team player, not a builder of silos. 
Meanwhile, Don Taylor, the Chief Planner in Nash’s department, wrote to the ONR for 
more information. Colonel Reynolds responded: 
We have not yet had the official application from the Department of National Defence for 
the R.C.A.F. station at Moosonee, but I know that it is not dead—they are asking for 
additional information nearly every daye [sic] and have promised to have the official 
application in shortly. As soon as it is received I will pass it along to you for your 
information.
282
 
The words “for your information” at the end of Colonel Reynolds letter seem to emphasize that 
ONR was in charge when it came to the RCAF base and that provincial planners were welcome 
to be involved—as observers.   
Furthermore, the ONR, or at least the Colonel, assumed the role of expediting 
development rather than considering planning options proposed by the Department of Planning 
and Development. By the time provincial planners heard about the radar base project, ONR staff 
had already met with the RCAF in North Bay (28 October 1958) and both parties had travelled to 
Moosonee in early November to view a potential site north of the town. Al Jardine, the ONR 
General Manager who accompanied the RCAF to Moosonee, forwarded a confidential report to 
the Colonel after the November trip. He enclosed “a rough draft of the proposed location of the 
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apartment buildings, single men’s quarters, administration building, etc.”283 Jardine also 
indicated that a major road extension would be needed from First Street (in downtown 
Moosonee) to the proposed air base.  
Jardine’s letter is the first indication that the ONR hoped for some placement of radar 
base facilities into the town.  It is also the first record that mentions that the RCAF wanted a 
completely separate location for most of the infrastructure related to its radar base.  Jardine wrote 
that at their first meeting, the ONR suggested that RCAF accommodation (e.g. apartments) be 
located on the town site, which Jardine refers to “our present town site.” 284 He noted however 
that the RCAF was starting to push for an autonomous and separate location. By 1 December  
1959 Colonel Reynolds was advising provincial planners that “the RCAF had decided not to 
locate their residential accommodation within the townsite as originally contemplated.”285 Don 
Taylor later wrote of this decision: 
Both Col. Reynolds and the writer were disappointed with the decision as it would now 
be necessary to have two completely independent utility systems—one for the ‘civilian’ 
townsite and one for the ‘military’ and further this separation would not lead to a healthy 
social situation.
286
 
Despite the Colonel’s message about separation of the town and the radar base, the military, 
ONR and provincial government planners continued to meet to discuss the potential community 
structure that might integrate  the town and the air force base.  Three months after the Colonel 
said the base and town would be completely separate, his own General Manager, Al Jardine, was 
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indicating the opposite.  Jardine wrote that RCAF representatives had “no objections to … 
integrating the RCAF [residential] dwellings into the Townsite area, but …time was a 
dominating factor.”287 The RCAF had indicated that construction estimates were already 
submitted to the federal government and as soon as these estimates were approved they would be 
subject to strict construction timelines.  They also emphasized that they would be keeping their 
single men’s quarters [barracks], their power plant and other infrastructure within the base itself. 
They also had no inclination to get involved in the “installation of sewers, water and power 
supply” within the townsite.288 
Provincial planners, on the other hand, saw the proposed military base as a potential part 
of an integrated community, which would share sewer, water, and power infrastructure, plus 
schools and recreational facilities. They also saw the proposed base as an opportunity to design 
an ideal or model new town. Early in 1959, the planners leapt into action, gathering data and 
drawing up development options for the area.  On 9 January,  F.H. Deeks, a Senior Design 
Planner, requested the following data for departmental plans: an existing land use survey 
(including schools and hospitals), a landscape contour survey, a soil survey, a list of existing 
services (e.g. water, power), and a description of the population “Native and White adults and 
school age.”289 Deeks said that all of this material would be needed “assuming a townsite of 
3000 people.” 290  
Meanwhile, Don Taylor drew up sketches of the staging for the new townsite. He had an 
all-encompassing approach to development which he demonstrated by describing Moosonee as a 
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potential “trans-shipment centre,” a mineral processing site, and a military base.291 The “trans-
shipment centre” examined the potential for Moosonee to add a harbour and major airport to its 
railway shipping efforts.  Taylor showed the industrial storage areas and mineral processing sites 
as being located between the military base and the Moose River. He focused community 
residential development in two stages: Stage One was the existing residential area including the 
downtown and areas to the north.  Stage Two was the area south of Store Creek.  In his 23 
January notes, Taylor had assumed that the “housing and defence installation … [would be] 
physically segregated from the remainder of the Moosonee townsite.”292 Within a month he was 
back to the possibility of integration. Taylor also suggested that there would be “a population 
reaction on the Moosonee townsite itself” even if the base was built as a completely separate 
unit. 
293
 By this he meant that there would be an increase in employment in retail, professional 
and construction jobs. Taylor also provided the first commentary on potential social impacts of 
new development: 
Some considerable thought will have to be given to the provision of land for Indians 
moving into the area to partake of the new employment opportunities which will be 
offered. It is doubtful if the standards of housing and customs characteristics of the native 
Cree can be intermingled with the new white populations which will be attracted—great 
care will have to be taken in handling the problems which could arise through the rapid 
merging of the two quite dissimilar cultures. This will undoubtedly prove to be one of the 
most complex and challenging problems of the entire project.
294
 
Although Taylor noted that Cree would be moving into the area in the future, he was also aware 
that some Indigenous people were already living in Moosonee. Shortly after he wrote his 23 
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January 1959 memo, he added a handwritten label for an “Indian Village” south of downtown 
Moosonee.
295
 RCAF maps from 1959 (see Map 4.1) also recognize this settlement area, showing 
the “Moosonee Townsite” and the “Indian Village” as two distinct areas to the south of the 
proposed radar base.
296
  
 Several joint meetings (involving the ONR, RCAF, and Planners) were held during late 
February 1959 to finalize planning options for Moosonee. The result was the presentation of an 
integrated plan on 19 February 1959 which Don Taylor stated “met the approval of all 
agencies.”297 The plan included: 
a) The integration of both military and civilian housing 
b) Single sewage disposal plant 
c) Centralized primary and secondary school facilities 
d) Centralized recreational facilities and, 
e) Shopping centre 298 
 
All parties understood that the integrated plan relied on speedy budget approvals by both the 
federal and provincial governments in order to meet the military’s original construction 
schedules.  On 23 February 1959 provincial planners met with Colonel Reynolds to discuss the 
integrated plan and to confirm his agreement. Taylor noted after this meeting “Col. Reynolds 
agreed with the plans presented.”299 
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 A few days later Colonel Reynolds “made public the preliminary townsite plans” 
prepared by provincial planners.
300
  The Globe and Mail headline “Development Plan Disclosed 
for Moosonee” announced: 
A preliminary plan to develop a townsite to accommodate 4,000 to 5,000 persons at 
Moosonee near James Bay at an estimated cost of $1,500,000 was revealed today by Col. 
C. E. Reynolds, chairman of the Ontario Northern Transportation Commission…The plan 
for the townsite was ordered by Col. Reynolds …to control growth of the town.301 
In effect, the Colonel claimed that all of the land use planning work that had been completed was 
his initiative. Things continued to go ‘downhill’ from there. 
Unfortunately for the provincial planners’ vision of a new community structure, the 
potential for an integrated and planned community was cancelled shortly after the Globe and 
Mail article and without their input.  In fact it was decided over lunch—a lunch attended by the 
Ministers of Municipal Affairs, Public Works, and Planning and Development, and Colonel 
Reynolds of the ONR.  The Minister of Planning and Development, W.M. Nickle, wrote to 
Premier Frost later that day and indicated that the group was “unanimously of the opinion that 
the air force should be informed forthwith to make their own arrangements to establish in the 
area they have chosen… outside of the proposed townsite [of Moosonee].” 302 Colonel Reynolds’ 
version of the lunch was somewhat different than Nickle’s report. In a letter to Air Commodore 
Whiting of the RCAF, Reynolds wrote: 
I had a meeting in Toronto on Monday [March 2
nd
] with the three Provincial Ministers 
concerned with the development of Moosonee; … I convinced them that it was a mistake 
to delay this matter any further in an effort to try and integrate the R.C.A.F. with the 
Townsite, and we agreed that it should not be delayed further and I was instructed to 
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advise you that it was quite in order for you to proceed with the plan originally presented 
by your Department … [on] February 12th.303 
It is clear that the Colonel notified the RCAF the same day as the lunch meeting as Air 
Commodore Whiting wrote to thank Reynolds for his phone call of 2 March and for advising 
him that the provincial government would not be proceeding with a plan to “integrate the RCAF 
PMQs [Private Married Quarters] with the Townsite.” 304  Whiting also said “That a quick 
decision has been given on this difficult question, of whether or not to integrate, is, I feel, 
directly attributable to your own positive actions.”305 It is not at all clear from the archival 
material why Reynolds would appear to agree with provincial planners and then would help to 
have their plans cancelled. All one can conclude is that he was not a typical ‘team’ member and 
that judging from the style of some of his correspondence, he also wanted to be completely in 
control of the town at all times.  
 Although the concept of integration was dismissed there was the potential to retain two 
infrastructure aspects from planners’ proposals.  These were the construction of sewage 
treatment facilities and the proposed location of the main road connecting the RCAF base to 
downtown Moosonee.  Air Commodore Whiting advised Reynolds on 11 March 1959 that “in 
deference to the wishes of the Department of Planning and Development and in order to avoid 
pollution of the future harbour, we now intend installing secondary sewage treatment.”306 
Surprisingly, although Reynolds was not in favour of a fully integrated townsite, he was hoping 
for some sewage services from the RCAF.  In fact, in one of his letters to Whiting, Reynolds 
wrote “It is still hoped however, that before construction is started on your sewage disposal plant 
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we might be able to arrive at some arrangement whereby your requirements would be enlarged to 
accommodate the whole town.”  Immediately backing down from this request, Reynolds wrote in 
his next sentence “This, of course, is not a condition of the deal at all but something that we 
might be able to arrive at.” 307  
On the second issue-- a connecting road for the base-- Reynolds backtracked even further 
from provincial proposals.  Both Reynolds and RCAF understood that the Department of 
Planning and Development required only one condition to a non-integrated site.
308
 This condition 
was that the road connecting the base to downtown had to be Fourth Avenue (now Atim Road), a 
road allowance that closely paralleled the ONR train track, rather than Revillon road or Second 
Avenue (now Bay Road – See Map 5. 1). Building a road that paralleled the train tracks would 
have kept military traffic, such as loading of supplies and equipment, away from pedestrian 
pathways, residential areas, and local traffic.  Less than a week after the RCAF acknowledged 
this planning requirement, Colonel Reynolds wrote to them stating “If, of course, you do not 
want to go ahead with putting your main entrance by Fourth Street at the start, it is quite in order 
to use the waterfront road [Revillon Road] .” 309  
By the end of March 1959 the ONR seems to have developed its own plans for Moosonee 
and completely ignored the provincial planners.  Al Jardine, the General Manager for ONR wrote 
we have prepared a plan … It is our suggestion that the present roadways be used and the 
existing bridge over Store Creek be used instead of constructing a new bridge on an 
extension of Fourth Avenue … If the RCAF feel that they cannot tolerate the possible 
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traffic interference along Revillon road, then it would be necessary for you to build a 
road…” 310  
 
Map 5.1 Moosonee Settlement Areas (circa 1962) 
 
The Department of Planning and Development had required that Fourth Avenue be extended to 
link the RCAF base to the town, while bypassing residential areas.  This requirement had now 
been rejected.
311
  Furthermore, the ONR was ignoring local people by indicating there might be 
“possible traffic interference along Revillon Road.”  Revillon road was the main waterfront 
thoroughfare for local residents.  Their use of a traditional route was now labeled as 
“interference.”   
It seems likely that the RCAF always intended to build a new road in whatever location 
was the most convenient for its operations. As noted above, the ONR encouraged the building of 
such a road.  The route that was finally constructed, known as RCAF Road or Bay Road, can 
easily be seen on 1960 air photos as a straight white line from the RCAF base to the middle of 
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Moosonee’s main street (see Appendix 3 for the 1960 air photos). In effect, the road that the 
ONR casually allowed to proceed – Bay Road -- brought military traffic ‘smack dab’ into the 
middle of downtown Moosonee, right at the corner of the HBC store and the Catholic Mission.
312
 
Clearly, the needs of residents were secondary to those of the RCAF and the ONR. In 
addition to routing military traffic through the downtown area, the RCAF followed the ONR’s 
suggestion (above) to use an existing bridge to cross Store Creek rather than building a new 
bridge at Fourth Avenue as recommended by provincial planners. The use of Store Creek Bridge 
would eventually interfere with fire protection services to residents living south of the bridge as 
the old wooden bridge could not hold the weight of fire tanker trucks. In summary, the RCAF 
and the ONR did not “stick to the plan.” In particular, the ONR practised and encouraged 
incremental and disjointed decision-making, which caused difficulties in the town of Moosonee 
for decades. Chapter Seven includes a discussion of these difficulties, including the fire 
protection issues and Store Creek Bridge.  
Planners were devastated when the integrated plan was shelved.  Director Nash wrote to 
his Minister that “We regretted hearing of the decision made by the Prime Minister [the Premier] 
that no funds could be made available at this time for the establishment of joint facilities at 
Moosonee with the RCAF.”313 Nash indicated that the community would still be subject to 
development pressures related to the military base and he recommended that “we immediately 
take steps to finalize a detailed development plan for Moosonee.” 314 In order to be ready for a 
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potential sea-port and for commercial development related to the base, Nash stated that “it will 
be necessary to … carry out detailed studies of the topography and soils and preliminary studies 
of water supply and sewage disposal” in the town. He concluded: 
If these investigations are not carried out in the near future we may find ourselves in the 
same position as in Manitouwadge and Elliot Lake where the pace of activity was so 
swift that mistakes were made in the design of these townsites which could have been 
eliminated had additional time been available.
315
 
This demonstrates how planners may have been left out of parts of the first round of discussions, 
but they clearly tried to continue to place themselves as part of the decision-making group. Don 
Taylor wrote directly to Air Commodore Whiting in December 1959 requesting copies of soil 
and drainage surveys and asking to be advised “of any change…in the original time schedule 
which proposed residential occupancy of the R.C.A.F. site late in 1961.”316   
Some studies did occur over the next ten years or more, and very slowly issues related to 
roads, sewer and water were ultimately resolved.  However, two incremental decisions by the 
ONR to reduce RCAF construction requirements (i.e. not requiring Fourth Avenue construction 
and not demanding sewage treatment for the entire community) had already set the tone for 
piecemeal, incomplete, and inadequate servicing decisions for Moosonee.  
Ironically, when the RCAF undertook security tests in the mid-1960s it indicated that the 
entire RCAF base could be shut down by issues with communications infrastructure that was 
outside of its fence.  The Vulnerability Test Report filed in August of 1966 indicated that “This 
unit does not have capability to defend Ontario Northland Communications microwave relay, 
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and connecting longline on which all unit communications depend.” 317 This situation occurred 
because the base defence system had been premised on “protecting our restricted areas only.” 318 
The restricted areas were the radar domes and power plant, which an interviewee indicated were 
protected by security guards at two layers of fences: one surrounded the entire base and a second 
internal fence surrounded the three domes and the power plant. The RCAF had succeeded in 
locating its principal connecting road on Second Avenue, which was a direct route to the ONR 
Communications building, but it had all other facilities within the fenced base. Although this 
demonstrates a vulnerable defence system, to be fair the integration of the town and base would 
not necessarily have improved this situation.  
Federal air force planners needed an air base as quickly as possible. Archival memos 
indicate that the provincial government knew it could not come up with its share of funding to 
shape an integrated community with anything like the speed of the federal government defence 
initiatives.  It also appears that the mediator between the air force and the province, Colonel 
Reynolds, although discussing the concept of an integrated and planned community, was not 
actually fully supporting it.   
 To a certain extent, the planners’ visions of shaping a brand new townsite were doomed 
from the beginning, even if the air force had not proposed an air base. The planners were not, 
understandably, totally familiar with the area and did not realize that Moosonee had been 
developing for over two decades by the time the radar base was proposed. Provincial planners 
(based in Toronto) were informed about the proposed air base at the end of October 1958 and 
had only a month or two to collect data and propose planning strategies for the community.  As 
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an example of a lack of information, the planners did not seem to be aware of two significant 
items.  These were the existence of a construction camp on the main street of Moosonee, and the 
gradual development of the area known as ‘the Indian Village.’  This lack of realization between 
planning vision and reality is evident in a 23 January 1959 memo.
319
  Don Taylor wrote about the 
integrated community and, as is common for planners, showed the proposed stages of 
community development (Stage One…Stage Two). At some point he would have gone on site or 
talked with local contacts, and he would have realized that the town was neither ‘pristine’ nor 
vacant and that there were already people living in two distinct areas.  For example, one of Don 
Taylor’s drawings shows a handwritten notation “Indian Village!” in the area south of Store 
Creek.  
The planners had wanted to get in at the very beginning of a new townsite and they hoped 
to make Moosonee a prototype of a planned community as opposed to a community which 
mushroomed without services for residents, due to the ‘cyclonic activity’ common to mining 
towns.
320
 Planners had a vision of development as staged and nodal or focused, as opposed to 
incremental and scattered.   
Correspondence between the RCAF, ONR, and Ontario’s planners shows that initially the 
three groups worked in semi-isolation, or in government ‘silos’.  That is, each party only 
revealed part of its goals and plans to the others. The three parties did share one commonality.  
That is, none of the three seemed to involve local people in decision making processes at the 
beginning of the planning process. These characteristics of the RCAF, ONR and Ontario 
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planners:  partially working in silos and not fully implementing public input, were to have long 
term impacts on the town of Moosonee. These impacts differed widely from the intensively 
planned area of the radar base to the partially planned Moosonee Townsite and finally to the 
initially ignored and transient area of the Village.  
Construction of the Radar Base 
 The press first wrote about the potential for a Moosonee air force base in June 1959.  A 
reporter for the Globe and Mail indicated that Premier Frost “guardedly confirmed that the 
federal government [was] considering Moosonee as a northern air defense base.” Furthermore, 
Frost was quoted as saying: “I don’t know if it is a missile base or an airfield … Where there is 
smoke there is fire.” 321 He also noted that “defence service technicians have been studying this 
area for months.” It is possible that he believed the extensive surveys would only have been 
conducted if the base were going to proceed. 
 In fact, technical surveys for the potential air base had been ongoing since the fall of 
1958. 
322
 Engineering consultants filed their initial survey results in January 1959.  They 
indicated that the proposed RCAF site was “covered by approximately two feet of muskeg”323 
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 Muskeg is defined as “bogland covered by sphagnum moss.” See Robert Bone, The Canadian North: 
Issues and Challenges, 4th edition, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012), 320. Muskeg is common throughout 
the Hudson’s Bay Lowlands (which includes the entire west side of James Bay and the Moosonee area), See 
Bone,47. 
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but that it “was likely quite suitable…provided … the muskeg is drained.”324 Site drawings 
prepared in 1960 further described the proposed building site as “semi-dense swamp” which was 
covered in black spruce and tamarack trees.
325
  In summary, although the engineers were 
optimistic, their reports from 1959-1960 demonstrated that the Moosonee site would need a lot 
of work.  Issues with muskeg and drainage would plague Cold War era development in 
Moosonee and will be noted again in the chapter on Infrastructure. The site which the engineers 
were studying is shown on a 1959 RCAF map as the area north of the Moosonee townsite 
between Otter Creek and Butler Creek. 
326
 
 Archival documents show that the Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC) 
provided advice for a dozen or more Pinetree sites.  Specifically, in Moosonee’s case, early water 
studies needed by the RCAF were conducted by the OWRC and this provincial body monitored 
the site throughout its fourteen years.  Water samples were taken by OWRC in December 1958 
and in March and June 1959 from two locations: the Moose River between Otter and Butler 
Creeks and from Butler Creek “3000 feet above [the] mouth…Ice thickness 36 inches.” 327 
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 AO, File 119.3 Moosonee 1969. “Preliminary Report-Air Force Station, Moosonee.” Trow, Soderman 
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 AO, RG 84-22, B120655, Federal Government RCAF Station-Moosonee,  1958-65, Division of Sanitary 
Engineering, Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC), 27 January 1959 to 21 July 1959.  Included in Box 
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Butler Creek would ultimately be dammed up to provide a water supply for the residents and 
workers on the base.  The OWRC reported that the “Proposed RCAF supplies” were “Grade A” 
which meant “Satisfactory-No colon bacilli in all portions tested.” The only issues noted were a 
relatively high level of iron and the fact that the water was coloured rather than clear.
328
 The 
brown colour of Moosonee’s water supply has been observed for decades and is generally 
understood to be due to high levels of organic material. One interviewee noted that RCAF 
officers had issues with the colour of the water during their first exploratory visits to Moosonee 
during the mid-1950s. This person related: 
The RCAF arrived in uniform-- there were quite a number of them. They told us that the 
colored water [brown water from the Moose River] was unacceptable for the RCAF staff 
and families who would be potentially moving to the community. The RCAF said “Our 
people won’t tolerate that. They have to have clear water.” 329 
Clearly, the RCAF would need to implement special water treatment systems in order to deal 
with this issue.  By October 1961 the RCAF had put in place a system for “raw water 
conditioning, pressure filters and chlorination.” 330 Archival materials show this as the only 
impediment to establishing the radar base.  The brown water issue would have been a normal 
part of everyday life for most of the residents of Moosonee.  Interviewees indicated that most 
people had no running water and they had to draw their drinking water directly out of the Moose 
River.  Those who could hook up to the ONR’s water system would have been drinking 
chlorinated brown water. 
                                                                                                                                                             
B120655 with the Moosonee OWRC files were the OWRC records for 5 or 6 other Pinetree radar bases. This 
indicates that OWRC provided technical assistance for most Ontario Pinetree radar bases.  
328
 Ibid. 
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 Interview notes, 2013.  Note that Joseph Boyden referred to the brown colour of the water from the 
Moose River in the first paragraph of his semi-fictional book on Moosonee. See Joseph Boyden, Through Black 
Spruce (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 1. 
330
 AO, File 117.8 “Moosonee 1960-63,” Report on Sanitary Conditions in Moosonee and Moose Factory, 
written by K.H. Sharpe, Assistant Director, Sanitary Engineering Division, OWRC,16 October 1961, 4. 
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 The Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC) was also involved in site planning 
for the RCAF’s sewage system. The RCAF’s engineering consultants wrote to the OWRC in 
June 1959 to indicate they were considering either Butler Creek or the Moose River for the 
sewage “outfall” from a proposed sewage plant. The engineers asked OWRC for direction as 
follows: “We would appreciate your advice as to the nature of sewage treatment facilities which 
you will require….”331   The engineers from OWRC replied: 
In view of the fact that there will be a harbour development in this area, it is thought 
desirable that secondary treatment be provided with discharge to either Butler’s Creek or 
Moose River whichever you feel is the best location.332 
It is encouraging to see the discussion on water and sewer services as a partnership or at least a 
careful series of requests in the OWRC’s archives. What this signifies is that the style of 
planning and construction for federal Pinetree bases, or at least Moosonee’s base, was one that 
factored in provincial regulations regarding environmental issues. In one sense, this was positive 
for the townsite as without environmentally appropriate services the community could have 
become more exposed to contaminated drinking water and to sewage outflows than it already 
was at the time.
333
 On the other hand, it is curious that the only reason the OWRC asked for 
sewage treatment was that it might affect harbour development, not because some of the townsite 
residents drew their drinking water from the Moose River.  The radar base was, in theory, 
downstream from the town. However, the fact that the Moose River is a tidal river would have 
increased the potential for mixing of only partially treated sewage with drinking water supplies.  
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 AO, RG 84-22, B120655 “Federal Government: RCAF Station Moosonee, 1958-1965.”  A. G. Lamont 
(W. S. Atkins & Associates Ltd.) to G. Galimbert (OWRC), 26 June 1959.   
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 Ibid., Galimbert to Lamont, 2 July 1959.  
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 Ibid. J.R. Barr, Assistant Director, Division of Sanitary Engineering, OWRC to R.A.Powell, Group 
Captain, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, 1 March 1965. Powell had indicated to Barr that the RCAF wanted 
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The OWRC gave final approval for the water and sewer plants in August 1960. 
334
 
Follow-up reports by the OWRC indicate that the final sewage outflow was upstream on Butler 
Creek (i.e. away from the Moose River).
335
 The guidance of the OWRC continued to moderate 
environmental issues over the next few years as the RCAF became more familiar with managing 
the sewage treatment plant. The final cost of the water and sewer systems for the RCAF base was 
just under $1,000,000.
336
 Final expenditure totals for the construction of all the base facilities 
could not be located, however, one 1958 document estimated the construction of the site to be 
$9.5 million.
337
 
 The 1959 Annual Report of the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission (ONTC) 
included a section called “Moosonee-a Progress Report: Progress made during 1959 for the 
ultimate establishment of an ocean port and city at Moosonee.” Although most of the report 
focused on engineering studies related to a potential port, it also provided details on construction 
activities at the RCAF base as follows: 
The RCAF has purchased approximately 232 acres … for the construction of a housing 
development in connection with a huge radar station … The land for the RCAF townsite 
has already been cleared and drainage has been installed. Construction will begin in 
1960. The townsite will include individual houses, some dormitory buildings for single 
men, schools, churches and a recreation centre. A dam will be constructed in Otter Creek 
338
 to impound an ample supply of water for the [RCAF] community and a sewage 
treatment plant will also be provided. It is expected that ultimately the increase in 
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population due to the RCAF installation will amount to six or seven hundred persons. 
This, it is hoped, will be merely a foretaste of things to come in the Moosonee area.
339
 
The 26 January 1960 throne speech noted this optimism, with the Lieutenant Governor reporting 
that construction in Moosonee “for 800 people,” and its future seaport would “shape the destiny 
of the north country.”340 
The Globe and Mail picked up on both the harbour and the RCAF aspects of the throne 
speech and the ONTC’s annual reports. In June 1960, the Globe published an article called 
“Moosonee: A City of 25,000 in the Future” in which it outlined the pros and cons of harbour 
development.
341
  Later in the year, the Globe provided an air photo of the developing base under 
the headlines “Millions for Pinetree Line Radar Make Moosonee Hum.” The air photo shows 
cleared building sites and includes in its caption “Site is outlined by construction road. Work is 
in progress on foundations.”342 On the same page, Globe reporter Walter Gray penned an article 
titled “Radar Station Creates Boom at Moosonee.” Gray wrote that the federal government 
expected to spend $7 million on Moosonee’s radar base. He also described how one of the first 
projects connected the existing townsite to the base: 
One of the first big jobs was the laying of a highway of wooden planks running through 
muskeg from the town of Moosonee to the radar site in order to transport heavy 
equipment and material into the work area. Officials said the planks would eventually be 
replaced by a permanent gravel road. 
The arrival of the construction crews has created an era of prosperity for Moosonee in the 
form of employment, merchandising sales and recreation and entertainment…. By 1962 
some 250 air force and civilian personnel will be assigned to the Moosonee station.
343
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RCAF air photos taken during the same time period help with our image of the ongoing 
construction (See Appendix 3 for three air photos from 1960). One of the 4 October 1960 air 
photos shows the building sites for the three radar domes and the barracks, a partially constructed 
officer’s mess, roads for the PMQ (private married quarters) sites, and some clearings for the 
maintenance and power plant buildings.
344
 Another air photo from the same day shows the Carter 
Construction camp on First Street in downtown Moosonee. There are approximately 15 trailers 
or General Purpose huts (known as “GP” huts) clustered on the south side of First Street close to 
the junction of Store Creek and the Moose River.
345
  
By early 1961 the first homes were being shipped to Moosonee’s base. The Minister of 
Economics and Development, Robert W. McCauley, reported in the legislature that “121 homes 
are being shipped from Fort William [now Thunder Bay] for erection in Moosonee.”346 The 
ONTC report for 1961 showed several pictures of the homes being unloaded from railway cars at 
Moosonee. One caption read “A view of the railway siding at Moosonee, where pre-built homes 
were removed from railway cars and placed on floats for transportation to site.” Another caption 
indicated that the homes would house personnel manning [the] adjacent RCAF base.”347 The 
homes arrived in two parts which were fitted together to form complete homes or Private 
Married Quarters (PMQ’s).   
The debates in the Ontario Legislature for 22 November 1961 show that the 
Conservatives were being heavily criticized for their consideration of Moosonee as a harbour 
site. One MPP indicated during that day’s debate that “You cannot blame us, in the opposition, 
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for being a little bit skeptical about an area such as Moosonee.”348 The response of the 
Conservatives was to mention engineering studies on the Moosonee harbour, but also to keep on 
coming back to the RCAF base as an economic success story. Rene Brunelle, the member for 
Cochrane North, indicated “Moosonee is an area to which we can look with optimism.” 349 He 
added that “At the present time there are air force personnel in the neigbourhood of around 500 
and in a few months’ time, by this summer; we should have approximately 700 or 800 personnel 
of the air force.”350 Brunelle’s somewhat exaggerated account of 500 personnel in November 
1961 may have been a correct number for all construction workers and air force personnel in the 
area rather than just air force personnel.   
Archival documents do not indicate exactly how many contract or construction workers 
were in Moosonee, but they do show that there were only a small number of RCAF officers in 
Moosonee in December 1961.
351
 Brunelle’s statements appear to have been intended to show that 
an air force base was a good economic prospect and that the government was supporting the 
financial future of Moosonee, even if work on a new harbour had not begun.  In other words, 
discussion of the air base was just what the province needed to make it look good when all else 
was lagging behind schedule. One other saving grace of the Moosonee air base was that the 
Conservatives could show that its impact was broader than just the town, that is, homes were 
built in northwestern Ontario (Fort William), so jobs were also being created there.  
                                                 
348
 Ontario, Debates, Nov. 22, 1961, p. 1171 (see MPP Whicher) 
349
 Ibid., 1172. 
350
 Ibid. Note that the Jan.26, 1960 throne speech referred to “accommodation for 800 people” in 
Moosonee, not 800 air force personnel.   
351
 DHH files, “CFS Moosonee, Ontario,” File 2365. Annual Historical Report (hereafter AHR) for 
December 1, 1961 to May 31, 1962.  Note: The first page of this report was originally retrieved at the Canadian 
Forces Museum of Aerospace Defence (hereafter CFMAD) in North Bay, Ontario, as File: 2002-34-15). 
 102 
Interviewees indicated that, in addition to construction crews, there were several 
technical firms engaged on the Moosonee project. Some of the Quonset huts and/or General 
Purpose (GP) huts at the Carter Construction site were also used by Universal Plumbing, a 
Toronto based company, and by Bell Canada contractors.
352
  
Interviewees indicated that, at this point in the construction phase, they were hoping that 
the RCAF “would not bring its own workers.” Globe and Mail reporter Walter Gray had written 
in 1960 that military “and civilian” personnel would be assigned to Moosonee.353  Interviews and 
archival material indicate that this was not actually the case and that civilians were hired locally, 
first from the Carter Construction camp, and on an ongoing basis from throughout the town.  
Interviewees confirmed that it was not exactly a ‘recruitment’ process.  Those who were working 
at the Carter camp knew their temporary jobs would be over as soon as the base was completed. 
They exercised agency in checking out civilian jobs at the base as soon as ‘the grapevine’ 
indicated there was any possibility of civilian jobs opening up. 
Early RCAF reports indicate that the role of the military was not just to operate a radar 
base, but to establish its own community.  The completed “base,” as it is still known locally, 
consisted of three radar domes, a power plant, maintenance and equipment buildings, a barracks, 
a combined Mess building, diesel fuel storage tanks, a housing subdivision, a grade school, a 
recreation centre (with a gymnasium, pool and bowling alley), and a complete sewer and water 
                                                 
352
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system. 
354
 The Moosonee base was modelled after previous Pinetree bases, as best described by 
Fletcher: 
Domestic sites had two-storey barracks and a mobile home park accommodating 30-50 
trailers for married personnel. Unless a large town was nearby, there was  also an area of 
30 to 50 transportable, double-width, single family homes. There were separate buildings 
for power, heating, administration, school, library, fire station, recreation centre, 
maintenance, sewage and water treatment. Some stations had a swimming pool and a golf 
course.
355
 
 
The best description of the homes in the base subdivision is contained, ironically, in the 
1975 base closure report under the section “Married Quarters Facilities” as follows: 
There are 114 “Transportable Homes” on the site. 108 of these are standard three 
bedroom layouts … The remaining six units have had extensions added to provide a five 
bedroom floor plan. In addition to the bedrooms, each unit has a living/dining area, 
kitchen/laundry area and bathroom with bathtub and shower. Utilities include oil-fired 
furnaces, electricity, running water and sewage.
356
 
Interviewees have indicated that these homes received electricity from the power plant on the 
base and that underground cables were used to carry power from the plant to the PMQs, and also 
to the larger buildings on the base (e.g. barracks). 
357
 Most residents in the town at this time did 
not have electrical power, except for one or two streets which were supplied from the ONR’s 
generators. The level of infrastructure in the town will be discussed further in Chapter Seven as 
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will the changes in roads, water and sewer and power which were necessitated due to the 
construction and operation of the radar base.  
 This chapter has focused on the planning process for the RCAF base and on physical 
infrastructure. The next chapter discusses the human or personal aspects of both life on the radar 
base and within the town as local people and base residents interacted. 
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Chapter Six: Occupation and Operation of the Moosonee Radar Base 
 
One of the goals of this study is to examine the human impacts of the radar base on 
Moosonee’s residents. To do this it is necessary to describe the lives of people on the radar base, 
especially as they interacted with local Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. This chapter 
begins by describing military personnel and civilian employee numbers, and defence activities 
on the Moosonee base. The second part of this chapter discusses women and families who lived 
on the base. An understanding of military families is significant as women and children were part 
of the daily process of interaction with local residents. The third part of the chapter examines 
recreational activities at the base as these activities and events were focal points for interaction 
between military personnel, civilian employees, and their respective families. Furthermore, 
recreational activities at the base were mentioned frequently by interviewees as having a positive 
impact on their lives.  Recreational activities are broken down into three types:  sports activities, 
the Messes, and recreational or social events. 
Military Personnel and Civilian Employees 
The Annual Historical Reports (AHRs) of Commanding Officers from 1961 to 1975 give 
some details on the opening and early operation of the Moosonee base.358 As an example, the first 
AHR covered the period from November 1961 to January 1962 and gave a brief history of the 
arrival of the RCAF in Moosonee.359 The report indicated that on 8 November 1961, the first 
Detachment Commander, Flying Officer Beaupre, arrived with "a small group of airmen." The 
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radar base was not yet ready so the airmen had to stay at the “RCAF/DCL [Defence Construction 
Limited] Moosonee transit camp, then on loan to Carter Construction Ltd." 
360
  By Christmas 
1961 the “power, heating and water treatment plants were taken over” and the “Single Quarters 
[barracks]” were ready. 361 
By 8 October 1962, the AHR reported that “Basic installations [were] completed and 
Operations handed over from the contractor to the RCAF. Limited operations commenced.” 362  
This was just in time.  On 24 October 1962 “RCAF Station Moosonee [was] placed on DEFCON 
3,” due to the Cuban Missile Crisis.363 DEFCON 3, or Defence Readiness Condition Three, 
meant an increase in the RCAF’s readiness level so that it could mobilize within 15 minutes.  
The Moosonee base did not return to normal readiness (DEFCON 4) until 28 November 1962. 
364
   
The number of military staff in Moosonee peaked during the Cuban Missile crisis. The 
AHR indicated that there were 200 military personnel on the base in November 1962, including 
“18 Officers, 25 Warrant Officers and Non-commissioned officers, 43 Corporals, and 114 
Airmen.”365  Clearly the RCAF took the required state of readiness seriously, even in Moosonee, 
which was one of the most northerly Pinetree radar bases. Normally, the average number of 
military personnel in Moosonee was only 145 with the average number of civilians employed on 
                                                 
 
360
 Ibid. The reference to an RCAF ‘transit camp’ and Carter Construction Ltd corresponds to the earlier 
noted articles by French and Delaplante and also suggests -- since this was an RCAF camp -- that it would have been 
the location for the Mid-Canada Line operations—right on Moosonee’s main street. 
361
 Ibid. 
362
 DHH, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962, Entry for 8 October 1962. Note: For the first two 
years (1961-62) the Moosonee AHRs covered parts of years, rather than January to December. 
363
 Ibid.  The five stages of DEFCON were noted in a Moosonee Vulnerability and Security file as: “Five: 
Fadeout, Four: Doubletake, Three: Roundhouse, Two: Fastpace, One: Cocked Pistol” Level five or Fadeout (the 
lowest level) meant “Normal readiness” and Level One or Cocked Pistol meant “Maximum readiness” or “nuclear 
war is imminent.” The final level above level one was not numbered. Instead it was just known as “BIG NOISE: Air 
Defense Emergency.” See Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), “Moosonee-Plans, Operations, Readiness-
General, 1968-1973,” RG24-G-16-1, File 3000-1, Part 2: Volume 23533 (Note: Despite the dates on the folder, this 
file included material from 1962 to 1973). 
364
 DHH, AHR for June 1, 1962 to Nov.30, 1962, Entry for 28 November 1962. 
365
 Ibid., Entry for 30 November 1962. 
 107 
the base being 68 (see Table 6.1).
366
  The personnel level during the Cuban Missile Crisis was 
35% higher than at any other time during the life of the base.  
The AHRs provide some operational details about the military aspect of the base.  
Examples have been taken from these reports to show that military personnel focused on two 
goals: the use of radar to detect foreign aircraft and the defence of the radar base itself.  For 
example, in 1964, the AHR listed detailed technical changes to radar equipment and noted that a 
perimeter fence had been constructed “ thus increasing the security of the unit.” 367 The 1966 
AHR noted the reconfiguration of the Operations Room to modify a raised area which had been 
utilized by the “Battle Commander, Raid Master and four intercept directors.” 368 The 1967 AHR 
notes that all military personnel were briefed on “Nuclear Defence procedures during alerts,” that 
“Vulnerability Tests” were conducted, and that military personnel were provided with weapons 
training on Browning pistols and Sten submachine guns.
369
  These examples are provided as a 
very brief reminder that the Moosonee base, like other Pinetree radar bases, served a regular and 
daily role in the broader system of (North American Air Defence Command) NORAD systems.  
This role, although significant, is not the focus of this dissertation but it needs to be mentioned 
here as a reminder of what military personnel accomplished during their work days.
370
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Table 6.1 Moosonee: Military Personnel, Civilian Employees and Radar Base Population 
Year Military Personnel 
Radar Base 
Population
371
 Civilian Employees  
Note: Unless otherwise noted below, 
Military and Civilian numbers were 
obtained from DHH Annual Historical 
Reports for the Moosonee Base.  
 
1961 10 10 0  
Mar-62 74 162 0  
Nov-62 200 440 72  
1963 141 440 78  
1964 154 440 67  
1965 136 440 69  
1966 129 454 65 
Source for 1966 Base Population: 
Statistics Canada. 
1967 138 440 68  
1968 137 440 67  
1969 135 440 54  
1970 145 425 65 Source: DHH 
372 
1971  n/a 470 n/a Statistics Canada 
373
 
1973 143 440 n/a  
1974 142 440 76 LAC 1974
374 
1975 141 440 60 Source: Timmins Daily Press
375
 
Average 145 442 68 
Averages are based on figures in this 
table from November, 1962 to 1975 
 
                                                 
371
 This column includes military personnel and dependents, but not civilians. For most years the Base 
population was calculated by taking the average of 1966 (454) and 1970 (425), which equaled 440.  This average 
was not used for 1966, 1970 and 1971. See footnotes for those years. The base population figure for March 1962 
was derived by multiplying the military personnel number by 2.2 (the same ratio as later in the same year, i.e. 
November, 1962.). 
372
 DHH File 72-345, “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972,” Report to file by E .R. 
Keirstead, Surgeon Commander, DND on October 1970 visit to Moosonee, 2 November 1970.   
373
 Statistics Canada provided a combined (town and base) 1971 total of 1,793 upon request in July 2015. In 
September 2015, Statistics Canada staff provided the breakdown for 1971 (1,325 town and 470 radar base) under 
Contract EO2377. 
374
 LAC, Establishment-General, Canadian Forces Station Moosonee, 1967/11-1975/03, RG24, Series G-
16-1, Vol 23534, File 1920-1, part 1, 104. The 1974 figures in the table are for military and civilian employees only. 
375
AO, RG 68-9, B503347,Northern Affairs Branch, Director’s Files, Moosonee Vol.3, Len Gillis, “Defence 
Budget Cuts Killing CFS Moosonee,” Timmins Daily Press, Jan.18, 1975.  
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 Moosonee’s civilian population figures correspond closely to the average for other 
Pinetree bases across Canada. 
376
 What these figures show is that civilian jobs, at Moosonee and 
at other Pinetree sites, made up one-third of all positions on radar bases and were an integral part 
of day to day operations on an RCAF radar base. Archival data emphasizes this fact as illustrated 
by organizational charts for the Moosonee base.  These charts show that civilian employees held 
60% of the positions in the construction and engineering group, 50% of positions in the 
personnel and administration cluster, and 25% of positions in the logistics (supply and 
transportation) group.
377
 The large number of jobs in the construction and engineering group was 
significant because it included civilians who learned to operate the power and heating plant and 
the water and sewer facilities. One of the two fire prevention positions in this group was also 
designated for civilians. The positions in the personnel and administration group may have been 
less rewarding because the majority of these civilian jobs (16 out of 23) were in the cleaning and 
food services groups. Not surprisingly, all the jobs in the high security radar and 
telecommunications areas were held by military personnel.
378
 
The AHRs also show that almost all military personnel, and most of the civilian 
employees, were male. The only female military personnel were the base nurses, who were 
referred to as “Nursing Sisters.” The AHRs generally showed one female in this position each 
                                                 
376
 LAC, Organization General, 1965/02-1975/01, RG 24, Series, G-16-1, Vol. 23534. This file showed the 
number of military and civilian employees in 1970 for 23 Pinetree bases across Canada .  Averages, calculated by 
the writer, showed a mean of 145 military and 68 civilian positions. Employee reports do not indicate if civilians 
were Indigenous or non-Indigenous. 
377
 LAC, “Establishment-General, Canadian Forces Station Moosonee,”1967/11-1975/03, RG24, Series G-
16-1, Vol 23534, File 1920-1, part 1, pp 85-86.  The percent of positions was calculated by adding up all civilian 
(CIV) jobs and dividing that number by all military jobs in the same group. Actual numbers included: 28 civilians 
out of 47 positions in Construction and Engineering, 23 civilians out of 47 in Personnel and Administration, and 9 
civilians out of 37 in Logistics.  
378
 Interviewees who worked on the base indicated that the radar dome area was protected by a second level 
of fencing (in addition to the fence surrounding the entire base) and that they were checked twice by military guards 
before handing in reports or doing any deliveries to this area. 
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year and in 1965 the reports also showed a female doctor on staff. 
379
 In regard to the gender of 
civilian positions, a 1975 Ontario Cabinet Submission indicated that, out of 56 civilian positions 
at the base, “32 are native, 16 are non-native and 8 are not heads of household.”380 It is likely that 
the 8 employees in the latter category (who were neither Native nor non-Native!) were women, 
although there is some possibility that this group may also have included single male civilians. 
The organizational chart, mentioned above, did include 9 positions that were shown as secretary, 
stenographer or typist.  These positions, in 1974, would commonly have been held by women 
and this again suggests that eight of the 56 civilian employees on the base might have been 
women.  
The 1975 Cabinet Submission also included a “Detailed Employment Profile,” although 
only 48 of the 56 civilian positions were listed in the profile. That is, the “not heads of 
household” jobs appear to have been excluded and we therefore cannot benefit from knowing 
more about this group. The 48 jobs that were listed in the Cabinet submission were categorized 
as follows: 
Building Cleaners (7), Food Services (5), Labourers (5), Power Plant Operators (5), 
Carpenters (4), Water and Sewage Operators (4), Drivers (3), Storesmen (3), Cooks (2), 
Electricians (2), Trade helpers/apprentices (2), Fire Officer (1), Grounds Maintenance 
Man (1), Heating Plant Operator (1), Heavy Equipment Operator (1), Painter(1), [and] 
Plumber (1).
381
 
                                                 
379
 The reference to the female doctor is discussed further in the ‘births’ section of this chapter. 
380
 AO, RG1-121, B207227, “Lands-Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resources 
Development] on the Moosonee Area,” 25 June 1975.  This Cabinet report makes it clear that the 8 employees who 
were not “heads of household” were in addition to the 48 shown as “native and non-native.” Also see Table 6.1 for 
sources for civilian numbers from 1962 to 1975.  A 1967 Department of Social and Family Services report also 
included a reference to town residents working at the RCAF base.  R. Rivard wrote that “27 male Indians” were 
employed at the Canadian Forces base. Source AO, “General Admin., Moosonee Development Board,” RG19-F-7, 
B350920,  R. A. Rivard, Regional Administrator, DSFS to C. J. Williams, Executive Officer, DSFS, 24 November 
1967.  
381
 AO, RG1-121, B207227, “Lands-Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resources 
Development] on the Moosonee Area,” 25 June 1975. 
 111 
Clearly there was a wide range of civilian positions on the base, ranging from unskilled labourers 
to highly skilled workers. Interviewees indicated that they tended to move to jobs on the base 
after getting their early work experience at the Carter Construction camp on First Street in 
downtown Moosonee.  They said that, as soon as “the word got around” in town that the RCAF 
was hiring, people employed at Carter started to apply for work with the RCAF. Similarly, as 
soon as the base started closure procedures, and often even before those procedures started, 
interviewees took the skills they had learned on the radar base and used them to get provincial 
government or municipal jobs.
382
 Several interviewees said that they “learned their life-long 
careers” while at the radar base.  
The AHRs included almost no references to Moosonee’s Indigenous heritage.  In 
February 1964 one of the radar test operations was referred to as “Operation Cree Dance.” 383 
The word Cree was not used again until the closure of the base was announced eleven years later. 
A Department of National Defence (DND) report on the closure indicated that 80% of local 
people were “Cree Indian.”  384 This was the only National Defence or military report, sourced 
for this dissertation, which referred to local people and civilian employees as Cree. It appears 
from the DND report and from the AHRs, that the only distinctions or categories that were 
important to the RCAF were not social (i.e. race or class) or economic, but whether employees 
were military or civilian.
385
  
                                                 
382
 The reference here to “municipal” jobs is to employment with the Moosonee Development Area Board 
or MDAB. A full discussion of the MDAB’s formation is included in Chapter 8. 
383
DHH, AHR 1964, Entry for February 1964 in Operations Section.  
384
 DHH, “Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Report titled “Department of National 
Defence: CFS Moosonee,” 29 January 1975. An appendix to this report was titled “Moosonee/Moose Factory: 
Historical and Socio-Economic Development.” It indicated that the “total population of Moosonee/Moose Factory is 
approximately 3,000 of which about 80% are Cree Indian.” 
385
 It is also possible, and likely, that the turbulent early years of the 1970s, in terms of Indigenous activism, 
raised the profile of local Indigenous people for military writers.  The issue of Indigenous activism will be discussed 
further in subsequent chapters.  
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Women and Families  
Literature on the Pinetree Line indicates that it was the only radar line that provided 
family accommodation.
386
  Gil McElroy referred to the Pinetree Line sites as “family friendly.” 
387
 He meant that Pinetree bases, unlike the more northerly sites (Mid-Canada Line and DEW 
Line), provided family accommodation and activities for military dependents.  Gordon Wilson 
commented on the family aspect when he interviewed air force pilots and radar technicians for 
his book on NORAD. 
388
 Wilson stressed the importance of the family-friendly Pinetree sites to 
military staff: 
One of the main things that the interviewed Radar Technicians wanted emphasized was 
the tremendous positive effect of having the families together with the military personnel 
at the radar sites. The isolation, irregular hours and hardships imposed by a military life 
were made tolerable by the cohesion of the family unit. This was an effective decision 
made by the military and the Canadian government at the time to maintain morale. They 
opted for the extra expense of constructing a domestic site with the operations site based 
on the premise that a happier workforce is a more productive workforce.
389
 
Wilson also indicated that “A few sites were lucky enough to be next to towns.”390 Both 
McElroy and Wilson mention the importance of family and community, and they indicate that 
base life was successful, or at least pleasant, if it involved both families and neighbouring towns.  
Isabel Campbell has documented the ways the struggles of military personnel stationed in 
postwar Europe helped to raise the government’s awareness of the importance of allowing 
                                                 
386
 As noted earlier in the discussion of the Cold War and radar bases, there were three radar lines that 
crossed Canada (the DEW line, Mid-Canada radar line and the Pinetree line). 
387
 Gil McElroy, Cold Comfort: Growing up Cold War (Vancouver, Talonbooks, 2012), 131. 
388
 Gordon L. L. Wilson, NORAD and the Soviet Nuclear Threat: Canada’s Secret Electronic Air War 
(Toronto, Dundurn, 2011).  
389
 Ibid., 116.  Although PMQs were constructed on Pinetree bases, one radar base had to wait over a 
decade for its family housing. See P. C. Kvas, Lobster, Lighthouse and Long-Range Radar (Barrington: Canadian 
Forces Station Barrington, 1987), 115. Kvas indicates that between 1958 and 1971 married personnel at the 
Barrington, Nova Scotia radar base “were living 30 to 50 miles” north of this Pinetree base (49) due to the lack of 
Private Married Quarters (PMQs) on the base.  
390
 Gordon Wilson, NORAD, 104. 
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families to live on or near military sites.
391
 When the Canadian government tried to prevent 
soldiers from bringing families with them to locations like West Germany, some soldiers brought 
their families anyway, at their own expense. Campbell also describes how Canadian military 
personnel compared themselves to American soldiers. Drawing upon American historian 
Franklin W. Davis’s work about the American experience, she concludes that  “The Americans 
had set a high standard: most had their families with them, and they had mixed bowling leagues, 
golf tournaments and swimming pools in their communities.”392  Campbell also indicates that, 
particularly where families were not present, the Canadian government had to deal with issues of 
morale and with more pressing and politically embarrassing consequences like prostitution, 
venereal disease and alcoholism. Getting along with neighbouring communities was a significant 
goal in Europe, partly because the local press highlighted instances in which the military caused 
local trouble.  Campbell shows that the federal government ultimately supported military 
personnel by developing family accommodation at bases and removing the restriction on families 
overseas.  This modification of Canadian defence policy in the early 1950s may have shaped the 
planning and development of Pinetree site environments, like Moosonee’s base. 
Although Moosonee’s military and civilian numbers were relatively easy to verify, it was 
difficult to locate figures for the number of ‘dependents’ (wives and children) 393 who lived on 
the base. One of the more reliable figures for the number of people on the base was a report of a 
medical tour carried out by E.R. Kierstead, the Surgeon Commander for the RCAF during 1970.  
Kierstead reported that the Moosonee base had “145 service personnel, 280 dependents and 65 
                                                 
391
 Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951-64, (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2013). 
392
 Franklin M. Davis Jr., Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army’s Occupation of Germany, 1945-
49 (New York: MacMillan, 1967), 194-95, quoted in Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats, 98. 
393
 Annual Historical Reports (AHRs) use the word “dependents” to include both women and children who 
lived on the base.   
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civilians.”394 The combination of the 145 military personnel and 280 dependents was used for the 
1970 base population total of 425 on Table 6.1.  Base population figures had to be extrapolated 
for other years as indicated in this table.
395
 
Although there were married quarters on the base, military spouses and women in general 
were rarely mentioned, except for initial reports on employment on the base.   The 1962 AHR 
indicated that the base school was opened and that a “Miss M. Milne” was appointed as its first 
principal.
396
 There is no indication if the other teachers hired were women. Occasionally military 
wives were mentioned if they were employed on the base.  For example, a Mrs. Wasylyshyn was 
hired as the base postmaster in 1962 
397
 and a 1968 base inspection report showed that “5 wives 
[were] employed as attendants” at the base snack bar.398 Although the RCAF’s Annual Reports 
do not mention women working full-time, interviewees have indicated that some wives of 
military personnel had clerical and accounts positions on the base, working either in the base 
administration headquarters or at the construction/engineering building. One source also refers to 
“a shortage of skilled women (teachers, secretaries, etc.)” after the radar base closed because 
“service wives” had been employed “in the community.” 399 It is not clear if the writer meant in 
the radar base community or in the town of Moosonee, but interviewees did not report that 
military spouses worked off the base. Interviewees also reported that the RCAF provided a daily 
bus to pick up civilians in the downtown area and bring them to the base for the day. The same 
                                                 
394
 DHH, “Visits and Inspections,” Keirstead.  
395
 See the footnotes for Table 6.1 for detailed calculations. 
396
 DHH, AHR for 1 December 1961 to 31 May 1962, Entry for 2 March 1962: First principal and three 
teachers arrived on the base. 
397
 DHH, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962, Entry for 6 December 1962. 
398
 DHH File 72/345 “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972.” The dates for the snack bar 
inspection were Feb.8-9
th
, 1968. 
399
 AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs Branch, Director’s Files, Moosonee Vol.3, R.V.Scott, 
Director, Northern Affairs Branch to G. D. Spry, Executive Director, Finance and Administration Branch, Northern 
Affairs Branch re: Canadian Forces Station-Moosonee, 22 April 1975. 
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bus was used to take wives of military personnel to the downtown area for shopping once or 
twice a week. 
The 1962 annual report was the only base report to include a reference to volunteer work 
undertaken by women living on the base.  The report mentioned that a “Station Women’s 
Auxiliary” organized the distribution of food baskets by snowmobile to “poor Indian families.” 
Harrison and Laliberté put the volunteer work in context.
400
 They indicate that spouses of 
military personnel were expected to be part of “Wives’ Clubs” and that these clubs organized 
activities such as “fashion shows, Tupperware parties, cosmetic demonstrations, making 
cookbooks, and community benevolence [charitable] work.” 401  The main reason for the Wives’ 
Club was to provide peer support and activities to women who were isolated and likely felt 
lonely and out of place. A 1973 North Bay Nugget article provides some insight into this 
situation. Reporter Arnie Hakala quoted two military personnel on the topic of wives. Major 
Kilby, the CO, said that most problems occurred when the wives first arrived at Moosonee; “It’s 
a bit of a shock to come way up here but by the time Christmas and the winter carnival come 
around, it would be hard to get them to leave. They just love it.” 402 Captain Greg Milne, the 
base’s chaplain, told the reporter that urban women found it particularly difficult to move to 
remote locations as they were, “thrust into a totally different environment and that can cause a 
few problems. But most of them adapt.”  403 While it is unfortunate that military spouses were 
not interviewed for this article, it is possible to gain some perspective from the book We’re 
                                                 
400
 Deborah Harrison and Lucie Laliberté, No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada (Toronto: James 
Lorimer & Co., 1994).  Harrison and Laliberte write more about the Gulf War era than the Cold War but they 
indicate that their descriptions of military base activities include long standing practices. 
401
 Ibid., 76. 
402
 Arnie Hakala, “North Radar Base Modern Centre.” North Bay Nugget, March 7, 1973.  Sourced in AO, 
File Moosonee Vol. 2, RG 68-9, B503347. 
403
 Ibid. 
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Moving Where? The Life of a Military Wife. 
404
 Jeanette Shetler Russell writes about her family’s 
move to Moosonee when her husband was transferred there: 
As we neared Moosonee, the trees became terribly scarce. My spirits sank further. How 
would I be able to trim my Christmas tree if there was none available … Finally, after six 
hours aboard that hot, crowded and rattling railway car, we arrived. I could see the 
welcoming committee through the steamy window –a handful of native Canadians and a 
van with Military Police written on the side. … After a few minutes my heart rate 
steadied and I managed to collect myself. I knew I had no other choice. I made my exit – 
depressed, full of tears and anger …. I wanted so badly to go back to North Bay, but that 
wouldn’t happen. There was only one place to go and I was there. I had to make the best 
of it ….   
We passed the recreation centre, the social hub of any base with its indoor pool, 
gymnasium, [and] bowling alley …. 
We walked down a long wooden boardwalk and stepped into a screened-in porch 
attached to the front of the trailer … I must admit I was surprised. The trailers were 
tastefully furnished, and the interior looked quite delightful. … I could live with it. Can 
you imagine that? 
Within a matter of days – hours for the kids – we had all adjusted.405 
 
Shetler Russell subsequently admitted that her initial perspective towards Native Canadians 
changed as she interacted with local people. She wrote that she visited with local “Cree artists 
and artisans,” and sold their work to raise money for sports equipment for military and ‘native’ 
children. Shetler Russell concluded that “This mutual sharing of cultures … created an 
understanding and respect for each other.” 406  
The irony of the Nugget article and Shetler Russell’s book is that, in both cases, people 
spoke on behalf of ‘the other.’ Military men spoke about military spouses and later a military 
spouse (Shetler Russell) spoke about local ‘natives.’ Women’s voices about women were silent 
                                                 
404
 Jeanette Shetler Russell, We’re Moving Where? The Life of a Military Wife (Renfrew: General Store 
Publishing House, 2003). 
405
 Ibid., 36-37. 
406
 Ibid. 38. 
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and both the names and voices, of Indigenous people, were absent in describing their 
experiences.  
 Shetler Russell also wrote about the role of the wife of the base Commanding Officer 
(CO), Perry Kilby, and indicated that “without her engaging personality and untiring energy, 
days and nights in our small community would have been distressing for many.” 407 The formal 
RCAF records (Moosonee’s AHRs) had only one reference to the spouse of a CO. The 1962 
AHR noted that the CO’s wife, Mrs. L. L. Nault, arranged shipment of “6,000 lbs of used 
clothing” from RCAF Station Trenton for “needy families in the local and James Bay area 
through various religious organizations.” 408 Although the AHRs lack more entries about the 
wives of COs, Harrison and Laliberté indicate that this woman had a significant role on most 
Canadian military bases.
409
 In particular the spouse of the Commanding Officer was expected to 
provide guidance to the spouses of other Officers and military personnel. A single archival 
memo provides insight into how this position would have worked in Moosonee. In a 1968 thank 
you note to Commanding Officer Misener, a recent visitor, Lieutenant-Colonel Futer, wrote, “I 
especially appreciated meeting your charming wife and was impressed with her sense of 
responsibility toward the dependant personnel on the station. I’m sure that this contributes 
materially to the good morale prevailing on the unit.”  410 
                                                 
407
 Ibid. The Commanding Officer was John Kilby and his wife’s name was Perry Kilby. 
408
  DHH, AHR for 1 December 1962 to 31 May 1963, Entry for 19 December 1962. There were no other 
references to the Women’s Auxiliary in any of the annual reports reviewed for the time period from 1963 to 1975. 
The December 1963 report only notes “a shipment of clothing … arrived Station Moosonee for distribution to needy 
children,” and it does not give credit to any particular group for this activity.    
409
 Harrison and Laliberte, 74. 
410
 DHH File 72/345 “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972.” Memo from Lieutenant-
Colonel Futer, DND to Major Misener, Commanding Officer, CFS Moosonee, Oct.23, 1968. See Harrison and 
Laliberte, No Life Like It, on spouses of Commanding Officers (74-75).   
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The next reference to women residents of the radar base was the 1964 AHR which noted 
that arrangements had been made for “dependent wives to make a tour of the Tower.”411 The 
Tower was the high security centre (the middle dome) for radar operations on the base and the 
reference to a tour for the spouses was reported in the “Public Relations” segment of the annual 
report. This suggests that wives were not part of the inner circle of military personnel but that the 
relationship between these women and the base was occasionally considered to be important.   
The most frequent references to women on the base were as the mothers of new babies.
412
 
Women were identified as “Mrs,” not by their first name but by their husband’s, and their 
spouse’s rank was provided with each birth. For example, “Mrs. B__, wife of LAC J.M. B___, 
gave birth to a boy, the first baby born in the RCAF Stn [Station] Moosonee Hospital.”413 The 
AHRs indicate that most births at the base hospital were to military families; however there was 
one reference in 1962 to a birth related to a civilian employee.
414
 By the following year, births 
may have become too commonplace to report, as the only reference to a birth on the base was 
recorded in the AHR because “the snowmobile road to Moose Factory Hospital was 
impassable.”415 Clearly life for pregnant spouses must have been precarious if a snowmobile ride 
across a frozen river was occasionally required in order to seek assistance with childbirth. By 
May 1962, it took the birth of twins to be newsworthy enough to make the AHR. 
416
 
Furthermore, after this report of twins, there were no other references to babies being born on the 
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 DHH, AHR 1964, Entry in “Public Relations” section. 
412
 DHH, Moosonee CFS, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962 and AHR for 1 December 1962 to 
31 May 1963. Six babies were born from September to December 1962, two at the Moose Factory Hospital and four 
more at the radar base infirmary in the administration building.Two of the first six babies were stillborn (one at the 
Moose Factory Hospital and one at the RCAF base).  
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  DHH, AHR for 1 June 1962 to 30 November 1962.  The last name and specific birthdate are not entered 
to protect privacy. 
414
 Ibid. 
415
 DHH, AHR 1963, Entry for 2 April 1963. 
416
 DHH, AHR 1965, Entry for 1 May 1965 “First set of twins born in the Station MIR (medical 
infirmary).” 
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base for the remaining ten years that the Moosonee base was open. It is likely that babies 
continued to be born on the base; they were just no longer newsworthy. It is also possible that 
base commanding officers wished to have less personal material in the annual reports. 
There are only a few references to children of military personnel being born “out of 
wedlock.”  These children were briefly referred to by interviewees as “Base babies,” but 
otherwise there was very little information on babies born to unmarried mothers.  Wendy 
Thomas, a provincial social worker who reported on Moosonee in August 1963, indicated that 
there were some concerns about unmarried pregnancies caused by RCAF personnel. She wrote 
that: 
The existence of the base seems to have created a greater problem of illegitimacy among 
the Indian women. There have been several Paternity Declarations made against airmen 
and there are apparently many others who have not been named by the girls. There is an 
attempt made by the base officials to control this type of behaviour.
417
 
Thomas did not indicate what she meant by “many others” nor did she indicate if there were any 
issues of violence against women.  It is however, important to note that some local women had 
babies with military personnel and that, as Thomas indicated, “These children would appear to 
be acceptable to the community.”418 Other than the Thomas report, there is no other information, 
or even mention, of “Base babies” in any of the documents reviewed as part of this study. One 
gap in the Thomas report is that she did not write about local women, both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous, who dated and married military personnel.  Interviewees indicated that this type of 
interaction was common during the radar base time period.  The Thomas report, on the other 
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 AO, RG 29-01-1480, B334469, Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Deputy Minister’s Files, File: 
“Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66,” Report by Wendy Thomas,  Welfare Development Officer, 23 August 1963, 13. 
Thomas indicated that she “was able to interview a total of 123 households which included 750 persons ….” (p.4). 
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hand, gives the impression that military personnel never married local women or acknowledged 
their children. 
Although there is one reference in the AHRs to a civilian mother giving birth at the base 
(see above), interviewees indicated that most women from Moosonee had their children at the 
Moose Factory Hospital, or out of town, for example, at the hospital in Cochrane. Interviewees 
did give some impression, though, that they knew medical help could be available at the radar 
base if they needed emergency help. 
419
 This may have been reassuring during the years the base 
operated.  
However treatment at a hospital, or nearby medical assistance, was not always successful. 
For example, archival documents refer to the death of a two year old child after the father “took 
his sick baby to the Moose Factory Hospital and to the clinic at Moosonee, received medical 
services and was returned home. The baby apparently died of pneumonia … [the family] lives in 
a tent in Moosonee.”420 Social Services staff indicated that there were 12 families living in tents 
in Moosonee and Moose Factory during December 1969 when the baby’s death took place.421 
One interviewee recalled that people knew to avoid the village area because “babies died there.”  
This person implied that the village was an unsafe area, but it seems that it was the absence of 
adequate housing that was the true health and safety issue.   
                                                 
419
 Interviews, 2013. Wendy Thomas also noted in her 1963 report that “There is no doctor resident in 
Moosonee, except during ‘break up’ when the RCAF base brings in a Medical officer.” She implied in her report 
that this doctor could be available for local emergencies in the town itself, in addition to the base. (See page 3 of the 
Thomas report). 
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 AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939, Department of Social and Family Services, Deputy Minister’s Files, 
File: “Indians –Moosonee, 1967-70,”  Departmental Memo from Peter Szego, Director, Indian Community 
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In some cases a doctor was present at the radar base, for childbirth or for other medical 
issues but often the only reference was to a nursing sister. As noted earlier, nursing sisters were 
the only female military personnel on the base. This changed when a Dr. D. Grinnell was hired 
as Senior Medical Officer in 1965. The record entry for this doctor did not include a first name, 
but we know that the doctor was a woman because the records showed that the infirmary on the 
base was “under her control.”422 The 1965 AHR also recorded that a part of the barracks had to 
be reconstructed “to allow former male Officer Quarters to be used by females of Officer 
Status.” 423 This suggests that the original construction of the base had not anticipated female 
officers.   
One of the first references to the number of school-age children was contained in a report 
in 1970 by Major R. W. Saxberg, who was Base Commander at Moosonee. The Major indicated 
that there were 100 school children attending the Henry Hudson base school, from Kindergarten 
to Grade eight. 
424
 At the time of the base’s closure in 1975, the Department of National Defence 
(DND) reported that there were 130 students at the base school along with seven teachers, six of 
whom lived on the radar base.
425
   DND archival material also shows that the provision of grade 
schools on Canadian military bases was common practice, with 70 schools on bases across 
Canada and 28,253 students in attendance at these schools in January 1971.
426
 These records also 
tell us that the Moosonee radar base had its own school board that handled hiring of teachers for 
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 DHH, AHR 1965, under “Administration” section. Emphasis mine. 
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424
 DHH File 72-345 “Visits and Inspections of CFS Moosonee, 1968-1972.”Air Defence Command: Unit 
Administrative Evaluation, Moosonee CFS,” 14 November 1970, 12.  
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 DHH, “Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Report titled “Department of National 
Defence: CFS Moosonee,”29 January 1975. 
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 LAC, RG 24, Vol.22458, File 5300-1, “Canadian Forces Base-Moosonee, 1963-1971, “Annual Report -- 
Provision of Educational Facilities to Dependent Children by the Department of National Defence, 14 May, 1971. 
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the base.
427
 Federal policy documents on education also show that DND supported schools could 
offer education to children of civilian personnel if such employees lived in the vicinity of the 
base and if openings were available.
428
  Interviewees told me that local children attended the 
primary schools in the town, rather than on the base. It is likely that Moosonee’s civilian 
employees preferred to have their grade school children closer to their homes, rather than seeing 
them bussed to the radar base.  
However, there appears to have been some sharing of facilities between the base and the 
town.  One report mentioned that “pupils from the station school obtain arts and crafts training in 
the town school.” 429 Additionally, Wendy Thomas’s report (noted above) suggests that some 
local children would be taking Grade 9 courses on the base, starting in the fall of 1963. 
430
 This 
was significant because interviewees indicated that most high school-aged children who were 
town residents had to travel by train to North Bay or Sudbury for their high school education. 
The lack of a high school also affected the base. Commanding Officer Kilby stressed that the 
lack of a high school even shaped the demographics of the military community. He said: 
It [Moosonee] is a young base in two ways. It was built in 1962 and most of the people 
who come here are young. The reason for that is that there is no high school in Moosonee 
and we try to get people who have no children over the Grade 8 level…. There are a few 
exceptions but very few. In a way, I guess you can say the children have a lot to say 
about who comes here.
431
 
In fact, the lack of a high school impacted both town and base families and this absence of 
critical infrastructure eventually resulted in the transformation of the radar base. This issue, 
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National Defence: CFS Moosonee.” 
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central to the impacts of the radar base on the community, will be discussed later in Chapter 
Nine. 
In 1966, the RCAF Annual Reports began to differentiate between Moosonee and the 
radar base by referring to the base as “Sasakipao” in the title of all reports and by prefixing the 
radar base’s post office with the same label. 432 The name “Sasakipao,” chosen for the base and 
the post office, initially seemed to symbolize a distinct geographical place, and a physical 
separation, as it is the creek that completely separated the base from the town site.
433
  Initial 
research suggested that the use of the term Sasakipao was intended to separate the radar base 
from the town. However, information provided by interviewees indicates that the base and 
Moosonee itself were closely connected. This section on military personnel and their families 
and on civilian employees gives an initial indication of these connections. The next half of this 
chapter provides more connections between the two communities by examining the ways that 
recreational activities contributed to intermingling between the two groups. 
Recreation 
The RCAF’s annual reports were heavily laden with references to recreational and 
competitive sports activities.  Two of the initial AHRs emphasize the increased importance of 
recreation on isolated bases.  The 1963 AHR included the following commentary: “Although this 
station is well isolated, sports activities are numerous, perhaps in even greater numbers than on a 
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 DHH, AHR 1966.  Interviewees indicated that Sasakipao is a Cree word. The meaning of this word was 
not explained, however, Sasakipao Creek in Moosonee is also called “Devil’s Creek” by interviewees.  
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 Sasakipao Creek is not on most maps of Moosonee, but it does appear on a 1971 Ministry of Treasury, 
Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs map of the community. In twelve years of working with Moosonee I did 
not hear about this creek at any point (even though I frequently talked with town staff about other waterways, such 
as Store Creek and Butler Creek).   
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normal station.” 434 The 1964 AHR noted “The sports program on Station Moosonee is quite 
extensive due primarily to its isolated position.”435 This emphasis on sports became important for 
the local residents during the radar base period, and interviewees indicated that this aspect of 
base existence influenced their lives for many years. 
Recreation is divided in this section into three elements, all of which demonstrate the 
positive interaction(s) between the radar base and the town.  These are: sports activities, the 
Messes, and social events.  Some aspects of these elements are described below but there is no 
attempt to summarize every recreational event that occurred or that had a connection to the base. 
   The 1963 AHR gave a good overview of sports activities in the early years of the 
Moosonee site. It describes how 
A curling rink was built out of volunteer labour and GP [General Purpose] Huts were the 
scene of several bonspiels, in addition to men’s and mixed leagues competitions. Softball 
was also very popular. The station team visited Moosonee, Moose Factory …Bowling 
was active all year round … Swimming, volleyball and trampoline facilities were widely 
used.
436
 
Curling remained one of the most popular events at the base and interviewees have indicated that 
the base was where civilian employees and spouses tended to learn the sport. Interviewees also 
indicated that the curling bonspiels, and in particular, the “Moosonee End-of-the Rail Bonspiel” 
was an elaborate affair with huge prizes for winners. 
437
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 DHH, AHR 1963, Entry in Summary notes.  See Map 2.1 at the end of Chapter Two which shows that 
Moosonee was one of the more isolated Pinetree bases. Presumably the reference to “normal” in this quote is to the 
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 DHH, AHR 1965, Entry for 22-25 January 1965. The first “End of the Rail Bonspiel” was played over 
three days in January, 1965 and included teams from “Moose Factory, Moosonee, and Iroquois Falls.” 
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It is worth noting that the AHRs sometimes referred to Moosonee as a separate entity or 
community, and a competitor in terms of sports.  This type of comment is evidenced by 
references to the military personnel playing against the Moosonee Bombardiers hockey team in 
January 1964. This hockey team had been in place since 1954 under the banner of the Moosonee 
Bombardiers (later the Two Bay Bombardiers).  Members of the team, when interviewed, 
recalled that they did not always win against the RCAF, but they mentioned this was likely due 
to the fact that the radar base supplied the referees for the games.
438
 The 1966 AHR does not 
mention referees, but it does note that “the [RCAF] Squadron hockey team entered … [the] local 
hockey league with Moosonee and Moose Factory” and “emerged as winners of the final 
playoffs.” 439  Occasionally the distinction was not between the base and town residents but 
between military personnel on the base and civilian employees. This was evident in the 
description of softball playoffs: “A very successful season was enjoyed with the DND 
[Department of National Defence] civilian employees emerging as winners of the station 
league.”440 
Initially sports references focused on activities for male military personnel.  Later, they 
started to reference civilian sports activities and sports for children. Eventually, the reports 
included women’s sports activities as part of the annual reports.  In that regard, a note in the 
1965 AHR included a rather odd entry that “the distaff side with dependents share essentially 
equally in all recreational activities.”441 The impression left is that the “distaff side” (i.e. the 
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reports but the New Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “relating to a woman or women, female, as in the distaff side 
of the family.” 
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spouses of military staff) may have expressed some concerns about the adequacy of recreational 
opportunities for women.  The following year the issue of recreation was highlighted on the first 
page of the AHR as follows: “Recreation for service personnel, their dependents [women and 
children] and DND employees [civilians] was varied to meet the needs of all individuals and was 
considered to be of a high standard.” Other reports, from 1964 to 1967, gave examples of sports 
for women and men such as bowling, curling, broomball, and softball. 
442
  
The AHRs also indicated that local residents were involved in sports activities. 
443
 
Interviewees added more information by stating that both military personnel and civilians would 
participate in, or compete with, the radar base leagues and that there were both men’s and 
women’s leagues in bowling and other sports.  Also, some interviewees indicated that their best 
memories of the radar base were the ones associated with joining the men’s and women’s sports 
leagues and that they kept up their participation in the sports they played on the base throughout 
their lives. 
Like most Pinetree radar bases, Moosonee had three messes or clubs combined in one 
building. The three messes were shown in the 1968 Inspection Report as the Officers’ Mess, 
Sergeants’ Mess and Airmens’ Institute (also known as the ‘Junior Ranks’ Mess or the Cariboo 
Club). 
444
 Interviewees indicated that, depending on either their local circumstances or their 
employment at the base, they could join one of the messes and use all the recreational facilities at 
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the base. For example, they specified that business managers, local veterans, and school 
principals could join the Officers’ Mess. 
One archival source suggests that membership in the Messes may have been determined 
by race.  Wendy Thomas, a welfare development officer, wrote that “Indian persons working at 
the RCAF base are permitted to apply for associate memberships at the Airman’s [Airmens’] 
Mess.”445 However, interviewees stated that many of the civilians who worked on the base joined 
the Airmens’ Mess and they did not describe any separation of civilians by race in this regard.  It 
is worth noting that at least one individual, who could have joined the Officers’ Mess, chose to 
get a membership at a lower ranked mess.  Interviewees indicated that Ed Butcher, a local 
business owner, could have joined the Officers’ Mess but he preferred to be part of the 
Sergeants’ Mess. It is worth noting that Mr. Butcher became the first Chair of the Moosonee 
Development Area Board (MDAB) in 1968.
446
   
One of the closure reports for the base suggested that the messes made the radar base a 
focal point for the area: 
Station personnel enjoy an excellent social relationship with the local townspeople and 
the station, because of its messes and recreational facilities, has become the social centre 
for the area. Although there is an LCBO store in the town there are no bars and 
consequently associate membership in all messes is high – 35-40 in the officers’ mess, 50 
in the NCO’s [Non Commissioned Officers] mess and 100 in the other ranks [Airmens 
Institute].
447
 
Research by Harrison and Laliberté suggests that the cheery atmosphere and camaraderie 
of the messes was not always positive for families or communities and that messes contributed to 
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 Ontario, Department of Public Welfare, report by Wendy Thomas, Welfare Development Officer, 
August 23, 1963. OA “Indians –Moosonee, 1963-66,” page 13. 
446
 In 1968, Mr. Butcher  became the first Chair of the Moosonee Development Area Board.  Appointments 
to the MDAB are discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
447
 DHH, “Permanent Reference File (PRF) Moosonee CFS, Jan.29, 1975 report titled “Department of 
National Defence: CFS Moosonee.” The NCO’s mess was often referred to as the Sergeants’ Mess. 
 128 
alcoholism on Canadian military bases.
448
 In that regard, a few interviewees noted that the 
custom of holding “TGIF” nights at the Moosonee Mess sometimes encouraged both military 
and civilian members of the mess to keep drinking long into the weekend. There is no other 
information on substance abuse at the base from the archival documents or from interviews 
conducted as part of this research. 
      Social events initiated by the RCAF demonstrate the level of interaction between the base 
and the broader community. That is, these events showed how military personnel and their 
families interacted not only with civilian employees and families, but with local people who, 
because of their employment status, were not connected to the radar base.  Social events are 
grouped below into dances and carnivals, and children’s parties. 
The first dance at the radar base was held on 30 March 1962 only a few months after the 
base became operational. There appeared to be no boundaries between military and civilian 
personnel as the annual report noted “The Stn [Station] Combined Mess was opened to all 
civilian personnel in the area. A dance followed at 2100 hours.”449  Other dances and banquets 
took place over the next decade from Hallowe’en dances, sports banquets, winter carnival and 
New Year’s Eve dances and these events appear to have been attended by people from the base 
and Moosonee.   For example, the 1968 and 1969 AHRs specifically mention that “all ranks” 
were invited to the New Year’s Balls.450  Interviewees emphasized that local residents, who were 
civilian employees, or spouses of employees, were invited to all dances on the base.  
                                                 
448
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material suggests that “Thank God It’s Friday” (TGIF) nights at the Messes had been a long term practice at military 
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Some events were open to both civilian employees and the general public.  For example, 
in March 1964 the radar base “Played host to the Canadair Variety Show which arrived on the 
eve of this Station’s first Winter Carnival. This unit plus the local population enjoyed it 
immensely.”451 The 1965 AHR gives one of the more detailed entries of the base Winter 
Carnival and describes “a successful day of skidoo races, dog races, broomball games, skating … 
held with full participation from service personnel, PMQ residents and DND employees. The 
public was invited to attend and enjoyed the proceedings.” 452  Clearly, the RCAF tried to 
involve local residents in the social events that occurred on the base. This involvement extended 
to events that included children. 
 Radar base events included both PMQ children, as they were called, and local children. 
For example, the December 1962 AHR includes the following entry:  “Service personnel 
sponsored a Christmas Party in the Stn Rec Centre for 185 Indian and white children from the 
Public and Mission [Catholic] Schools in Moosonee.”453 There is no reference to a party for 
children who lived on the radar base, but it is likely they would have had such an event.  One 
year later, the children’s parties were clearly described as separate events. 454 The separate 
parties continued until at least 1967 when the Annual Report indicated that the “children’s 
Christmas parties for both the Station and the town were again held this year and proved very 
successful.”455 Other than the first year for these parties, local children were never again referred 
to as “Indian or white.” Instead they were just children from the local grade schools.456  
Interviewees indicated that the two local grade schools were attended by Cree, mixed ancestry 
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and non-Indigenous children and that these children came from both the town and the village. 
That is, the community schools were diverse. Interviewees gave no indication that children were 
excluded from Christmas parties based on where they lived or whether they were Indigenous or 
non-Indigenous.   
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, interviewees often referred to recreational 
activities during the radar base time period. They also indicated that their involvement in 
recreational and social events was one of the most positive aspects of being situated beside the 
radar base. Interviewees indicated that they felt part of the Moosonee radar base, stating that they 
“were always visiting.”  One interviewee specified “we used to visit on the base and people used 
to visit in town. I met so many people from the base that I can’t remember them all.” 457  It is 
important to note, however, that the wide range of recreational and social activities was not an 
accident.  Instead it appeared to be part of what the military referred to as good public relations. 
For example, a senior officer who visited the Moosonee base in 1968 wrote later that “It was also 
apparent that the base enjoys an admirable relationship with the townspeople of Moosonee and 
surrounding locality.”458 This comment shows that it was important to the local commanding 
officer, in this case Major Misener, to be able to demonstrate camaraderie or at least good local 
public relations. Good public relations were also broad enough to include both civilian 
employees and people who lived beyond the base.  
The radar base was not always a safe place to live or work. For example, both base 
residents and civilian workers were exposed to environmental hazards.   Two examples of 
environmental contaminants that were used on the base were DDT and creosote.  It appears to 
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have been commonplace to spray the radar base area with DDT in order to reduce the number of 
black flies and mosquitoes, which one interviewee stated “were hated by the air force folks.”459 
To illustrate, the 1968 AHR included the following entry:  “June 23, 1968: Second Annual air 
spray for mosquitoes, black flies, etc. was carried out…spray was very successful.” 460 Two 
interviewees indicated that they observed aerial spraying for black flies.  In one case, it appears 
that civilian employees were not warned about the spray activity and that they were working 
outside when the planes dispersed chemicals.  One interviewee mentioned that residents of the 
PMQs were marginally protected as they were generally advised to stay inside during aerial 
spraying. The same individual indicated that “PMQ kids were back out playing on the sprayed 
lawns within ten minutes of the plane leaving.” In addition to the recollections of interviewees, 
there are 1964 photos on a Pinetree Line website which show a DC3 airplane spraying near the 
radar base recreation centre.
461
  One interviewee also indicated that it was common to see “fog-
like clouds” on the radar base early in the morning, after pesticides had been manually applied to 
ditches using hand sprayers. It was not clear if such spraying was conducted by military 
personnel or civilians.  
Furthermore, on the issue of exposure to harmful chemicals, one interviewee mentioned 
that civilian employees were responsible for coating wooden boards with creosote and that this 
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www.dtic.mil/ADA506261/ADPO23973, Accessed 8 August 2013.  This report describes aerial spraying of 
American military bases from 1962-1973. The purpose of the spraying was to reduce insects. 
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work was generally done by Indigenous employees. The boards were then placed across ditches 
in front of PMQs and thus provided access to homes. The employees were outfitted in full rain 
suits and gloves but this was clearly not a preferred chore and it would have meant some 
exposure to chemicals. Military personnel, women and children would have also been exposed to 
creosote by virtue of using these walkways.  
Environmental contamination continued at other radar base sites many years after they 
were closed. Recent accounts have documented such contamination at both DEW line bases and 
Mid-Canada radar sites. Arthur Johnson focused on the huge numbers of abandoned fuel drums 
left at or near DEW line sites and the very expensive remediation efforts which are still 
underway in the north.
462
 McCreanor et al. documented chemical contamination of water and soil 
at former Mid-Canada line radar sites, including one site north of Moosonee on James Bay.
463
 It 
is beyond the scope of this study to describe environmental contamination issues more 
thoroughly but it is important to note that life on a radar base was not completely safe.  
Discussion  
The description in this chapter of people and activities on the base shows the generally 
positive impacts that the base had on local people.  The most significant, positive impacts were 
the provision of employment and the access to recreational activities. This study suggests that the 
apparently family-friendly and employee-friendly Moosonee base reached out to the 
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neighbouring community, thereby broadening the concept of a positive radar base environment 
to a generally positive community environment.  
There was, however, a dichotomy of lifestyles between the base and the town that was 
evident every single day that civilians from Moosonee came to work there.  Civilian employees 
witnessed on a daily basis services and infrastructure that they did not have access to in their 
own parts of the town and village. Furthermore, they managed these services and the associated 
infrastructure for others. For example, civilians ran the power plant, and the water and sewer 
services. Additionally, some of the civilians cleaned the barracks and Messes and checked the 
PMQ homes for fire safety.  Then they went home to houses that most often had no electricity, 
no potable drinking water and no sewage disposal system. Civilian employees, and other town 
residents, also had no paved roads in the residential areas in Moosonee.  This last fact seemed to 
be particularly irksome to interviewees.  Several people asked “Why should the only paved road 
in Moosonee in the 60s and 70s be the one leading to the base?”464 During the radar base’s years, 
grumbling about paved roads quickly expanded into intense inquiries about water and sewer 
facilities, fire protection services and other community requirements. 
The next chapter deals with the disparity between the modern infrastructure on the radar 
base and the very limited services and infrastructure available within the town and the area south 
of town known as the village.  It also describes the years of planning and construction needed to 
bring the town’s facilities and structures up to standards that approached those on the radar base.  
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Chapter Seven: Water, Fire and Moosonee: The Development of Local Infrastructure and 
Services 
 
 
This chapter focuses on infrastructure related to three community services: water supply 
and sewage treatment, fire protection, and garbage disposal.
465
 These services are useful in 
depicting the impacts of the RCAF radar base. The discussion of water and sewer services has a 
dual purpose. First, it shows the impact on the town of Moosonee of population growth due to 
military development. Second, the discussion of infrastructure shows how difficult it is to 
remediate an environmental infrastructure issue, rather than to plan for infrastructure before 
development occurs.  
The relationship of water, sewer and population change is simple. As Paul and Anne 
Erhlich explain: 
If a few people per mile live along a large river, their sewage may be dumped directly 
into the river and natural purification will occur. But if the population increases, the 
waste-degrading ability of the river becomes overstrained, and either the sewage or the 
intake water must be treated if the river water is to be safe for drinking.
466
 
In Moosonee’s case, the water from the Moose River was declared “satisfactory” in 1959, two 
years before the radar base opened.
467
  However, by early 1961 -- even before the radar base 
officially opened -- the Department of Health began to report serious water quality and sanitation 
issues due to the increasing population and lack of sewer services. The RCAF was not 
responsible for Moosonee’s water and sewer services, but the very presence of the base and its 
promise of potential employment caused environmental damage to the adjacent community. The 
                                                 
465
 Water and Sewer are integrally connected and therefore they are discussed as one service group. 
466
 Ehrlich, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, Population, Resources, Environment: Issues in Human Ecology, (San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1970) ,128. 
467
 AO, RG 84-22, B120655, Ontario Water Resources Commission (OWRC), Division of Sanitary 
Engineering. File: Federal Government RCAF Station-Moosonee, Memos and reports, 27 January 1959 to 21 July 
1959. These memos will be discussed further in this chapter.   
 135 
connections between the radar base, population growth and water and sewer facilities will be 
discussed in this chapter. The operation of water and sewer facilities was also so integrally 
connected to the provision of electrical power by the RCAF that this topic is also covered in the 
first part of this chapter.  
The second service discussed in this chapter – fire protection – is used as an example of 
how a community can develop a dependency on the provision of a service from another agency. 
In this case, Moosonee came to rely on fire protection services from the RCAF base. This 
dependency could not continue indefinitely, especially when the radar base cut back its own 
facilities and services.  
 The third service area examined in this chapter is garbage disposal. This service is an 
example of infrastructure that was shared by the town of Moosonee and the RCAF. In fact, the 
landfill was likely the only physical infrastructure that was not planned as part of the RCAF 
build up for the new radar base, and yet it was ultimately a quasi-integrated project.
468
  
Water and Sewer Services 
 On 4 July 1966, J. W. Spooner, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, provided a list of 
recent municipal legislation to Premier John Robarts. On the list was the Moosonee 
Development Area Board (MDAB) Act, which had received third reading a few days earlier. 
Spooner indicated that: 
This Act is to provide a corporate status for the Moosonee area and to provide a board 
which will have the powers of a municipality in certain limited matters without in fact 
being a municipality. It will permit contracts to be made for the installation of sewer and 
                                                 
468
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water services which are necessary for the immediate development proposals in this 
area.
469
  
Spooner’s description of creating a very limited board is likely one of the least enthusiastic 
municipal descriptions in the archives. Also, although Spooner indicated the services were 
needed for development, everyone -- including the Premier -- likely knew that the real reason for 
water and sewer contracts was to prevent a community health crisis.  
Issues of contaminated water, and inadequate sewage collection and treatment, had been 
ongoing in Moosonee for half a decade by the time Spooner wrote to Premier Robarts. Only part 
of Moosonee had piped, treated water when the RCAF arrived in 1958 to start planning the air 
base. Water from Store Creek was chlorinated by the ONR and then stored in its water tower 
(located just west of the train station) before being distributed to a small area of town.
470
 The 
ONR’s legal department showed water lines on only two streets in 1964; Henry Crescent (which 
followed the north side of Store Creek) and a small part of Ferguson Road (parallel to the 
Waterfront and crossing First Street).
471
 A 1966 map showed a slightly larger distribution 
system, with another water pipe along Second Avenue (Bay Road) passing the Roman Catholic 
Hospital and HBC store before ending near Second Street.
472
 See Map 5.1 in Chapter Five for the 
location of streets in the 1964 and 1966 maps. 
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Department of Municipal Affairs paid ONR for a “Water line extension” during December 1964. Although ONR’s 
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Interviewees have confirmed that the hospital and public school were connected to the 
water system and that some people carried water from these two locations to their homes. Others 
have said that they carried their drinking water, using a yoke, directly from the Moose River to 
their homes. People who lived south of Store Creek would have carried water from Store Creek, 
or possibly from the Moose River. None of the archival material shows sewage pipes or any 
form of community sewage treatment within Moosonee at the time of the opening of the RCAF 
base. 
For most of the 1960s, various health departments and agencies wrote to provincial 
planners with health concerns related to water and sewer systems in Moosonee. These reports 
ranged from advising of unsanitary conditions to warning of the potential for epidemics in 
Moosonee. In August 1960, W.G. Cooke, an Assistant Chief Sanitary Inspector from the Ontario 
Department of Health, described the ongoing construction of the radar base and noted that the 
RCAF would have its own water and sewer systems. He then warned that:   
The O. N. Railway supplies treated water and electricity to residents of the townsite. 
Conditions are unsuitable for private (water carried) sewage disposal systems. Since local 
labour is to be employed in the defence project, an influx of Indians and others can be 
anticipated, with resulting sanitation problems.
473
 
In fact, the population of Moosonee had already grown considerably.  In 1951 Moosonee had a 
population of 124 people. This number doubled by 1956, the year after defence construction 
started on the Moosonee airstrip. Between 1956 and 1961, the population quadrupled – from 237 
people in 1956 to 975 in 1961 (see Table 4.1 in Chapter Four). A month after the Cooke report, 
                                                                                                                                                             
invoice did not specify the location of the extension, the timing would seem to indicate that this is the slightly larger 
area shown on the 1966 map. See File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66, R. A. Groves, Chief Accountant for Department of 
Municipal Affairs, memo to Minister Spooner. Subject: Moosonee Costs, 28 August 1965.    
473
 AO, RG 19-77, B388332, File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63. Memo from W. G. Cooke, Department of 
Health to Deputy Minister Cumming, Department of Municipal Affairs. 19 August 1960. Cooke’s reference to 
private sewage disposal systems is likely to septic tanks and tile drainage beds. References to ‘sanitation’ throughout 
this chapter generally refer to sewage disposal. 
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A.L.S. Nash, from the Department of Municipal Affairs, briefed his Deputy Minister, and echoed 
Cooke’s concerns: 
Moosonee has generally been a creature of the Ontario Northland Railway in that the 
railway has, in the past, owned most of the land and has wielded what little degree of 
supervision of development there has existed. The Railway has attempted to provide a 
limited domestic water and electric power supply … and has attempted to keep the 
townsite roads and drainage facilities in a ‘just less than dangerous’ condition. 
If the population were to remain stable at about the 700 level the present primitive 
arrangements for meeting basic community needs might continue to work, particularly if 
a more appropriate method could be found for disposing of sewage wastes. 
However, the population will not remain stable and in our view the present arrangements 
for the provision of services and general administration will be totally inadequate in a 
short time. 
474
 
 
Nash then elaborated on the reasons for population growth starting with the construction of the 
radar base. He indicated that the base would bring associated commercial and servicing 
employment and would “attract a further population to Moosonee.”475 He also suggested that 
existing proposals for harbour development would enlarge the number of town residents.  
During 1961 there were two reports on sanitary conditions in Moosonee and Moose 
Factory. W. H. Oerton, from the Ontario Department of Health, indicated in a report dated 23 
June that “chlorinated river water [is] supplied by the ONR at Moosonee. [However], some 
Indians are certain to be using raw river water.” 476 Water studies conducted by the Ontario 
Water Resources Commission (OWRC) in 1958 and 1959 had shown that river water was free of 
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 AO, RG 19-77, B388332, File 117.8 Moosonee 1960-63, A. L. S. Nash, Director Community Planning 
to L.H. Cumming, Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, 28 September 1960. This memo was actually written by 
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 AO, RG 9-1, B113127. Townsite Committee Studies, W. H. Oerton, Provincial Sanitary Inspector, 
Department of Health to W. G. Cooke, Acting Chief Sanitary Inspector, Department of Health, Re: Sanitary Survey 
of Moosonee, 23 June 1961, 2.  
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bacteria.
477
  However, in 1961 Oerton indicated a potential problem with using water from the 
Moose River:  
At Moosonee there are various types of pit privies, cesspools and septic tanks, the 
effluent from which discharges into ditches at the sides of the streets. This eventually 
finds its way into the Moose River…. 
 The septic tanks and cesspools discharge into the road ditches due to the fact that tile 
disposal beds do not function in this ground, which consists of two feet of muskeg. 
478
 
Oerton also indicated that there were a few “privies” or outhouses in the area south of Store 
Creek.  He laid the blame for poor conditions solely on the ONR by saying “Although the 
Ontario Northland Railway Commission own all the unsold lots … they will accept little if any 
responsibility for conditions in the townsite [other than] occasional work on the roads and 
ditches but little else.”479 Oerton did mention, however; that the ONR had recently frozen land 
sales in Moosonee with the goal of ensuring orderly development. Like his colleague, W. G. 
Cooke, Oerton concluded that people were moving to Moosonee to look for work, and that this 
factor was responsible for sewage disposal issues. Specifically, he stated, “Indians have come to 
this area from reservations up both coasts of James Bay, mainly to obtain employment.”480 
Figure 7.1 shows the quadrupling of Moosonee’s population between 1956 and 1961 even before 
the RCAF base opened.
481
 The anticipation of employment at the radar base caused part of the 
population boom in the town even as environmental conditions worsened.  
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The freeze on land sales was noted by K. H. Sharpe of the OWRC towards the end of 
1961. Sharpe wrote that some of the employment (and therefore population) growth in Moosonee 
was due to “contractors engaged in the construction of the RCAF Station.”482 Furthermore, he 
echoed Oerton’s concerns about defective septic systems and warned that “A hazard to health 
exists in the Moosonee area due to inadequate sewage disposal facilities.
483
  
What this series of memos shows is that the radar base was affecting development in 
Moosonee at the most basic of local services: sewage disposal.  In 1962, the Globe and Mail 
mentioned the local health issues in an article titled “Municipality Status Studied for Moosonee 
by Cabinet Committee.” Globe reporter John Miller noted that “With no sewerage and an 
                                                 
482
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inadequate water supply, there is danger of a serious health hazard.”484 OWRC’s Sharpe 
recommended a solution for Moosonee. He wrote that, “The Air Force Station under 
construction will have sewer and water services. Consideration should be given to servicing the 
built-up area of Moosonee into the RCAF Station sewage plans.”485 Sharpe did not just file his 
report. Instead he followed up with the ONR to ask it “if any action had been taken on these 
recommendations.”486 The ONR responded by requesting a cost estimate for a sewage system. 487 
The sewage system estimate was developed by the OWRC in March 1962 using 
engineering data from the firm that worked on the Moosonee RCAF station. The proposed 
sewage system costs of $365,000 were thus based on the type of plant that was being constructed 
on the RCAF base. 
488
 The OWRC’s estimate was comprehensive, covering both the Moosonee 
Townsite and the area south of Store Creek and assuming population growth from the current 
(1962) level of 1,000 people to about 3,200. 
489
  The OWRC staff also explained in its estimates 
why Moosonee could not simply hook up to the RCAF sewage plant. They stated that the RCAF 
plant was much smaller than the OWRC realized (about a third of the size they had anticipated) 
so that “there is no reserve capacity.” OWRC also added “It was not considered economical to 
carry the sanitary wastes from Moosonee easterly 6,500 feet … to the RCAF Station.” 490 What 
the report seemed to be saying is that the earlier concept of integrating the town and the air base 
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might not have worked anyway – even if the political leaders had been receptive to it. However, 
at least the extensive planning for the radar base helped save some time and money in terms of 
planning for Moosonee’s own system. 
A few months later there had been no decision on building a sewage system but land 
sales continued to be frozen. In 1963 the OWRC delivered its most damning report about health 
risks in Moosonee. The District Engineer for OWRC, C.H. Kretch, indicated that “the sanitary 
conditions in Moosonee are very unsatisfactory and constitute a definite hazard to the public 
health.”491 Kretch’s letter is important because it is one of the few that described how landscape, 
pollution, and disease were linked at Moosonee. Kretch explained this as follows: 
The relatively level terrain and muskeg nature of the soil, combined with a high ground 
water table, make the operation of sub-surface drainage systems unsatisfactory. The 
result is that septic tank effluent, which is tantamount to raw sewage, is either lying or 
flowing in the ditches of almost all of the main streets in the townsite…eleven [town] 
drains were found to be discharging wastes directly to the Moose River. Some drains also 
discharge to Store Creek downstream from the water works intake. 
All …samples collected in Moosonee …contained Escherichia coli [e-coli], some in 
concentrations of millions… The presence of these bacteria in large numbers indicates 
that … diseases as typhoid fever and poliomyelitis could be present.  
At the time of this investigation children and dogs were playing in the ditches. When it is 
remembered that … liquid collected from these ditches … [is] equivalent to raw sewage 
… the seriousness of the sanitation problem in Moosonee can be appreciated. Such 
diseases as typhoid fever, paratyphoid fever, poliomyelitis, and dysentery, plus others, are 
transmitted by sewage… The possibility of an epidemic of a communicable disease, such 
as typhoid fever, [is] a very real one.
492
 
Kretch also wrote that, during spring thaw, ice jams could back up in Store Creek and cause the 
polluted waters of the creek to flow back over the ONR’s dam – a dam that held back water 
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intended for the townsite’s piped drinking water supplies.  Kretch concluded in his report that 
there was a “dire need” for sewage treatment facilities in Moosonee. It is ironic that the issues he 
outlined were more serious in the Moosonee townsite, rather than in the area south of Store 
Creek.  Residents and business owners in the townsite were constructing standard sewage 
disposal systems—septic tanks and tile drainage beds—but these systems were failing. People 
who lived south of Store Creek were using outhouses or ‘privies.’ Moreover, the town’s drains 
flowed into both the Moose River and Store Creek, and both of these waterways were used as 
drinking water supplies by the town and village residents.  
 There is no indication that an epidemic resulted from the poor water conditions, however, 
there are also no detailed records of stomach flu and other disorders for this time period. 
Epidemics were considered serious as demonstrated by the RCAF Annual Historical Reports, 
which show that station personnel and dependents were inoculated for typhoid in September 
1966.
493
  
 Several provincial ministries would weigh in on sewage costs during the five year period 
after the 1962 cost estimate. The Cabinet Committee on Townsites received two such reports, 
from the Department of Economics and Development (DED), during 1962.  The first, by H. F. 
Crown, indicated that Moosonee was critical “as a railhead and shipping centre to service 
defence establishments in the lower Hudson Bay/James Bay region.”494 However, Crown’s 
report also noted some problems with the town becoming a regional centre. For example, he 
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indicated that the ONR had fifty applications to purchase lots but that it could not sell any more 
lots until “sanitation and municipal services had been resolved.” 495 Crown also indicated that 
there was a development and services quandary; the ONR, the party that owned almost all of 
Moosonee’s land, “has no authority, nor does it wish to provide these additional municipal 
services.” 496  
The Department of Economics and Development recognized that the province would 
likely need to install the required sewage treatment plant and pipes, since there was no municipal 
authority available to do this.  However, DED recognized that there could be province-wide 
impacts if the province provided money in Moosonee and not elsewhere.
497
 Finally, the Crown 
report concluded that the province could have shared a sewage treatment system with the RCAF 
but had not taken advantage of this opportunity.
498
 
 Later in 1962, a second report from DED emphasized that development in Moosonee 
“has been virtually brought to a standstill because of the ban on selling any further lots [due to 
sewage issues].”499 This report reiterated the suggestion that the ONR did not consider servicing 
lots to be part of its role.  The author, Al Etchen, added that the ONTC “is in poor financial 
shape [and] is not in position to finance either the installation of a sanitary sewage system… or 
any further extension of electricity or water services.”500 Etchen also described the extra-
municipal role of the ONR and indicated that the ONR did not consider providing sewage 
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services as “part of its function. The function of the Commission is to operate the Railway and its 
ancillary road and water services.” 501At this point, one wonders why the ONR was ever allowed 
to sell land, because it appears that this was not part of its role either.  Nevertheless, the ONR did 
engage an engineering firm in late 1963 to review Kretch’s report.502 The ONR Commissioners 
agreed with the firm’s recommendations that construction of a sewage system be combined with 
the extension of existing water lines and the reconstruction of roads and ditches in Moosonee.
503
 
In other words, although the ONR did not want to finance a costly sewage treatment system, it 
now wanted to see the expansion of the sewer works into a full water, sewer and roads 
reconstruction project. 
 By 1963, letters and reports shifted focus from the town to the area south of Store Creek. 
A Department of Public Welfare employee, Wendy Thomas, filed a 23 August 1963 report 
which noted serious concerns with both water and sewer services: 
One of the biggest health hazards are the open ditches which breed all manner of insects 
as well as producing an unpleasant stanch [sic]. It is common to see the children playing 
in these. The Moose River is a favourite swimming spot of the Indian children and is 
unclean for that purpose.  
Water for the village is carried – often by the children – in unclean pails from the creek or 
River. Both of these water bodies have shown high E coli counts … Some walk long 
distances to the [Roman Catholic] Mission to get good drinking water. 
There is only one privy to every 1.7 households. Most of these are filthy and not useable. 
There is no night soil or garbage collection. … It is easy to understand, therefore, the 
high incidence of food poisoning, vomiting, diarrhea, skin infection, septic conditions 
and diseases of the upper respiratory tract.
504
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Thomas also noted good hygiene was prevented by “a good and readily available water 
supply.”505  
A month after Thomas’ report, the Department of Health again warned of the danger of 
drinking water from Store Creek.  This warning was ominous; especially as it does not appear 
that the residents who took water from the creek were aware of the hazardous condition of local 
drinking water.
506
  There are few records of comments from residents on the water and sewer 
issues.  However a ‘fact finding tour’ organized by the Department of Education did record some 
community concerns including comments such as:  “Ontario Northland sits on its fanny – afraid 
of sewer responsibility,” and “Septic tanks have a straight gut to the nearest ditch.” 507  
 Although the ONR appeared to be refraining from taking action, its correspondence 
showed an increasing concern over sewage issues.  For example, Allister Johnston, the Chair of 
the ONR, wrote to J.W.Spooner, Minister of Municipal Affairs, stating “I [have] had a 
discussion with the Prime Minister in connection with the extremely dangerous situation in 
Moosonee with respect to the sewerage system.” 508 Johnston then explained that the ONR could 
not afford to fix the sewage problem due to recent, unspecified “heavy financial burdens.”509  
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Johnston suggested that another branch of the bureaucracy – the Department of Economics and 
Development – construct a sewer system. Spooner responded that he hoped to take the issue to 
Cabinet soon but had deferred it to the Committee on Townsites for their recommendation.
510
 No 
one seemed to have the authority or sole responsibility for this complex decision. 
 The sole goal of Cabinet seemed to be to ‘patch things up” rather than to deal 
comprehensively with the situation. Specifically, the ONR was given funds for a “Moosonee 
maintenance” project, beginning at the end of 1963; essentially Cabinet paid the ONR to provide 
some limited services to Moosonee. For example, the ONR billed the Ontario government $3500 
for the construction of one water line and tap in the “Indian Village.” 511 By the end of 1964, the 
ONR started to bill the province for the supply of water to the Indian Village. 
512
  The use of a 
single water outlet for the Village continued for over five years, even as the rest of the 
community began to receive piped water and sewer systems to service individual homes. This 
quasi-municipal arrangement will be further discussed in the next Chapter.   
The inadequacy of this system generated comments from both government staff and 
consultants. In 1964 the Department of Health recommended that there be at least three water 
outlets for the 900 people living south of Store Creek.  W.G. Cooke indicated that, “Families that 
must carry water the maximum distance from the present outlet (half mile) will be discouraged 
from using water freely for personal hygiene and they may turn to readily available polluted 
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supplies.
513
 A planning report released in April 1964 confirmed Cooke’s prediction that people 
would continue to use ‘available polluted supplies’.  Project Planning Associates described the 
situation in ‘the village’ as follows: 
Fewer than half [of the houses] have latrines. Frequently toilet facilities are pails kept in a 
corner. … There is no garbage removal or night soil collection and waste and refuse is 
either dumped in the bush or into the creek or river. Both water bodies [Store Creek and 
the Moose River] show high E coli counts and while the new communal water house [the 
water pipe outlet] now serves about 1/3 of the village, the remainder still draw their water 
from the creek or river.
514
 
The Project Planning Associates’ report, which had been commissioned by the ONR, was 
immediately labeled as “strictly private” and “confidential” when it was received by Department 
of Municipal Affairs.
515
  
Meanwhile the press continued to spread the word about conditions in Moosonee. In 
February 1965, the Toronto Telegram interviewed Tom Archibald, whom it referred to as “the 
accepted leader of the Cree Indian community in Moosonee.”516 The Telegram reported that, 
although Archibald was a full-time employee at “the Air Force base in Moosonee,” he lived “in a 
shack in … the Indian Village [that] is liable to an epidemic through lack of any communal 
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discussed further in the chapter on Local Government. Also see W.G.Cooke to Don Taylor, September 10, 1963, 
earlier in this chapter. Cooke’s memo refers to Archibald as the Chairman of the local citizen’s committee. 
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sewage system.” Archibald was quoted in the article that “[the construction of] a sewage system 
… will end the illness that comes every summer.”517 
Later in 1965, the combination of memos, reports, and media coverage had results.   As 
Don Taylor indicated in a briefing “A serious sanitation problem and an extremely bad press [in 
1965]” had caused the government to start the Moosonee servicing program.518 The Minister of 
Energy and Resources Management, J.R.Simonett, wrote to Premier Robarts on 8 September 
1965 to initiate the process: 
Last week while at Moosonee a group of the townspeople requested a meeting with Mr. 
Spooner and me. Among other things, the matter of water supply and sewage disposal for 
the townsite was discussed. I would like to recommend that the Ontario Water Resources 
Commission be asked to update [water and sewage] figures…and that the Ontario 
Government provide these services for the Moosonee townsite.
519
 
Clearly Simonett’s opinion counted. Less than a week later, Don Taylor was notified by Minister 
Spooner that “the P.M. [Premier] had instructed OWRC to get moving on providing sewers and 
water supply in Moosonee.” 520 A month later, after meeting with the OWRC, Taylor confirmed 
that they were “being pushed into position where they must have plans for new water supply and 
sewage system for Moosonee soon.” 521  
In order to expedite the process, the OWRC requested water and sewer construction costs 
for the Moosonee RCAF station from the Department of National Defence (DND).  These costs, 
                                                 
517 Ibid., Pennington, The Telegram. 
518 AO, RG19 F-7, B350920. General Admin. Moosonee Development Board. Don Taylor to Deputy 
Minister Palmer, 6 April 1967. This briefing material from a 1967 file referred to the 1965 decision to proceed with 
public works in Moosonee. 
519 AO, RG 19-77 B388332. File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Minister Simonett, Department of Energy and 
Resources Management, to Premier Robarts, 8 September 1965. Simonett also recommended that ONR be removed 
as the manager of the area. This will be dealt with in the next chapter on Local Governance. 
520 File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Don Taylor to Deputy Minister Palmer, Municipal Affairs, 20 
September 1965. Taylor says in this memo that he was told about the Premier’s instructions on September 14th 
(only six days after Simonetti requested action from the Premier). 
521 Don Taylor to Deputy Palmer, 18 October 1965. 
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based on work done in 1960 and 1961, totaled just under $1 million for a dam, water distribution 
system, water treatment plant, sewage collection system and sewage treatment plant. 
522
 The 
ability to use the DND cost reports likely saved some time in what had become an urgent 
process. The OWRC developed an estimate of $2.1 million for the first four contracts, possibly 
after considering that the area they would be servicing was about the same size as the base, but 
that it needed ditches, culverts and major roadwork. 
523
  The contract was also designed to 
accommodate projected growth in Moosonee’s population to 2,300. 524 
By 23 April 1966 the Globe and Mail announced that “The OWRC has let a contract for 
a sewer and water system for Moosonee.” The Globe article, titled “Sewerage for Moosonee,” 
indicated that the project would likely cost $2 million and that, in terms of sewer and water 
facilities, “the town now has none.” The Globe and Mail article also noted that the lack of sewer 
and water facilities was holding up the construction of a $1 million school, the James Bay 
Education Centre (JBEC), which had already been announced by William Davis, the Minister of 
Education.
525
 He was one of the Ontario Cabinet members pushing for speedy sewer and water 
construction, as without it, his own project, the JBEC could not be operational.
526
 As Don Taylor 
                                                 
522 AO, RG84-22, B120655.  Federal Government: RCAF Station-Moosonee. R. B. Whiting, DND to K. 
Sharpe, OWRC, 8 November  1965. Note that this was the second time in three years that OWRC had benefitted 
from RCAF cost estimates. In 1962, OWRC had obtained sewage system estimates from the RCAF. See 
Townshend, 26 March 1962 earlier in this chapter. 
523 Ontario, Sessional Papers, OWRC Annual Report for Year End 1966, p. 13. 
524 File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Minister Spooner to Premier Robarts, 11March 1966. 
525 John Dafoe, “Sewerage for Moosonee,” Globe and Mail, April 23, 1966 The development of the 
school, known as the James Bay Education Centre is beyond the scope of this thesis, however it is worth noting that 
it was located within the first Contract, on First Street. 
526 File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Meeting concerning Moosonee Development, 17 September 1965. 
Meeting minutes of OWRC and other ministries regarding “Moosonee Development” indicate staff  were well aware 
that “the Minister of Education, the Hon. Mr. Davis [wanted] this project [to] proceed without delay.”  
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reported, “[the] Education complex timing necessitated that Department of Municipal Affairs … 
undertake [the] first stage of public services (along First Street).” 527  
Provincial staff and politicians had hoped that sewer and water tenders could be issued by 
the new Moosonee Development Area Board, but the MDAB Act did not receive third reading 
until the end of June 1966 and it was not enacted until August 1968. So the first round of tenders 
had to be issued by the province itself.  Construction, however, did not begin until after the 
MDAB Act was passed in 1966 and the building of the JBEC was delayed until mid-1969.
528
  
Most of Moosonee’s water and sewer system was constructed over the three year period 
from September 1966 to October 1969.  The OWRC estimated, at the end of 1969, that the final 
costs would be in the area of $2.5 million.
529
  Two areas were excluded from the initial contracts; 
the Village and the town’s industrial area.  Department of Municipal Affairs hoped to gain 
federal funding for the Village’s work before proceeding because most of the residents south of 
the Creek were Indigenous, but the funding requests were not successful.
530
  The other area that 
was excluded was the industrial warehouse area along the Moose River shoreline between the 
town and the radar base. In August 1967 business owners in the warehouse area petitioned for 
water and sewer services and indicated that there was a fire hazard in their area since there were 
                                                 
527 AO, RG19 F-7. B350920. “General Admin. Moosonee Development Board.”  Don Taylor to Deputy 
Minister Palmer, 6 April 1967.  
528 Rudy Platiel, “Teachers, Indians picket Davis, Brunelle in Moosonee.” Globe and Mail, Toronto, page 
9, June 16, 1969. MPP William Davis was the Minister of Education in 1969 and therefore he was in Moosonee in 
June, 1969 to open JBEC. 
529 OWRC Annual Report, 1969.  Construction timelines and specific costs for the major contracts are 
summarized in Appendix Five. These costs total just over $2 million.  It is possible that the 1969 OWRC estimate of 
$2.5 million was higher than $2 million because it could have included borrowing costs.  
530 AO, RG 19-5, B269767. Cochrane-Moosonee Townsite General, OWRC meeting on January 18, 1967. 
Also see AO3, File 118.4 Moosonee 1967 for February 1967 meeting notes regarding joint session of ONTC, 
OWRC and Department of Municipal Affairs to discuss Moosonee construction issues. 
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no fire hydrants close to oil storage tanks and warehouses.
531
 Planners reported that the 
warehouse area was deferred primarily because they wanted to focus the first construction 
contracts on areas in the core of the Moosonee townsite.
532
 
By January 1968 people living south of Store Creek were demanding equal access to 
local services, particularly clean drinking water and sewage services. A petition sent to the 
Department of Municipal Affairs used language reminiscent of Wendy Thomas’ welfare report 
in 1963. Petitioners stated, “Not only would the availability of running water ease the daily 
chores of the women [south of Store Creek], but [it] would be of great importance in improving 
the general hygiene of the community.” 533  
Around the same time as local residents voiced their concerns to Municipal Affairs, Paul 
Wilkinson, a Community Development Worker from Department of Social and Family Services, 
started to write to his supervisors about the connections between the provision of water and 
sewer services and the high cost of building lots. Wilkinson indicated that some residents “would 
like to have running water so that their children might take a bath occasionally.”534  Although he 
focused on living conditions such as water, sewer and housing, Wilkinson was also one of the 
few people to document the systems’ dynamics related to provision of water and sewer services, 
                                                 
531 AO, RG 19-77 B354517. File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68. E.R. Butcher, Imperial Oil Ltd and petitioners 
to Minister Spooner, 7 August 1967.  
532 File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68. Don Taylor to Minister Spooner, re: “Moosonee – Servicing,” 
30August  1967.  Also see Claudia Milne, Master’s.Thesis 1974. The maps in this thesis show that the Revillon 
Road industrial area received water services and hydrants by 1974, but not sewer services. 
533 AO, RG 19-F-7, B350920. General Admin. Moosonee Development Board, Petition to Don Taylor, 17 
January 1968.   
534  AO, File 118.5 Moosonee 1967-68, P. Wilkinson, Department of Social and Family Services (DSFS) 
to E. V. Ralph, Indian Development Branch, DSFS, 15 December 1967. Over time, Wilkinson started to copy the 
local MPP Rene Brunelle and even opposition MPPs.  It would have been, and still is, extremely uncommon for a 
provincial civil servant to write to, or to copy, an elected representative of the provincial government, but this 
practice shows the frustration Wilkinson had with the slow pace of change in the Village area of Moosonee. 
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housing and local employment.  He described the high cost of lots within the Moosonee townsite 
due to the provision of sewer and water and how people felt about this situation: 
Those who own lots on the south side of the creek …feel they are being discriminated 
against since they are in effect being told that if they want services they must move 
across the creek and pay $2,000 to $3,000 for a lot which was worth no more than their 
own until a bureaucratic decision was made to service only the lots on the north side of 
the creek. 
535
 
Wilkinson also indicated that those local residents who were fully employed, including “men 
who worked for the RCAF base, Hudson’s Bay Company or the Ontario Northland Railway,” 
could buy vacant lots in town and receive financial assistance from the Indian Affairs Branch for 
the lot and for the cost of building a home. Wilkinson referred to the employed men as a “small 
but fortunate group.” 536 In essence Wilkinson was showing the connection between employment 
opportunities, servicing of lots and inflated costs for building lots. He was demonstrating that the 
average vacant lot had been pushed out of the price range of many local residents because such 
lots were now fully serviced. A fifth contract was finally authorized later in 1968 to provide 
services south of Store Creek and in the industrial warehouse area, followed by a sixth contract 
to construct a new bridge across Store Creek.
537
  It is very doubtful if these last two contracts 
would have been signed without the lobbying done by local citizens and by individuals like Paul 
Wilkinson.  
In particular, the Village area presented complex servicing and construction issues. The 
main problem was that the placement of sewer and water pipes required houses to be located on 
                                                 
535 File 118.5, Moosonee 1967-68, Wilkinson to Don Taylor, 29 December 1967.   
536 Ibid. It is not clear if Wilkinson is referring to the provincial or federal “Indian Affairs Branch.” 
537
 AO, File 119.4 Moosonee 1969. Department of Municipal Affairs. “Report to the Treasury Board: 
Moosonee.”   Also see File 119.1 Moosonee 1968. McKeough to Brunelle, 26 August 1968. The OWRC Annual 
Report for 1969 states “due to the failure of the banks of the creek as a result of the contractor’s operations, the 
project was not completed. Alternative means of crossing the creek are being investigated.”  By July 1969 the 
existing old Store Creek bridge was temporarily replaced by a Bailey Bridge loaned by Department of Transport. 
See Hewson to McKeough, 14 July 1970 in AO, “Minister’s Tour-Moosonee 1970.” 
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standard lots and relatively straight roads, which was certainly not the case for a large number of 
these houses. This issue was actually addressed by the Moosonee Development Area Board 
(MDAB) shortly after it was formed in 1968. In order to move beyond a problem which seemed 
unsolvable, the MDAB’s members indicated they would encourage Village residents to move 
their homes onto regular lots in order to speed up the construction of improvements to this area. 
The Board expressed these opinions within two days of taking office. 
538
 Furthermore, the 
MDAB indicated that it would pay for the demolition of some shacks, provide compensation to 
owners, and also provide them with building lots where this was absolutely necessary.
539
  
The problem of extending the infrastructure was exacerbated by the fact that the 
provision of water and sewer services required the installation of private plumbing within a large 
number of homes that did not yet have such facilities.
540
  In other words, contractors were 
constructing expensive pipes coming from the water plant, and other pipes leading to the sewage 
plant, but people could not afford to construct inside plumbing in their homes that could connect 
to these systems. The members of the MDAB recommended that, rather than waiting for people 
to renovate their homes with conventional plumbing and then extend pipes through 
neighbourhoods, it made sense to construct the water and sewer pipes first, thus encouraging 
residents to “improve their housing.”541 Provincial planners were initially aghast at the concept 
                                                 
538
 AO, RG19-77 B354517. File 119.2 Moosonee 1968.  F. A. Braybrook to Deputy Minister Palmer, re: 
“Report on the Organization of the Moosonee Development Area Board – Current Administrative and Other Matters 
Affecting the Board” 9 September 1968. Although the report was dated September 9th, Braybrook wrote that he 
toured the Village, with the new MDAB members, on August 30
th
, two days after their inaugural meeting.  Board 
members told Braybrook they wanted immediate action on services for the Village.  
539
 File 119.2 Moosonee 1968. G. C. Hewson, Supervisor, Department of Municipal Affairs to F. A. 
Braybrook, 3 October 1968.   
540
 Ibid. 
541
 AO, File 119.2 Moosonee 1968.  M. Balas, Community Planner  to M. H. Sinclair, Head, Research and 
Special Studies re: “Visit to Moosonee on August 28-29 and 30, 1968,” 5 September 1968.  
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of using public money to move or replace shacks, but they eventually agreed to support the 
MDAB’s more proactive approach.542   
This interaction between the town’s Board and provincial planners was one of the first 
times that the planners and the local infrastructure plans seem to have been informed by local 
people. Once started, this process of local input to influence policy implementation continued to 
be part of the MDAB’s management role.  To illustrate, in a “Moosonee Brief to Cabinet” 
document from 1975, the MDAB indicated that the province needed to assist with the 
completion of water and sewer servicing on certain streets south of Store Creek which had not 
been part of the initial infrastructure works. The MDAB also described the essence of this area 
and how population and services were linked: 
The surveyed lots … are presently without water and sewer services…The lack of 
sewage [pipes] require that there be out-houses. This situation was acceptable when the 
population was small but as families move in, the sanitation problem becomes more 
serious…Originally the idea of having a supply of low cost lots …was thought to be good 
policy during the transition period from a shack situation to fully serviced modern homes. 
It now is considered to be wise to upgrade these lots [with services].
543
 
This section of the MDAB’s submission to Cabinet recognized that the area south of Store Creek 
had changed over the past dozen years, but that it had a long way to go before servicing issues 
would be fully corrected. It also demonstrated that Council fully understood the environmental 
and health changes that took place in Moosonee as the population grew. 
 The provision of electrical power was integrally related to the operation of water and 
sewer infrastructure. The town was assisted by the RCAF in terms of generating the electrical 
power needed to operate its sewage treatment plant. Ironically this affected the RCAF’s ability to 
                                                 
542
 See handwritten notes on Hewson to Braybrook, Oct.3/68 (footnote above). 
543
 AO, RG 68-9, B503347, Northern Affairs files, Moosonee Vol.4, “Moosonee Brief to Cabinet,” 
Moosetalk, October, 1975.  The original brief was not in the Ontario Archives files, but it appears that the entire 
brief was printed in Moosetalk, the local monthly newspaper. 
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run its own operations as described in a 20 December 1968 internal memo.  The OWRC reported 
that, “A complaint had been received from the RCAF station … that voltage dips were being 
indicated at its generating station. This suggests that a heavy electrical load is being applied 
momentarily … [at] the sewage treatment plant and the Indian trade school.544 Although the 
OWRC did not explain the “Indian trade school” reference, another source indicates that this was 
the James Bay Education Centre (JBEC) since it had been advised “not to use Arc Welders and 
to delay starting their welding course (already in operation at the time) until sufficient power is 
available.”545     
It was ironic that a small town’s sewage plant and a single shop class could cause power 
fluctuations at a Canadian military base. The OWRC also confirmed that, whenever the RCAF’s 
power generating plant was down, there was no power to the OWRC’s sewage plant. In other 
words, the RCAF had become an integral service provider to the town. This situation was not to 
last. Shortly after its first memo on voltage dips in December 1968, the RCAF advised the ONR 
that it could not increase its supply of electricity, and furthermore that it wanted to “reduce this 
[supply] and eventually terminate the supply of power to Moosonee.”546 Clearly Moosonee 
                                                 
544
 AO, File 118.2 Moosonee 1968. J. G. Crookston, OWRC to W.A. Marshall, OWRC, 20 December 
1968. Crookston also explained why the ONR would get the complaint and not the town of Moosonee. He said “The 
ONR purchase power from the RCAF for distribution in Moosonee when the ONR generating plant cannot handle 
the load.” 
545 AO, RG 19-77 B354517. File 119.4 Moosonee 1969. Dick Knowles, President, James Bay Chamber of 
Commerce to Robert Boyer, Vice-Chairman, Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, 13 June 1969. Dick 
Knowles from the James Bay Chamber of Commerce indicated that the welding class at JBEC would have to be 
delayed due to the RCAF issues with power fluctuations. 
546 A5, File 119.3 Moosonee 1969. J.G.Crookston, OWRC to K. Shattuck, OWRC, “Sewage and water 
works – Moosonee Power Generation,” 10 March 1969. In this internal memo, Crookston also indicated the amount 
of power being produced and the costs that were being charged. He said that “the RCAF supplied 325 KW 
(kilowatt) in [for] Moosonee and their own station, 200 KW.” He also said that the RCAF charged the ONR 5.0 
cents per KWH (kilowatt hour) for the power and that the ONR then billed the OWRC 7.0 cents per KWH for power 
for the water and sewer plants. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this material further but it is important 
to note that the RCAF station appeared to have been generating well over the amount of electrical power that it 
needed and that the ONR was making a profit on the transfer of energy to another provincial government department 
(i.e. from ONR to OWRC). 
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would need another source of power in order to supply clean water, sewage treatment, and 
JBEC’s training needs. 
The provincial government approved the construction of an electrical transmission line 
from Cochrane to Moosonee and Moose Factory in 1974, the year before the closure of the radar 
base was announced.
547
  The Globe and Mail reported that the two communities were connected 
to the provincial power grid on 4 February 1976; however, the Timmins Daily Press indicated 
that there was an emergency connection to Moosonee by November 1975.
548
 The Timmins paper 
also reported that “Failure of diesel generators had created an urgency to supply Moosonee with 
electricity from the grid on Nov.12 [1975].” Although the news article did not mention the 
RCAF, the “failure of diesel generators” would have been a reference to the base’s closure and to 
the fact that RCAF personnel no longer managed the production of electricity for the area from 
their generators.
549
 An Ontario Cabinet submission had emphasized Moosonee’s potential energy 
crisis by stating that “the supply of power to the base and community must be ensured [after the 
radar base closes and] until Ontario Hydro’s line supply is available in November.”550 The 
discussion of the connection between electrical power and the base’s closure will be discussed 
further in Chapter Nine. 
 
 
                                                 
547 AO, RG1-121, B207227. Cabinet Submission by Ministry of Energy, 2 August 1974. File “Lands-
Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resource Development] on the Moosonee Area.”    
548 AO, RG 68-9, B503347. Northern Affairs Files, Moosonee Vol.4., “New Source of Power for 
Moosonee Region,” Timmins Daily Press January 10, 1976. “Moosonee Formally Linked With Hydro Grid,” Globe 
and Mail, February 5, 1976.  ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The Globe and Mail, accessed May 3, 2015. 
549 LAC, RG 24-G-16-1, File 1090-1, Volume 23533.  “Moosonee Board of Inquiry: 1969-1972.” Several 
years before the closure of the base, an RCAF Board of Inquiry had recommended that the Moosonee diesel 
generators be replaced. This was due to a small explosion in the power plant during September 1972. 
550 AO, RG1-121, B207227.  “Lands-Status Report to the CCRD [Cabinet Committee on Resources 
Development] on the Moosonee Area, June 25, 1975. 
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Fire Protection Services 
Fire protection was also directly connected to the provision of water services to the 
community, both in the village and in the main Moosonee townsite. In August 1960, a Toronto 
Daily Star reporter described the impact of a fire at Moosonee on a young Cree boy who was 
then at Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children. He said “Home would still be a tent but the tent 
that Walter lived in in January, in the middle of a James Bay winter, was destroyed by a sudden 
fire that killed his grandmother and burned the little boy.” 551 The reporter was referring to a fire 
in the area known as the Indian Village. Three years later, a Globe and Mail article titled “2 
Children Die at Shack Fire in Moosonee,” highlighted the ongoing problems with firefighting, or 
lack thereof, in Moosonee. 
552
 In this case the article referred to a connection with the radar base, 
“The Royal Canadian Air Force fire department from the base a mile north of Moosonee rushed 
to the scene, but bystanders said the flames destroyed the shack in a few minutes, prior to the 
arrival of the firemen.” 553 
The first mention of a technical issue related to fire protection in the Moosonee area was 
contained in an OWRC report from June 1963. C.H. Kretch described why the water system in 
Moosonee would be inadequate to fight fires. He said: 
It is noted that the distribution system has been gradually extended as required resulting 
in pipe sizes ranging from 4 inches to 1 and a half inches in diameter. Normally a 6 inch 
diameter pipe is considered the minimum size to meet domestic and firefighting 
requirements. [Moosonee’s] water system satisfies domestic requirements only.554 
                                                 
551 AO, RG9-1, B113127. Townsite Committee Studies-Moosonee. “Place of Hidden Beauty: Moosonee’s 
Worth Impresses Those With the Right Eyes,” Nigel Dunn, Toronto Daily Star, August 11, 1960. This article 
describes the range of images of Moosonee; that is, the town as seen by tourists and by residents. 
552  “2 Children Die in Shack Fire At Moosonee,” Globe and Mail, December 12, 1963, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers, The Globe and Mail, accessed May 2, 2015 
553 Ibid. The RCAF Annual Historical Report for 1963 does not report this incident, possibly because the 
firemen arrived too late to actually fight the fire. 
554 See Kretch Report, OWRC, Kretch. June 19th, 1963 earlier in this chapter. 
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Possibly due to the severity of sewage pollution issues in Kretch’s report, there seemed to be 
little attention paid to his comments on fire protection. An engineering report in 1966 by the 
Sutcliffe Company informed the understanding of fire issues by explaining that the amount of 
water in storage in the water tank was also a significant limiting factor in fighting fires.  The 
report showed that the existing water tank held only 50,000 gallons of water for both domestic 
and firefighting purposes. The engineers indicated that 60,000 gallons of water could be used up 
by two fire hoses over a period of only two hours. As a result, they recommended almost 
doubling the town’s water storage capacity.555 There is no indication that Moosonee’s residents 
were aware of Sutcliffe‘s report or that they knew they were at risk of major fires.  
Between 1964 and 1968, the townsite and village began to rely on the RCAF for fire 
protection and did not form its own fire department.  The RCAF’s AHRs have a number of 
references to assisting with fires in the adjacent community. 
556
 These show that the RCAF’s 
firemen responded to both residential and industrial fires, and that they fought fires in both the 
town itself and in the Indian Village. This demonstrates that the town had no ability to fight fires 
on its own and that it was developing a reliance on the RCAF for the protection of homes and 
commercial properties. 
                                                 
555 AO, File 118.2 Moosonee 1965-66. Sutcliffe Company, “Townsite of Moosonee Supplementary 
Report for Water, Sewage, Storm Sewers and Road Construction,” 7 March 1966, 6.  The Sutcliffe engineers also 
noted that 31,000 gallons of water was needed every four hours for domestic purposes. Their report recommended 
adding  underground storage of 41,000 gallons to supplement the ONR water tank stores of 50,000. 
556 DHH, Annual Historical Report (AHR) 1964. September 22, 1964: “Firemen were called downtown 
for fire at David Wynne’s General Store – Nil Casualties,” and December 21, 1964: “Firemen were called at 1930 
hrs to assist Austin Airways in putting out fire in Norseman Aircraft.” And AHR 1965: July 30, 1965: “Firemen 
were called downtown to a house fire in the Indian Village – Building complete loss however no injuries. In this 
case it appears that the RCAF firefighters were in the Village even though they initially mention “downtown.” 
August 4, 1965: “Firemen were called downtown to Moosonee to assist with a fire on a Hudson Bay Company 
Freighter.” September 17 , 1965: “Firemen were called to the town of Moosonee to assist in a fire in an unoccupied 
tar paper shack in the Indian Village. Building completely destroyed 
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      Not all of the RCAF’s firefighting efforts were successful. Petitioners, trying to get piped 
water for the Indian Village, had written that water was urgently needed for fire protection. They 
described the following incident related to a fire emergency:  
Perhaps water is most desperately needed in connection with fire protection…we may 
illustrate the present lack of protection by citing an example from last winter [1967]. 
When the fire alarm was given, the fire truck from the RCAF Base rushed to the scene 
but became stuck in the deep snow of the unplowed street (Gardiner Road). In order to 
extricate the truck the whole 500 gallons of water had to be poured out on the ground. 
Consequently when the firemen reached the scene of the fire, nothing remained but 
ashes.
557
 
Shortly after this incident, the RCAF started to reconsider fire coverage for the Indian Village. 
The main issue for withholding fire services was not the lack of snow plowing in the Village but 
the fact that concerns were growing about the apparent unstable nature of the bridge crossing 
Store Creek. Captain Smart of the RCAF described the situation: 
While it is not a Department of National Defence responsibility to provide fire services 
south of Store Creek in the village at Moosonee, it has been the practice of the Fire 
Department at CFS Moosonee to answer fire calls in this area. …Recently the question 
arose as to the structural adequacy of the bridge across Store Creek that the Fire Truck 
must use enroute to fire calls …A structural analysis was carried out … [and] It was 
concluded that there is no logical base for assuming the bridge is safe for the passage of 
the fire truck.
558
 
Dick Knowles, the President of the James Bay Chamber of Commerce, sent letters in 
1968 to Ministers Darcy McKeough and Rene Brunelle asking for action to fix the Store Creek 
bridge. 
559
 Knowles also asked for an emergency water supply if the bridge could not be repaired. 
                                                 
557 AO, RG 19-F-7, B350920. General Admin. Moosonee Development Board, Petition to Don Taylor, 
Municipal Affairs, 17 January 1968. 
558 AO, File 118.7 Moosonee 1968. Captain S. E. Smart, RCAF to P. Wilkinson, Dept. of Social and 
Family Services, 27 March 1968. 
559 AO, RG 19-6-1, B269790.  File: Cochrane District, Moosonee Townsite. Dick Knowles, President , 
James Bay Chamber of Commerce to Minister Darcy McKeough, 11 March 1968. Also see AO, File 118.7 
Moosonee 1968.  Knowles to Minister Rene Brunelle, 1 May 1968. 
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In one of his letters Knowles stated “It would be unfortunate if a major fire and tragedy 
developed and repairs to the bridge could have prevented it.” 560  
At the time of Knowles’ letters, the Moosonee Development Area Board Act (MDAB 
Act) had been passed (in June 1966), but not enacted. This Act included a provision authorizing 
the MDAB to provide fire protection services. A further withdrawal of fire services by the RCAF 
appears to have forced the proclamation of the MDAB Act. The RCAF indicated in June 1968 
that starting in September its fire fighters would not be authorized to go beyond the perimeter of 
the base. Paul Wilkinson of Social and Family Services wrote for help to Department of 
Municipal Affairs and stated: 
I have been recently informed of an impending cut-back of firefighters at the Canadian 
Forces radar base…townspeople have relied upon the base to provide emergency 
services. After September 1, 1968 the base … [will] retain only a skeleton crew of 
professional firefighters who will not be allowed to leave the perimeter of the base.
561
 
The need for water and sewer services had caused the passage of the MDAB Act; now 
the RCAF’s withdrawal of fire services forced the proclamation of that Act. On 19 August 1968, 
the Moosonee Development Area Board Act was proclaimed and the inaugural meeting of the 
newly appointed board took place on 28 August. 
562
 The anticipated September withdrawal of 
RCAF fire services also seemed to provide the final impetus for construction of water and sewer 
services to the area south of Store Creek. Two contracts, initiated in the fall of 1968, finally dealt 
                                                 
560 AO, File Cochrane District, Moosonee Townsite.  Knowles to McKeough, 17April 1968. 
561 AO, File 118.7 Moosonee 1968, Paul Wilkinson, Department of Social and Family Services to A. T. 
Butler, Department of Municipal Affairs, 7 June 1968. 
562 AO, RG19-20-1, B233000, Microfiche 25.11, “Moosonee Incorporation History,” This file included 
the Proclamation of the MDAB Act (19 August 1968), published in The Ontario Gazette, 24 August 1968.  Also see 
RG 19-47-1, B269789 “Cochrane District-Moosonee Townsite Gen.” The agenda for the inaugural meeting was in 
this file. 
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with extending water to this area and the construction of a new crossing over Store Creek. 
563
 
Without these contracts, water to fight fires and a bridge for fire trucks made firefighting 
impossible. 
Lobbying by local people forced the issues of clean water and fire protection to be heard, 
but it was the reliance on another body – the RCAF – which helped people become accustomed 
to some element of protection from fire. After this dependence began, people demanded that 
proper services be maintained and it is likely that the provincial government felt it could no 
longer hold back on creating a formal local government structure. 
Although fire services had been achieved as a legislative right, the community did not 
immediately enjoy fire protection and in fact, provincial advisors continued to rely on the RCAF 
to help out in this area.  In his summary of community projects in September 1968, F. A. 
Braybrook wrote: 
The present lack of adequate fire protection services is serious. We have advised the 
Board, and they have agree, to see a fire protection services survey from the Ontario Fire 
Marshal’s Office immediately as a basis for the innovation of an adequate service. In the 
meantime we can only hope that no serious outbreaks occur and that whatever services 
might be made available by the Defence Establishment (R.C.A.F.) and Lands and Forests 
will suffice.
564
 
Local people could not wait for a fire study to resolve their concerns. When Ministers William 
Davis and Rene Brunelle arrived in June 1969 to open the James Bay Education Centre (JBEC), 
they were met by picketers who demanded better fire protection for the Village. Protestors told 
Davis and Brunelle that “Moosonee firemen will not respond to fires” in the Village. A Toronto 
                                                 
563 Ontario, Sessional Papers, OWRC Annual Report, 1969. See Appendix Five for contracts 5 and 6 
which included the extension of water and sewer to the Village area and the construction of a causeway to this area 
(so that fire trucks could cross the creek.) 
564 AO, File 119.2 Moosonee 1968. F. A. Braybrook, Department of Municipal Affairs to Deputy Minister 
Palmer, 9 September 1968. 
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Star reporter recorded protestors stating that “no fire truck will cross the rickety wooden bridge” 
and that “three children have died in fires recently because of the lack of fire protection.” 565 The 
response to the picketers was that “a new bridge is being built which will enable the Moosonee 
truck to cross the creek.”566 Ministers Davis and Brunelle, who had likely been looking forward 
to a celebration of government largesse, were left with problems to fix rather than enjoy a day of 
praise. Less than two years later Davis was the Premier of Ontario and he eventually was the 
person who oversaw the devolution of the RCAF base to the Moosonee Development Area 
Board. 
The situation was urgent in the Indian Village, but it was likely the town’s largest fire 
which caught everyone’s attention. In July 1969 the Timmins Daily Press was about to publish 
an article on the history of Moosonee’s Catholic Hospital when it burned down. The article, 
entitled “Assumption Hospital is 27 Years Old” included a short sentence at the beginning which 
read, “As this edition was being prepared, fire destroyed the hospital.”567 Interviewees indicated 
that they ran out of water while trying to fight the blaze.
568
 They also mentioned that Lands and 
Forest staff tried to pump water from Store Creek to help fight the blaze but they were too late to 
save the totally engulfed wooden structure. Ironically, the Assumption Hospital had been hooked 
up to a new six inch water line by February 1969, some months before the fire.
569
  However, it is 
                                                 
565 AO, RG 29-01-1481, B430939. File: Indians-Moosonee, 1967-70. This file contained the following 
news clip: Anne Moon, “‘Keep Moosonee Clean’ but nobody collects the Indians’ garbage,” Toronto Star, June 16, 
1969. The newspaper article focused on the lack of services south of Store Creek in the Village. 
566 Rudy Platiel, “Teachers, Indians picket Davis, Brunelle in Moosonee,” Globe and Mail, page 9, June 
16, 1969. 
567 Tom Butkovich, “Assumption: Hospital is 27 Years Old,” Timmins Daily Press, July 17, 1969. (also 
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568 Interviews, 2013 and 2014. 
569 AO, RG 19-77 B354517. File 119.3 Moosonee 1969. Report on “Properties Connected to Services in 
Moosonee, Feb.1969.” It is not clear who prepared this table but it was likely Sutcliffe Company, the engineering 
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not clear if the water line was still connected to the inadequately sized ONR water tower or to the 
new water system, which had been operating since August 1968.  
The RCAF also served a role as dramatic fires, likely caused by arson, continued to occur 
in Moosonee. Social Services staff reported that a week after the hospital blaze “the Moosonee 
Development office was destroyed by fire. Shortly after, on the same evening [July 16], the 
Lions Club Centre was also partially destroyed. Arson is suspected.”570 Minister Darcy 
McKeough wrote to Major Misener, the Commanding Officer at the base, on 10 September 1969 
and thanked him for the assistance of his personnel during “recent unfortunate fires.”571 
In August 1969 Moosonee appointed its first Fire Chief – Joseph Crawford – who began 
to organize the volunteer fire department and to purchase firefighting vehicles and equipment.
572
 
Ironically, it was the closure of a northerly Pinetree radar site that helped the town supplement its 
equipment needs. G.C.Hewson’s summary in 1970 of Moosonee’s issues indicated that 
“Necessary firefighting equipment has either been purchased or acquired from the former 
military base at Pagwa.”573  Hewson also noted that the town’s fire department, made up of 20 
volunteers by July 1970, purchased a used fire truck from the City of Kitchener.
574
  
The town was beginning to create its own services, but it would be some time before it 
achieved recognition for its growing independence.  A medical inspector for the RCAF 
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Darcy McKeough, Department of Municipal Affairs to Major Misener, RCAF, 10 September 1979. 
572 Ontario, Sessional Paper, Department of Municipal Affairs Annual Report for 1969, p.36. and AO, RG 
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2002.35.2, Historical Files-Pagwa). 
574 Ibid. 
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commented on the level of cooperation shown during community fires in his inspection of the 
Moosonee base in November 1970. Surgeon Commander Kierstead implied that the fire 
department in the town was inadequate. He wrote that “ the [RCAF base] fire fighters are a very 
keen group who realize they cannot count on help from the village but, on the other hand, are 
usually called on to help them in an emergency.”575 It appears that Kierstead did not realize that 
some of the base’s fire fighters were civilians who lived in the adjacent town. This aspect of the 
situation was confirmed by interviewees who said that firefighting was part of the employment 
requirement for certain civilian jobs.
576
 What this means is that civilian employees at the base 
actually helped out in emergencies, however, they were not recognized as local townspeople. 
This demonstrates that, on occasion, Moosonee was seen as totally dependent on the RCAF, 
even as it was striving to provide its own services. 
Garbage and Landfill Services 
Garbage disposal was the only local service that was shared by the RCAF and Moosonee 
throughout the life of the base. The garbage and landfill situation, just prior to the radar base 
opening, was described by a Department of Health employee. W. H. Oerton noted in June 1961 
that “At Moosonee there is an established dump but no collection. The dump is poorly located 
well within the townsite and with indifferent maintenance.” 577 C. H. Kretch of OWRC 
elaborated on this situation in 1963 when he stated that, “The result was a large untidy refuse 
disposal area where dogs and wild animals could forage.
578
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576 Interviews 2013-14. 
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Before the RCAF base was built, the garbage dump would have been considered on the 
“outskirts” of the Moosonee townsite because it was located at the northeast corner of the town. 
The RCAF base was built just north of the garbage dump such that the garbage dump was now in 
the centre of the community.
579
  Both local townsite property owners and the RCAF used the 
dump, making it in effect, the most integrated part of the townsite and the base. In 1963, 
Department of Public Welfare staff referred briefly to the dump and to a private system of 
garbage collection in a report on the town.  
580
 This was the only reference to any system of 
garbage collection.   
Once the radar base was fully established, the RCAF became involved in the operation of 
the landfill. W.G. Cooke, from the Department of Health, wrote to the ONR in September 1964 
(three years after the base opened) requesting that the ONR and RCAF jointly care for the dump. 
He said: 
The RCAF have used their heavy machinery to try to keep the site in an orderly condition 
but [they] lack a suitable plan. Control over scavenging and persons using the site is 
essential.  
We have attached a rough plan for maintenance of the disposal site. This is based on the 
ONR constructing a short fence along two sides of the site and a gate at the entrance, the 
RCAF constructing a suitable access road in the centre of the site, burying refuse once a 
week … and a caretaker … to control dumping and burning and to prevent scavenging.581 
By 1970, local residents were complaining that the town dump needed to be fenced.
582
 One 
person mentioned at a public meeting that some children were combining “tag-ends of liquor in 
bottles found in the dump” and further, that the bottles had been “thrown away from the (Air 
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Force) base.”583 Later that same year the dump was closed and a new garbage dump was 
established “on land leased from the Crown outside the developed area.”584 Nine years after the 
base opened, the landfill shared by the town and the RCAF was finally relocated south of the 
town.  
The planning for the radar base should have included the issue of garbage disposal.  
Instead, it appears that the RCAF base dealt with some public services but not with all of them. 
In Moosonee’s case, the base dealt with its own sewage treatment, and assisted with the care of 
the local dump, but there is no evidence of advance planning for waste management. However, 
the management of garbage was still better than what researchers have described for more 
northerly DEW line bases.  To illustrate, R. A. Cheever, a construction superintendent at DEW 
sites, wrote “Sanitary and waste disposal was accomplished across DEW using oil drums hauled 
away to a dump or out on the ice to be lost in the breakup." 585 Arthur Johnson has suggested that 
“personnel at many [DEW] sites buried garbage all over the place” and that there were huge 
numbers of abandoned fuel drums left at or near radar bases.
586
 Johnson quoted one of the DEW 
remediation managers as stating that $583 million had been spent by 2007 on remediation of 
DEW sites.
587
 Additionally, some scientists have focused on environmental contamination at 
former Mid-Canada Line radar sites.
588
 For example, McCreanor et al examined Polychlorinated 
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Biphenyl (PCB) levels at MCL’s Site 050 which is adjacent to Fort Albany on James Bay.589  
Comments from Cheever, Johnson, and McCreanor et al. show that waste disposal, particularly 
of hazardous products, was a missing element in the planning for Canadian radar bases.   
Other sources demonstrate that this lack of concern for environmental and health issues 
was a continuance of practices initiated during the Second World War. That is, military 
construction in both Canada and Newfoundland caused serious water, sewage and garbage 
problems. Shelagh Grant writes that during the construction in 1942 of the Alaska Highway there 
were significant water, sewage and sanitation issues in both Whitehorse and Dawson Creek.
590
 
Steven High describes polluted wells, tar paper shacks, and horrendous sewage and garbage 
circumstances in Stephenville, Newfoundland, during the Second World War. These health and 
environmental impacts were generated by the construction and operation of American Air Force 
facilities there between 1941 and 1946. 
591
 P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish refer to 
the environmental impact of both Second World War and Cold War military activity in the 
Canadian North as a “toxic legacy” which impacted both land and water.592 Land use and 
environmental planning were missing in both Cold War and Second World War military projects 
and this lack of planning and due diligence caused damage to pre-existing communities. 
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Conclusion and Comments 
There were numerous complications throughout the construction phase of Moosonee’s 
water and sewer systems.  Most of the issues faced were not ones that had to be dealt with at the 
RCAF base.  The radar base was built on a ‘blank space’, an undeveloped landscape and there 
was no question of who should pay for its services.  There was no need to move houses or 
straighten roads in order to lay down water and sewer pipes.  The base represented a planned 
community and the associated water and sewer services were constructed for slightly less than 
one million dollars. The one feature that was missing from military planning was the dump or 
landfill.  Moosonee, on the other hand, exemplified the construction issues that need to be faced 
when there is an almost total lack of planning, or “intelligent forethought,” as coined by Don 
Taylor in 1959.
593
  The agency in control of the Town of Moosonee and the Village—the 
ONR—was in the development and land sale business, not in the future vision and services 
business.  This caused extensive problems for Moosonee as it grew due to the development of its 
military base.  Issues included moving houses back from streets where they had encroached on 
roadways, deciding who should pay for services and how much should be charged, and dealing 
with spillage from existing septic tanks during installation of new water and sewer lines.  Due to 
the huge expense of building the town’s systems, the province had to provide special funding to 
Moosonee for its water and sewer operations and for other administrative costs from 1968 until 
the present.
594
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 Many of the people who lobbied for the provision of proper local services were civilian 
employees of the RCAF or their spouses.  These employees, both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous workers, helped construct and maintain water and sewer services in Moosonee. They 
saw, on a daily basis, the running water, flush toilets, and water and sewer plants on the base. 
They knew that adequate services were achievable, and they insisted that such services be made 
available to them – whether they lived in the main townsite or south of Store Creek. Ultimately, 
after the radar base closed, local people who had been trained to operate the RCAF’s water and 
sewer plants took them over and also operated the new Moosonee townsite’s plants. The town 
thus gained trained environmental services workers because the RCAF had hired and trained 
local civilians on these systems. 
 In conclusion, the construction of the radar base caused population growth and created 
the dire need for the provision of environmental infrastructure.  Local people demanded that this 
infrastructure be built for everyone. The next chapter will discuss how demands for better 
services and gradual local empowerment eventually led to local governance. 
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Chapter Eight: “We are willing to stand on our own two feet”:  The Evolution of Local 
Government in Moosonee  
This chapter describes how it took a full decade from the first mention in 1958 of turning 
Moosonee into a municipality to its proclamation as a Development Area Board in 1968.  The 
chapter also discusses how local people influenced the development of local governance in their 
community. This is significant, because as R. G. Ironside states, “historically most [northern] 
settlement has been top-down in initiation and development.” 595 This chapter describes the ways 
Moosonee’s residents pushed for a new approach – one that was grassroots or community-based. 
The new approach was resisted initially by those who preferred the more typical top-down or 
government-led process. However, Moosonee’s residents persisted in their demands for more 
involvement in local governance.  
 
Early Requests for Municipal Organization 
In March 1955, the Ontario Minister of Public Works, William Griesinger, stated that 
“the Townsite of Moosonee …is owned by the [ONR] Commission.” He indicated that one of 
the ONR Commissioners, Reg Aubert, was paid an extra $2,000 annually to perform services 
such as “looking after the Townsite … and supervising the building of streets and tourist 
accommodation there.”596  
Ontario’s provincial staff met as early as October 1958 to discuss the potential for 
converting Moosonee from a rail town into a municipality.  However, staff memos indicate that 
the Department of Municipal Affairs was hesitant to proceed until after development, such as the 
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RCAF base, occurred. Specifically, Deputy Minister J. Carter stated that “he would rather not see 
a municipality established until the initial development and servicing work had been finalized.” 
597
 Other notes show that staff initially focused on problems and issues rather than how to 
organize local government structure. For example, Director Nash of the Department of Planning 
and Development emphasized that “We are most interested in developing a satisfactory solution 
to the problems which will arise in the Moosonee area from the introduction of the military 
installation.”598  
Despite the initial push back on municipality status, provincial staff and decision-makers 
seemed to gain momentum from the discussion of local issues to consideration of municipal 
governance.   Colonel Reynolds of the ONR referred to a late February 1959 meeting with 
Department of Planning and Development staff at which the topic of Moosonee becoming an 
Improvement District had been discussed.
599
  The following week, Minister of Planning and 
Development, W. M. Nickle, wrote to Premier Frost that he and two other provincial ministers 
were planning to meet with Colonel Reynolds “concerning the municipal status of the 
[Moosonee] area.”600 
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By June 1960, the Globe and Mail was suggesting that Moosonee could become a “City 
of 25,000.” 601 Although speculating that Moosonee might become a major city, Globe reporter 
Ronald Anderson provided no information about potential local government structures and 
instead wrote exclusively about the development of a harbour.  By the fall of 1960, the provincial 
planners were again writing about Moosonee’s concerns, in hopes of getting someone to take 
action. A.L.S. Nash wrote to his Deputy Minister that “the unorganized community of Moosonee 
has generally been a creature of the Ontario Northland Railway in that the Railway has … owned 
most of the land and has wielded what little degree of supervision of development there has 
existed.”602 Nash then explained that Moosonee was growing, primarily because of its new 
RCAF base.  He also said that there was the potential for Moosonee to have a major sea port and 
a new airport.  Nash stated that, because of these actual and projected developments, “thought 
should also be given now as to the most appropriate form of municipal organization and the 
means of gaining acceptance for it.  
603
 A few weeks later, Nash wrote to Cumming about 
sanitation and health concerns and stated that “rapid action [was needed] …to establish a logical 
form of government in the area.” 604  
The implication was that Moosonee and the provincial government could not resolve 
local health issues without some form of governance. It was common in Ontario during the 
1950s and 1960s for the provincial government to establish Improvement Districts as the “logical 
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form of government” where small resource-based communities experienced rapid growth but had 
no local authority to manage basic services. 
605
  
By 1961, local residents were ready to step in and effect change in local governance.  
W.H. Oerton, a Provincial Sanitary Inspector wrote: 
On June 21 I found that a public meeting had been arranged … This group included 
government officials and interested persons in the community…. Everyone presented 
their views on ways to improve conditions in the area but it was unanimously agreed that 
a type of municipal organization, probably an Improvement District, was the only 
effective means of affecting a permanent improvement.
606
 
One year later, Moosonee’s residents filed an application to form a local government body – an 
Improvement District.
607
 The Cochrane Board of Trade submitted Moosonee’s application to the 
Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) on 19 June 1962.  The Chairman of the Cochrane Board, Mr. 
Dorland, indicated in the covering letter, “It is very evident that the expansion of trade in the 
James Bay and east coast Hudson Bay area is seriously hampered by the lack of municipal 
facilities at Moosonee which are restricting the growth of this townsite.” 608 Although commerce 
would appear to be the main reason for the support of the Cochrane Board of Trade, the 
application itself provided a broader rationale for change.  It stated that Moosonee had 
experienced growth and that “the building of the RCAF Radar Base has had a tremendous 
impact. In fact Moosonee is beginning to bulge at the seams; not with middle aged spread but 
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with youthful vigour.”609  It is worth noting that the RCAF base in Moosonee opened in 
December 1961 only six months before the formal application for Improvement District status.  
The Improvement District application also included references to local services such as 
water and roads, which the community had quickly outgrown.  Further, the report indicated that 
“we find raw sewage running down our open ditches,” and that health authorities had warned of 
the potential for epidemics such as typhoid.
610
  This indicates that some of the town’s residents 
were aware of the Department of Health’s concerns but it is not clear if Village residents were as 
well informed. 
611
 The strongest statement by the petitioners was a sentence that read, “That we 
are willing to stand on our own two feet and do something for ourselves is best expressed in our 
petition to the Municipal Board to have this area made an improvement district.” 612 
Several Ontario departments and/or ministers responded to the Improvement District 
application.
613
 Minister Spooner of the Department of Lands and Forests indicated that 
“Personally, I think that Colonel Reynolds and the Ontario Northland Transportation 
Commission should not be in the Townsite business.” 614 Minister Macaulay of the Department 
of Economics and Development concurred with his colleague and wrote “I certainly agree that 
we do not want the O.N.R. in the townsite business, but since the Railway owns most of the land 
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in this townsite, a policy decision must be made so that the O.N.R. Commission is removed from 
this awkward position.”  Macaulay’s reference to ‘awkward’ included the issue of “septic tanks 
that are draining into the roadside ditches.” 615 Macaulay had been briefed by his staff a few days 
before his memo to Minister Spooner.  The Department of Economics and Development (DED) 
staff listed three possible responses to the Improvement District application in their briefing note. 
These were: 
1. Do not change the “status quo” of the townsite, in which case development of 
Moosonee and the large frontier region it influences will be retarded. 
2. Install a sewage disposal plant at government expense … 
3. Permit the establishment of local government to share in the cost of providing 
essential services…. 616 
 
The DED’s staff also noted that Moosonee had a “strategic importance as a … shipping centre to 
service defence establishments in the lower Hudson Bay/James Bay Region.” 617  In the midst of 
the Cold War the issue of defence was likely on the minds of senior provincial civil servants.  
 The provincial government continued to have difficulty deciding what type of 
governance structure would be best for Moosonee, possibly because it had focused throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s on resource towns not defence establishments.
618
  By the fall of 1962, the 
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Improvement District application had been referred to the Cabinet Committee on Townsites.  
619
  
Premier Robarts provided an update during a dinner at Moosonee’s RCAF base.  He was quoted 
by the Globe and Mail as stating that he had appointed “a special cabinet committee to study the 
possibility of municipal organization in this northern outpost of civilization in Ontario.”620 The 
Timmins Press added that this was “a step forward which cannot be longer delayed. Moosonee 
has passed the stage of a frontier post.” 621   
The referral to the Townsite Committee did not speed up the process of local governance 
as provincial staff continued to focus on issues related to sewage management.  For example, a 
report by the DED elaborated on sewer issues and the potential to make Moosonee into a 
harbour.  It only briefly mentioned the Improvement District application.   DED staff noted that 
“The Ontario Northland Transportation Commission and the residents of Moosonee are both 
anxious to have the townsite designated as an improvement district. “ 622 Provincial staff were 
accurate about the opinion of the ONTC as evidenced in an internal memo by that agency’s 
general manager. Al Jardine wrote that, “if an improvement district is formed …this would end 
our problem” -- that is, the problem of managing services in Moosonee.623 Clearly the ONR 
wanted to get back to its normal business patterns as railway and tourism managers.  The day 
after Jardine mentioned Moosonee as an Improvement District, his Public Relations Department 
issued a news release entitled “Plan ‘City Square’ at Moosonee: Commission to Build Hotel and 
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Museum.”624  The news release suggested that a new ONR hotel was “this townsite’s version of 
Montreal’s Place Ville Marie or New York’s Rockefeller Centre.”625 It also mentioned that 
Moosonee “was bursting at the seams” but gave no indication of serious sanitation and health 
issues.
626
  This demonstrates that the ONR was already hoping local governance would result in 
efficient local services and thus allow room for corporate growth in the near future. However, its 
corporate goals were about to be put into abeyance. 
The Ontario Cabinet’s Committee on Townsites ruled in January 1963 that Moosonee 
could not become a municipality until more study had been done on the potential for it to be a 
major harbour. 
627
 Don Taylor recommended that the ONR continue to manage the town’s 
services until a harbour study could be completed and that it consider forming a local advisory 
committee to discuss services. 
628
  There is no documentation that local residents were asked for 
their opinions on ONR continuance as a limited townsite manager. Instead the Improvement 
District petitioners were advised in January 1963 that “the Ontario Municipal Board [OMB] is 
awaiting a detailed study of the factors affecting incorporation.”629  
The OMB’s response was the impetus for the formation of a local lobby group.  In May 
1963, four months after the OMB had indicated it needed more time to research local 
governance, a citizen’s committee arranged to meet with Minister Spooner and Don Taylor in 
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Moosonee. 
630
 Based on a report by Wendy Thomas, a Welfare Development Worker, it appears 
that the formation of this new Committee was encouraged, if not  facilitated, by the Ontario 
Department of Public Welfare (DPW).  Thomas noted that a public meeting had been held in 
May “which was well attended by both Indian and non-Indian.” 631 At that meeting, a Mr. 
Asbury of the DPW encouraged attendees to “organize and plan” in order to improve their 
community.
632
  It appears that Asbury’s message was welcome. His staff noted that:  
There followed the creation of the Moosonee Townsite Development Board [MTDB]. A 
Treaty Indian was elected chairman by the gathered representation of the community. 
One Indian and one non-Indian were elected to head each of six committees to deal with 
the specific problems of Moosonee: Employment, Housing, Law enforcement, Health 
and Sanitation, Education and Recreation. …These elected representatives would appear 
to have the potential necessary to get action.
633
 
The formation of the MTDB demonstrated that local people, whether Indigenous or non-
Indigenous, intended to work together to improve their community.
634
 Although the DPW 
facilitated the public meeting at which the new board was formed, the notes taken by Wendy 
Thomas indicate that local people elected their own representatives to act on their behalf. As 
described later in this chapter, it would take another decade before the provincial government 
acknowledged local elections as a legitimate process. 
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 Only a month after Moosonee’s citizens started to lobby for change the Ontario Water 
Resources Commission (OWRC) issued its report indicating the potential for local epidemics due 
to sewage issues.  This report has already been covered in the preceding chapter, but it is 
necessary to emphasize that the OWRC felt local problems were difficult to solve without local 
governance. As an OWRC engineer noted: “Because it is a company established townsite, the 
responsibility for services seems to fall to the Ontario Northland Railway … Due to the 
seriousness of the problem, there is an urgent need for some type of municipal organization.
635
    
As soon as the June OWRC report was released, the ONR demanded that the province 
construct a “sewerage system” in Moosonee.  W. A. Johnston, Acting Chairman of the ONR, 
wrote a strongly worded letter to Minister Spooner on 8 July 1963 about “the extremely 
dangerous situation in Moosonee with respect to the sewerage system.” 636 Johnston suggested 
that the Department of Economics and Development should pay for a new sewage system for 
Moosonee. Spooner responded that he was waiting for a Townsite Committee recommendation 
on “townsite organization, services [and] administration” and that “it would be premature to 
discuss the particular matter of sewage disposal.”637 So at this juncture, the OWRC 
recommended sewage treatment facilities and a local governance structure, the ONR demanded 
sewage services, but the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs felt a complete sewage 
system was “premature.” Although the provincial government did not deal with the major issues 
at hand, it did allocate $25,000 for a local “clean-up.”638 These funds, provided through the ONR 
on 28 August 1963, were described by a Department of Economics and Development staffer as 
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designated for  “clean-up  of the garbage situation… control of dogs in the area, grading and 
gravelling of the roads, night soil collection … and any other measures for a thorough clean-up 
of this area.” 639   
The provincially funded ‘clean-up’ activities were merely superficial rather than 
structural; inhabitants would still be susceptible to epidemics, but at least the town’s general 
appearance would improve.  It would, in effect, be more pleasant to look at, but still dangerous to 
inhabit. Furthermore, a superficial clean-up was not sufficient for the local people.  By 
September 1963, Ontario’s Ministry of Health reported that the local citizens committee or 
“Moosonee Development Board” had effected some improvement in the levels of garbage in the 
town but that sewage contamination was still a major concern. 
640
 By October the membership of 
this lobby group had grown from eleven to fifteen residents and the group was becoming better 
known as the “Moosonee Townsite Development Board [MTDB].”641  Eight of the fifteen 
members of this board were people who had signed the Improvement District petition the 
previous year.
642
 Clearly these citizens were not prepared to wait for action by outside parties.   
The records of the Department of Health are the only archival materials that shed light on 
the composition and activities of the MTDB’s board members.   Its Chairman, Thomas 
Archibald, was noted as an employee of the RCAF.  Other board members were referred to as 
business owners, “housewives,” and ONR employees. The Department of Health also 
categorized the fifteen Board members as follows: “There are 8 white status Indians, two of 
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which are women, 6 whites, [and] 1 Indian.” 643  The term “white status Indian” was not defined 
in Department of Health correspondence. 
644
  The most significant part of the categorization of 
local people was not what various terms meant but the fact that the Department of Health’s staff 
appeared comfortable with colonial ‘sorting’ of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. The 
Department of Health’s staff also indicated that “The Board meets twice every month to discuss 
problems relating to the Moosonee settlement.”645 What this demonstrates is that, pending a 
decision on Improvement District status, local residents chose to form a local, formal group to 
address their concerns. It also shows that the term “development board” was first used by 
residents themselves, five years before the provincial government appropriated the designation 
when it enacted the Moosonee Development Area Board Act.
646
  
Even before local people formed the Moosonee Townsite Development Board, Don 
Taylor had recommended that a local advisory committee be elected by Moosonee’s residents.  
In briefing the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Taylor had suggested that a small group of local 
residents should be elected to act as a “sounding board” on development issues.647 Taylor was 
the first government advisor to recommend that local elected people be given a voice regarding 
local developments.  This was not an improvement district or full local governance, however, 
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because the elected representatives would only be advisory to an administrator employed by the 
ONR.   
 By the late summer and fall of 1963, Conservative MPPs began to badger each other 
about Moosonee in correspondence which seems more at home in opposition letters than 
between colleagues.  Minister Spooner sent a terse letter to Minister McCauley stating that, “The 
time has come when you must decide where we are going with Moosonee … Rene Brunelle is 
also very anxious.” 648 Rene Brunelle, the provincial member of the legislature for Moosonee and 
the James Bay area, wrote to Macauley requesting that he be advised, “what action the 
Government plans for the Municipal development of the town.” 649 Macauley’s response was 
“About the only thing I can think of in connection with the Moosonee Town Site right now 
would be a large scale clean-up …and our economic study of the area.” 650 Nowhere in his short 
response did Macauley give an indication how the governance aspect of Moosonee was 
progressing.   
The government of the day was not working together to expedite services in Moosonee, 
and the town’s residents seemed to be well aware of this.  A DED fact-finding group 
documented the public’s observations on this topic in October 1963 as follows: 
We found that many of the people to whom we talked were discouraged and confused by 
the stream of Government representatives who came to study various aspects of the 
economy without being able to effect improvements in either the economic or social 
sense. … Until this summer when a committee was elected by the residents of Moosonee, 
there was no one to speak for them, and the only voice to be heard was that of the ONR. 
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The town development committee of 12, 6 whites and 6 Indians, elected an Indian [Tom 
Archibald] as its chairman.
651
 
One of its recommendations was that “Moosonee… [should] be termed a ‘development area.’”   
  At this time, the citizen’s committee mentioned by the DED was not actually being 
recognized as a true local advisory group.  On 25 September 1963, Chairman Archibald wrote to 
Minister Spooner indicating that he had just heard on television “that $25,000 had so far been 
allocated to Moosonee for local development.” 652 Archibald continued: 
At this time we are seeking your advice as to the terms of reference on this money, the 
power of this board in connection with the use of this money and who the board should 
approach to gain access to the use of these funds? It is our understanding that this will 
come through the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission and that it will be used 
as directed by the Moosonee Townsite Development Board. 
653
  
It took over a month for Minister Spooner’s condescending response. Spooner wrote: 
The expenditure of these funds is the direct responsibility of the O.N.T.C. [Ontario 
Northland Transportation Commission]. In such a situation they cannot be “directed” by 
another body as to the disposition of the funds. However … the O.N.T.C. will lean 
heavily on the Citizens Committee in securing recommendations as to what work should 
be carried out, when it should be carried out and how it should be carried out (local labor, 
etc.).  
I believe that you will be hearing very shortly from representatives of the O.N.T.C. as to 
their long-range intentions for Moosonee. The continued assistance of your Committee 
would be highly valued.
654
 
Spooner’s response had two opposing messages: “We value you” and “You have no power.” 
What this meant is that the ONR still ran this town. It was almost a year and a half since local 
residents had applied for a local governance structure – an Improvement District.  They had 
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received no response on their application, and they were being advised that the ONR was still 
deciding the future of their town. There is also no indication in archival documents that the ONR 
involved the citizen’s group in any planning or development discussions after Spooner’s 
November 1963 correspondence.    
Minister Spooner’s reference above to the ONTC’s “long-range” intentions likely 
referred to the fact that it had commissioned a planning report from Project Planning Associates, 
a Toronto firm.  The 1963 ONTC Annual Report refers to this report as follows: 
A study of Moosonee townsite and environs has been arranged by the Commission on 
behalf of the Government … to provide information to assist in formulating a policy in 
respect to land use and development, educational, cultural, social and economic aspects 
of the situation as well as the possible formation of a local government organization in 
the area.
655
 
 The ONTC report indicated that this consulting report was to be completed by April 1964. 
However, the Project Planning Associates’ report, completed in 1964, was released neither to the 
citizen’s committee nor to any party outside of the provincial government. Instead the provincial 
government formally labelled this report as “confidential” and “strictly private.” 656  
 One year later Ontario’s Cabinet Committee for Indians (CCI) received a confidential 
report that purported to examine “the development of Indian communities in Ontario,” but that 
paid “particular attention to Moosonee.” 657 The April 1965 report included a proposal to 
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establish an Improvement District for Moosonee.  The authors of the report indicated that “ An 
Improvement District will give the residents of Moosonee an opportunity to gain experience in 
the processes of government through (a) membership of one or more appointed Moosonee 
residents on the Board; [and] (b) experience on the advisory committees to the board.”  658 
Furthermore, the report’s authors stated that there already existed a “Moosonee Advisory Board, 
with membership including local residents.” 659  It is likely the mention of an “advisory” group 
was actually a reference to the Moosonee Townsite Development Board, given its prominence 
and advocacy activities.
660
   
One of the members of the Cabinet Committee for Indians was Minister Spooner of 
Municipal Affairs, who was likely influenced by the Committee’s discussions to move ahead 
with local governance for Moosonee.
661
  Minister Spooner and Minister Simonett, Energy and 
Resources Management, met with local townspeople in September 1965, at the request of the 
residents.
662
 Simonett wrote to Premier Robarts after this trip stating that, “It is my strong 
recommendation that the administration of the townsite be removed from the supervision of the 
Ontario Northland Transportation Commission and placed in one of the departments of the 
Government.” 663 Within ten days of Simonett’s letter to the Premier, government staff met to 
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resolve both sewer and water issues, and the matter of local governance.”664  An examination of 
the minutes from staff meetings gives no indication that local people were to be involved in 
decision making and it also shows that local governance was a very minor part of the step 
forward to municipal status.  The pressing issue for the staff was how to pay for the $2,000,000 
of engineering work needed to make Moosonee a safe place to live. 
 By November 1965, Department of Municipal Affairs’ staff were drafting legislation for 
“a Public Act covering the erection of the area known as Moosonee into a very ‘limited’ type of 
municipality, similar in concept to an improvement district.”665  It appears that the initial draft of 
the legislation did not include the RCAF base.  Staff indicated in December 1965 that it “It is not 
felt that the RCAF Base, which has complete sewer and water facilities, paved roads, good 
schools, etc. … should be included in the area to be defined.” 666 This statement emphasizes how 
local services, rather than local voice, were the critical factor in drafting the Moosonee 
Development Area Board Act.  Despite the comments of staff, by 15 March 1966, when the 
Moosonee “Development Area” was mapped by the Department of Municipal Affairs, the 
boundary of the new community included the RCAF base plus a further area just north of it that 
eventually became the community’s airport. 667 Archival documents do not make it clear why the 
radar base was eventually combined with the townsite, but this decision made it easier to 
integrate the base and the town when the former closed in 1975. 
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 The Moosonee Development Area Board Act (Bill 175) received three readings in June 
1966.
668
  The Act gave the Moosonee Development Area Board (MDAB) jurisdiction for local 
services including water, sewer, roads, garbage collection, fire protection and street lighting. 
669
 
On 4 July 1966, J. W. Spooner, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, summarized the purpose of 
the legislation for Premier Robarts: 
This Act is to provide a corporate status for the Moosonee area and to provide a board 
which will have the powers of a municipality in certain limited matters without in fact 
being a municipality. It will permit contracts to be made for the installation of sewer and 
water services which are necessary for the immediate development proposals in this 
area.
670
  
It was an important step for the provincial government to finally pass the MDAB Act, 
however, it was not proclaimed until 1968, two years after its passage.
671
  Between the passage 
of the Act in June 1966 and proclamation in 1968 discussions within the provincial government 
became bogged down on the subject of how to pay for local services that were under 
construction. In other communities in Ontario, local people were expected to pay for part of the 
costs of installation of public services. However, many of the residents of Moosonee had 
insufficient incomes to pay for the construction and maintenance of the cluster of infrastructure 
and services that they needed.  
672
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 By the end of 1967, almost a year and a half after the MDAB Act had been passed, 
Moosonee’s residents started to ask the provincial government what had happened to their earlier 
demands for local governance. Dick Knowles, President of the James Bay Chamber of 
Commerce, wrote to the Minister of Municipal Affairs on 2 November 1967 indicating an 
appreciation for the ongoing construction of water, sewer and roads systems but also asking for 
more information about the creation of local government.  He wrote: 
On behalf of our residents we wish to express our thanks to your Government for helping 
us with steps designed to make Moosonee a self-respecting community. We wish to 
familiarize ourselves with your plans for a Municipal Governing body in Moosonee. We 
understand that it is to be similar to an Improvement District. So that our Chamber may 
be better informed on plans and time of implementation please advise what is proposed 
and when.
673
 
 It appears that local people had not been involved in the passage of the Act nor had they even 
been provided with copies of the legislation.  The 29 November 1967 reply to Knowles’ letter 
gives a clear indication that public involvement was an afterthought.  The reply, which is in the 
form of a public notice rather than a letter, reads as follows: 
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 2 and it is regretted this was 
not replied to earlier. However, for your information, enclosed is a copy of The 
Moosonee Development Area Board Act, 1966, which at the present time has not been 
proclaimed by the Lieutenant Governor. In view of this I am unable to comment further 
as to possible implementation. 
674
 
Ten days after this notice, Minister Darcy McKeough formally replied to the James Bay 
Chamber of Commerce and indicated that proclamation was being delayed due to service costing 
studies (related to water and sewer installations) and to the need to assess local properties for 
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taxation.  Over five years had passed since the Improvement District application had been sent to 
the OMB and over four years since the local Citizen’s committee had been formed. 675  
However, one more group of residents tried to change governance structures while the 
province was studying how to implement the MDAB Act.  In August 1967, a small group of 
local people from the Village filed a petition with the federal government to become a reserve. 
676
   The petitioners referred to themselves as “the Indians of the West Coast of James Bay” who 
were now residing in Moosonee. Eight of the nine people who signed the petition were members 
of the Attawapiskat and Fort Albany bands.
677
  The petitioners wrote that, “We, the Indians of 
Moosonee, want to draw the attention of the Canadians on the miserable condition of our 
community, our urgent need for public utilities such as housing, electricity, water, sewage and 
telephone.  These things we need to develop a model reserve … adjacent to the present town of 
Moosonee. 
678
  
The timing of the reserve petition may have been influenced by the release in 1966 of the 
Hawthorn Report. Anne-Marie Mawhiney states that this federally commissioned study revealed 
“the deplorable circumstances in which Canada’s status Indians were living.” 679 Additionally, 
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the petitioners may have been encouraged by media reaction to Expo 67’s “Indians of Canada” 
Pavilion. Both Bryan Palmer and Olive Dickason write that the displays at this pavilion 
emphasized the poor living conditions for Indigenous peoples across Canada.
680
 It is possible that 
the petitioners hoped to build on the public’s reaction to the Hawthorn Report and the Expo 
displays and thus draw the attention of Canadians to their plight. However, the petition for a 
reserve was rejected by the federal government. Federal representatives suggested that the real 
issue was provision of better services and housing by the province, rather than the establishment 
of a new reserve.
681
  
It is likely that correspondence both from the James Bay Chamber of Commerce and 
from the reserve petitioners pushed the provincial government closer to proclamation of the 
MDAB Act. However, before the MDAB Act could be proclaimed, it would need the 
appointment of members.  The MDAB Act did not provide an independent structure for the 
town’s residents, but it did put in place a quasi-municipal structure.  The Act specified that the 
Lieutenant Governor would appoint a Chairman and four other members to the MDAB. From the 
end of 1966 until proclamation of the Act occurred, several individuals and groups recommended 
people who should be appointed to the new board.  The first to supply a list of recommendations 
was Rene Brunelle, the MPP for the area that included Moosonee.  His recommendations, and 
later ones, are compiled in Table 8.1.  Brunelle listed twelve people as potential MDAB 
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nominees in a document he provided to the Department of Municipal Affairs in the fall of 
1966.
682
  He received a guarded response from Minister Spooner, who thanked him for his 
“recommendations” but indicated “we are not quite ready to proclaim the Moosonee 
Development Area Board Act and, until such time as the Act is proclaimed, it will not be 
possible to name any members to the Board.”683  
The second list of suggested names was sent in by the James Bay Chamber of Commerce 
in February 1968.
684
 The Chamber had been part of information meetings on the MDAB Act 
which had occurred in Moosonee on 29 January 1968. Three meetings had been held that day: 
one with the Chamber of Commerce, one with the Lions Club and “interested citizens” and one 
“by far the largest, was held in the evening and was open to the general public although the 
majority of the people present were from the South Side of Store Creek.”685 The person who 
recorded the issues and presentations at these meetings was Paul Wilkinson, a Community 
Development Worker with the provincial government. Wilkinson wrote that Department of 
Municipal Affairs staff “explained the powers that an appointed development board would have 
in Moosonee [and] … outlined the need for advice from the people of Moosonee in order that 
good representatives might be selected to serve on the board.” 686  
Two local women were likely the organizers of the evening meeting (the third meeting 
noted above).  Mrs. Kenneth Wynne and Mrs. Ellen Morrison had written to Don Taylor as soon 
as they heard he might be in town to meet with the Chamber of Commerce. They asked Taylor to 
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meet with them, and presumably others, on the evening of 29 January to discuss servicing issues 
(e.g. water) and “the question of representation in any proposed municipal council.” 687 The 
impression from Wilkinson’s notes is that the evening meeting garnered the most discussion and 
the highest attendance of the information sessions held that day. 
688
 
 Correspondence from the Chamber indicates that members were encouraged by 
provincial staff to recommend nominees to the new Board. It appears, however, that the 
Chamber wanted to take a more inclusive approach to this process.  Dick Knowles of the 
Chamber wrote to Rene Brunelle stating that “We prefer to have the residents suggest their 
nominees.” 689 Knowles later wrote that “we held an open public nomination meeting in 
Moosonee on February 20
th
, and despite strong opposition from the weather, there was a good 
representative turn-out, with a full hall.”690 The list prepared from this meeting included only two 
of the names submitted by Brunelle in 1966.
691
 These were Ed Butcher and Bert Trapper. The 
other difference between Brunelle’s list and the one prepared by the Chamber of Commerce is 
that the latter list included women.  Two women, Maude Tyrer and Dorothy Wynne, had been a 
part of the 14 people nominated at the 20 February 1968 public meeting. Both women had been 
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noted firstly as “housewives” and following that, as local employees. Neither of these women 
was appointed to the first Moosonee Development Area Board. 
692
  
 Three of the 12 names submitted by MPP Brunelle were either former or current RCAF 
employees or members of the RCAF messes. Furthermore, 9 of the 14 names nominated by local 
residents had an RCAF connection (employees and/or members of the RCAF messes). In effect, 
the public was demonstrating that the community had a strong connection to the radar base. 
Additionally, six of the nominees had been involved in the original Moosonee Townsite 
Development Board (MTDB).
693
   
The five individuals appointed to the MDAB by the Lieutenant Governor on 13 August 
1968 were: Ed Butcher, as Chairman; David Wynne, Vice-Chairman; and Pat Gray, Arthur 
(Archie) Michel, and Xavier Wesley as members.
694
 None of the people appointed to the MDAB 
were RCAF employees. The province did, however, appoint a retired RCAF officer (Pat Gray) 
and a member of the RCAF Sergeant’s Mess (Ed Butcher).695 The provincial government’s staff 
who prepared the list for the Lieutenant Governor did not seem concerned that they had excluded 
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women from the first Moosonee Development Area Board but some of the correspondence 
indicates that they were aware there should be representation from local Indigenous residents. A 
Municipal Affairs’ Director wrote, “I understand that the Indian population in Moosonee [and 
Moose Factory] is roughly 1550 – 1056 treaty Indians and 494 non-treaty. In view of this, should 
not the treaty Indians be represented on the Board by one of their number?” 696 Perhaps because 
of this memo, two Indigenous residents -- David Wynne and Xavier Wesley -- were 
recommended for appointment to the Board.
697
 
Table 8.1 Recommendations for Positions on the Moosonee Development Area Board. 
Name Background and/or Occupation698 Recommended 
By 
 
John Clarke Anglican Minister Brunelle, 1966  
Pat Gray Retired RCAF Officer 699 
Administrator, RC Mission 
Brunelle, 1966 Appointed to 
the MDAB 
Board 
Steve Preweda Manager, Hudson’s Bay Store Brunelle, 1966  
Ed Butcher*700 Manager, Imperial Oil 
President, Moosonee Lion’s Club 
Member, Sgts Mess, RCAF 
Brunelle, 1966 
Public Mtg  
Appointed as 
Chairman to the 
MDAB Board 
Bert Trapper RCAF employee 
Member, Lion’s Club 
Stationary Engineer, RCAF 
 
Brunelle, 1966 
Public Mtg  
 
Tom Archibald* “Former Chairman, Moosonee Townsite 
Development Board,” on Board of 
Governors, JBEC. 
 
Brunelle, 1966  
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David Wynne* Proprietor of Small Store 
Member of Public School Board 
Brunelle, 1966 Appointed as 
Vice-Chairman 
to the MDAB 
Board 
Marc 
Laframboise 
ONR Employee 
Member of Separate School Bd  
Brunelle, 1966  
Percy Tozer Minister-Episcopal Church, Member of 
Public School Board 
Brunelle, 1966  
Harley Winter Manager, ONR Lodge Brunelle, 1966  
Eddie Arpin Proprietor of Wonder Snack Bar Brunelle, 1966  
Archie Michel Retired, Member of Public School Board 
and JBEC Board (former ONR lodge 
manager) 
Brunelle, 1966 Appointed to 
the MDAB 
Board 
Bill Hunter 
 
Water/Sewage Plant Operator, RCAF Public Mtg   
Velko 
Novakovich*  
Member, Sgts Mess, RCAF 
Member, Chamber of Commerce 
Public Mtg   
Xavier Wesley* Employee, Esso 
Part time court clerk for OPP 
 
Public Mtg  Appointed to 
the MDAB 
Board 
Fred Close Member, Officers Mess, RCAF and Lions 
Club, School Principal 
 
Public Mtg   
Ernest Beaudoin Priest, RC Mission Public Mtg   
Maude Tyrer Housewife and Clerk, Hudsons Bay Co., 
Member of Legion, Ladies Guild 
Public Mtg   
Dorothy Wynne Housewife and employee snack bar, 
Member of Legion 
Public Mtg   
Dennis Eitzen Member, Officers Mess, RCAF 
Member, Chamber of Commerce, Dept 
of Transport employee 
Public Mtg   
James Morrison* Carpenter, Employee of RCAF Public Mtg   
Jack Ryder Steamfitter, Plumber, Employee of 
RCAF 
Public Mtg   
Bob Iserhoff RCAF employee, Member of Airmens’ 
Club [Mess] 
Public Mtg   
Jim Jackasum Clerk-Hudson’s Bay Public Mtg   
 
The first meeting of the newly formed MDAB was held on 28 August 1968. Ten days 
before that meeting, Premier John Robarts and Minister Darcy McKeough were in Moosonee to 
meet the new Board members and to announce that the MDAB Act had been proclaimed. The 
Globe and Mail captured the Premier’s reason for promoting the creation of the MDAB: 
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Mr. Robarts announced that the Cabinet had proclaimed the Moosonee Development 
Area Board Act, which, at the outset and in fundamental terms, means this community of 
1,500 persons will have a sewer system and indoor plumbing instead of outhouses, and a 
board, like a council, to raise realty [property] taxes to pay a little of the $2 million 
cost.
701
 
Robarts also indicated publicly that on a visit to Moosonee in 1965 he had been appalled at “the 
raw sewage running from the shacks and open ditches” and he left with “the feeling that more 
should be done.”702  MPP Rene Brunelle emphasized to local residents that the Board appointees 
would help ensure that improvements were completed. He said “These [MDAB members] are 
local people who know the needs of the area and will see that it is upgraded.”703 
 The handwritten notes from Darcy McKeough’s file give a more detailed outline of the 
reasons for the MDAB.  McKeough, the Minister of Municipal Affairs in 1968, had written some 
personal speaking points for the MDAB announcement which included the following: 
Population grew – realization something else needed – local participation – community 
involvement – something more than the leadership in the area provided by C of C 
[Chamber of Commerce] and other organizations…immediate attention –fire 
protection…something new will be added by the Board: local involvement, local 
planning, local initiative,[and] local control.
704
  
It had taken ten years of lobbying, from 1958 to 1968, for the town to witness some form of local 
governance. Yet despite McKeough’s assertions of “local control,” the MDAB was not yet a 
form of local government controlled by local people.
705
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The town did, however, have an essential element of local democracy through the 
creation of its own ratepayers group.  The group, called the Moosonee Community Council 
Steering Committee, included some of the people who had been nominated, but not appointed to, 
the MDAB.  For example, Mrs. K. [Dorothy] Wynne and Mrs. J. [Ellen] Morrison were on this 
Steering Committee.  There is only one specific source for the Steering Committee, but it 
suggests that local citizens intended to exercise voice, whether they were appointed to the 
MDAB or not. 
706
   
In addition, one of the members of the Steering Committee, Ellen Morrison, began to 
lobby for better living conditions and services as President of the Moosonee Homemakers Club. 
707
 One provincial planner suggested that the Homemakers Club, a group of “vocal Indian 
women,” should be included in all the community’s planning discussions.708 Linda Ambrose and 
Lianne Leddy have studied local women’s organizations and concluded that these groups might 
have appeared to be “Home Economics Plus” but that they often got involved in local 
governance and community improvement initiatives. Ambrose has provided examples of 
northern Women’s Institutes members who got involved in local activism and community 
projects.
709
 She has also demonstrated that even a century ago in rural Ontario, Women’s 
                                                 
706
 AO, File 119.4 Moosonee 1964. Homer Brooks, Chairman, Moosonee Community Council Steering 
Committee to Ed Butcher, Chairman, MDAB, 22 May 1969. Brooks wrote that the Steering Committee wanted the 
MDAB to deal with two hazardous situations involving water filled holes and roaming dogs.  
707
 The Homemakers Club was known for sponsoring sales of local handicrafts plus acting as a local voice 
for improved living conditions. See AO, File 119.5 Moosonee 1969, Mrs. Ellen Morrison, Homemakers Club to 
Minister J. Yaremko, Department of Social and Family Services, 19 June 1969.   
708
 AO, File 119.4, Moosonee 1969, A. J. Elie, Senior Planner, Community Planning Branch, Department 
of Municipal Affairs to Don Taylor, Director and Supervisor, Official Plans Section, Community Planning Branch, 6 
June 1969. 
709
 Linda M. Ambrose, ““What are the Good of Those Meetings Anyway?” Early Popularity of the Ontario 
Women’s Institutes,” Ontario History 87, no. 1 (Spring, 1995), 1-19.  Also see Linda M. Ambrose, “Our Last 
Frontier: Imperialism and Northern Canadian Rural Women’s Organizations,” Canadian Historical Review 86, no. 
2(2005): 257-284.  Ambrose writes about the Fort Simpson Women’s Institute (W.I.) and its efforts to effect 
improvements to sanitation and garbage collections. She also describes the efforts of W.I. President Mary Firth, a 
“Gwich’in Dene woman from Fort McPherson,” who lobbied for social and political change in the north (280). 
 199 
Institutes helped women to develop “their expertise in working with other women, and in 
exercising leadership.”710 Women focused on projects, such as municipal infrastructure, 
including streetlights and hydro service, and as they did they gained confidence in their abilities 
to be part of the voice of the community.
711
  Leddy has also written about Homemakers Clubs 
and has concluded that they were much more than cooking and sewing groups and furthermore 
that women became politically active through such groups.
712
 A full analysis of the Moosonee 
Homemakers Club is not part of this thesis but it is apparent that this group was as active and 
powerful as it could be in a small community like Moosonee. 
 Local residents continued to submit names for appointment to the MDAB from 1968 to 
1973, when they intensified efforts for local elections. A public meeting held on 26 March 1973 
included three hours of discussion with “most of the discussion focused on ‘Local 
Representation’ and ‘Communications.’”713 The meeting was attended by 75 local residents who 
discussed “local problems in both English and Cree.”714 It concluded with a unanimously 
adopted resolution emphasizing that any vacancies on the MDAB should be filled by elections, 
not appointments.
715
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th
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 Ibid. Also see Claudia Milne “Access and Services in Local Government: A Case Study of Moosonee, 
Ontario.” Master’s Thesis, July, 1974. University of Waterloo. Milne indicated that “D. Wynne passed away in 
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 The need for voicing local opinion about representation continued through 1973 and 
1974.  Claudia Milne described the 1973 nomination process and indicated that it involved 
people from throughout the community: 
A “candidates meeting” open to the public was publicized in both Cree and English, and 
held on Nov.6, 1973. … Eleven nominations were filed at the Board office and four more 
received from the floor. Of a total of 15 nominations, 4 were Indian status and one was 
Indian-white. The meeting was attended by over 100 adults … at least one-half were 
residents of the area south of Store Creek which is almost 100% Indian or Metis. 78 
ballots were cast. The top six candidates were A. Wesley (Indian), E. Butcher (white), 
Mrs. Maude Tyrer (Metis), Velko Novakovich (white), Peter Paulmartin (Indian) and 
Jack Ryder (white). The top three were appointed officially [by the provincial 
government] in Dec.1973. 
716
 
One year later the first election for positions on the MDAB occurred.
717
 The local newspaper, 
Moosetalk, reported that “253 Cast Ballots” and that the highest tally of votes – 152 – was 
garnered by Velko Novakovich, a local resident who had been nominated by the public for the 
first (1968) MDAB.
718
 This election was a step up from a public meeting, but it was not a regular 
municipal election ( i.e. one fully governed by the Municipal Elections Act). 
719
  The names of 
the people who garnered the top votes still had to go the provincial government for appointment 
                                                                                                                                                             
January, 1973,” (108). The public meeting to fill Wynne’s position ended with a motion which emphasized that 
positions should be elected. 
716
 Claudia Milne, “Access and Services,” 109. Comments on ethnicity in brackets are directly copied from 
Milne’s thesis. 
717
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The other successful candidates included Jane Moore and Nina Hunter with 113 and 111 votes. One of the people 
who ran unsuccessfully for office in the 1974 Moosonee elections was Tom Archibald who had chaired the 1963 
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November 12
th
 would be the date for nominations for all municipal positions in the province (Section 19 referred to 
this date as Nomination Date). The November 12, 1974 election appears to be the first time that the Moosonee 
election partially corresponded to municipal elections in Ontario.  That is, the Moosonee election occurred on 
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to the MDAB. Nevertheless, this process, which became known as an “informal election,” was a 
step in the right direction.
720
  
 The MDAB would not have been in the position to be effective in transforming the radar 
base, after its closure, had it not been for the long struggle for recognition by local people and the 
development of local voice demonstrated by the MDAB and local citizens.  For example, Velko 
Novakovich, who became the Chair of the MDAB in January 1975, was also the Chair for the 
Joint Closure Committee, which represented Moosonee and the local area in determining the 
future use of the radar base.
721
 Less than a decade after the Board was created, and only two 
years after its first formal elections, the MDAB became the body that took over the RCAF radar 
base and made it a significant part of both the town and the region.   
As has been suggested throughout this chapter, local people had been ignored or 
dismissed in planning and development studies, particularly in the early 1960s.  One report 
indicated that, “until this summer [1963] when a committee was elected by the residents of 
Moosonee, there was no one to speak for them, and the only voice to be heard was that of the 
ONR.”  722  Planners have recognized, particularly in more recent years, that residents of local 
areas should be involved in local planning and development, particularly when a resource 
company (a mine or forest industry mill) becomes the sole industry for a community.  This 
should also have applied when an entity like the ONR or the RCAF controlled land sales and 
developments, as was the case in Moosonee. Without a town council, the ONR was the sole 
contact for development discussions with the federal and provincial governments. However the 
                                                 
720
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 AO, Moosonee 1963-64, File 117.9, Report by Special Research and Surveys Branch, Department of 
Economics and Development, October 17, 1963 (no specific author noted), 2. 
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railway did not demonstrate any need for local public participation. Don Taylor commented in a 
speech he gave in the late 1950s that people often felt they were “being planned” rather than 
directing planning. He said that he recognized local councils and staff had to deal with the 
“outrageous cries of the persons who are being planned.” 723  What Taylor likely meant was that, 
although the job of provincial planners was to provide land use planning options, they were often 
removed from direct and, sometimes critical, local feedback. In Moosonee’s case, both 
provincial staff and provincial politicians were removed from local participants and their ideas. 
By 1975 the Town spoke for itself. The demand for local input and representation had 
started within months of the radar base opening.  As documented earlier a public meeting was 
organized in mid-1962 to discuss issues in the community and to determine how to improve 
them.  This meeting, held on 21 June 1962, occurred only 6 months after the RCAF base opened. 
724
 It took another six years before the Moosonee Development Area Board Act was proclaimed 
and a further six years – 1974 – before the people of Moosonee could vote for their own local 
representatives. 
725
  
The next chapter, Chapter Nine, demonstrates how the evolution of local government 
placed Moosonee’s residents in the position of taking over and transforming the RCAF’s base 
when it closed in 1975.  Furthermore, Chapter Nine describes the ways both local citizens and 
the MDAB worked within the community, with the town’s regional neighbours, and with the 
provincial and federal governments, to transform the radar base to meet local needs. Chapter Ten 
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then returns to a further discussion of local governance and voice as an aspect of change and as 
part of a proposed new model of community development. 
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Chapter Nine: Not the “Beginning of the End” : The Closure of the Moosonee Base and Its 
Transformation 
 
This chapter provides details on the federal closure announcement for the Moosonee 
radar base and on local objections to the announcement. It then outlines the ways that the 
community’s residents insisted on being part of the discussions about the closure and the 
strategies they used to examine closure options. The chapter closes with a discussion of the 
transformation of the radar base into a regional high school.  
The closure of the radar base affected local people personally and the community 
physically. It is essential to an understanding of today’s Moosonee to know how the base closure 
impacted employment, local activities, and infrastructure.  It is very likely that local residents 
who lived through this stage of the community’s development were not privy to all of the 
bureaucratic discussions involved in the base’s closure. In that regard, one of the goals of this 
dissertation is to provide the community with a detailed description of both what happened and 
how Moosonee’s people took control of their future.   
The Announcement 
The closure of the Moosonee radar base was a potent reminder that the defence of North 
America was controlled by NORAD, and ultimately by the Americans.  Bothwell et al. described 
NORAD as “the North American defence plan by which Canadian and American officers would 
jointly administer an integrated defence force under supreme American command.”726 What this 
meant in practice was that, although the Moosonee base was operated by the RCAF, its closure 
was only divulged to local military personnel after a meeting with the United States Air Force 
(USAF).  This meeting, attended by three officers from the USAF, occurred on 14 January 
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 Robert Bothwell , Ian Drummond and John English, “Bad Luck and Bad Management,” in Canada 
Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 242. 
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1975.
727
  The 1975 AHR has only a brief reference to the meeting, as the “Deputy Commanders 
Visit.” There is no indication of the purpose of the meeting, or whether any high ranking 
Canadian officers were included other than the CO, Major Conn.  Two days later, the closure of 
Moosonee’s radar base was formally announced by the Department of National Defence. 728 
Excerpts from the announcement included the following: 
 Defence Minister James Richardson today announced a government decision regarding 
military operations at two Canadian Forces Stations, Val Dor, Quebec and Moosonee, 
Ontario. Canadian Forces personnel will be withdrawn from the airfield at Valdor [sic] 
and the Radar Site at Moosonee will be closed. The process at both locations will be 
gradual, extending through late 1975… 
Several Government departments such as Regional Economic Expansion and Manpower 
and Immigration, will be working with the Department of National Defence and local 
authorities to minimize the disruptive effect on the communities concerned and to assist 
civilian employees to find other employment. Armed Forces personnel at the stations will 
be posted to vacant positions at other units. 
Qualified civilian employees at both bases, who are offered and accept a position at 
another defence establishment or elsewhere in the public service which requires a new 
place of employment, will be reimbursed for reasonable expenses involved in the move 
… 
Efforts to find suitable employment for civilian personnel are being supported by the 
Public Service Commission and Canada Manpower Center; which will be requested to 
provide assistance for employees who do not remain with the Department of National 
Defence. 
729
  
The announcement consisted of six paragraphs, three of which dealt with the impacts on civilian 
employees.  Clearly the impact on local employees was expected to be a powerful one. 
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It appears that civilian and military personnel on the radar base were formally notified on 
17 January. 
730
 The Premier of Ontario, Bill Davis, also found out about the base closure on that 
day.
731
  Press coverage started immediately and for the first half of the year concerns about 
closure were highlighted in newspaper articles with headings such as: “Defence Budget Cuts 
Killing CFS Moosonee,” 732  “Moosonee Base Closing Opposed by Civilians,”733  “Moosonee 
Troubles Spotlighted,”734  “Moosonee ‘coming to  a stop’ with loss of radar base jobs,”735 and  
“Moosonee military base winds down to a ghostly stillness.”736 
In the first newspaper article on the base’s closure, dated 18 January 1975, Major Conn 
confirmed that armed forces personnel would be transferred to other bases and that Department 
of National Defence (DND) was working to “relocate as many of the civilian employees as 
possible.”737 Conn noted that there were 141 armed forces personnel and 60 civilians employed 
at the Moosonee site.   
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Local Objections to Closure 
Two days after the first news article appeared, the union representing civilian employees 
rallied and started to voice objections.   Ken Sweigard, the President of Local 628 of the Union 
of National Defence Employees and an electrician on the Moosonee base, told the Timmins Daily 
Press that the civilian employees would be pushing to reverse the federal government’s 
decision.
738
  Sweigard stated that “closing the base would be a ‘slap in the face’ to the Indian and 
Metis who learned a trade to work at the base.”739 He also said that 40 of the 60 civilians 
employed on the base were Cree and they, like all of the employees, “were really shocked and 
pretty perturbed by the whole thing.”740 It is worth noting that interviewees tended to describe 
their training as “on the job, at the base” rather than prior to being hired as Sweigard suggested 
in the news article. However, Sweigard’s key point was nevertheless correct, which was that the 
radar base jobs were significant for civilians. Sweigard sounded “union tough” at the beginning 
of the news article, but by the end, he was proposing that the radar base be given to the 
Moosonee Development Area Board (MDAB) if the federal government did not back down.
741
 
The MDAB sprang into action as quickly as the union.  The Board held two special board 
meetings within hours of the announcement and they sent telegrams to their MP, Ralph Stewart, 
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and to Defence Minister Richardson.
742
  The Secretary-Treasurer of the MDAB, John Pringle, 
told the press that the telegrams were intended to highlight Moosonee’s concerns and to establish 
Moosonee as a priority bidder on the sale of base assets.  He said “We’re asking that we be given 
the opportunity to participate at all levels in the disposition of the base and that we be given 
some priority in it [in sales].”  Pringle also indicated that it would be “madness” to sell the assets 
to outside parties.
743
  Finally, he noted that the Board was concerned there might be temporary 
power failures when the base’s power plant was shut down because the town was not expecting 
to hook up to the new Ontario Hydro transmission line until November 1975.
744
 
After the initial flurry of special board meetings, the MDAB called a public meeting for 
28 January 1975, to discuss the closure and, as Secretary-Treasurer Pringle told the press, to 
“gather ideas and receive local input.”745 Despite what Pringle indicated, the real purpose of the 
public meeting appears to have been the Board’s wish to assess its public support; the Board 
wanted to hear from local people if it was truly a representative body for local residents. This 
was because the MDAB had been structured by the province and its members, although 
informally selected by local people, were still appointed by the province. 
746
  
While there is no indication how many people attended the public meeting, or if there 
was a vote taken on the Board’s role, the Board heard enough from local people to feel 
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comfortable moving forward;  it had been given a community mandate to proceed. The public 
meeting also likely ensured that the MDAB had half the seats on a closure committee that was 
formed a few days later by the provincial government.
747
 The Chairman and Secretary of the 
Joint Closure Committee for the radar base became Velko Novakovich, who was also Chairman 
of the MDAB, and John Pringle, Secretary of the MDAB. The Closure Committee also included 
five more members of the MDAB, three members of the Moose Factory Fire Prevention and 
Roads Committee, and three members of Moose Band Council. At its second meeting, the 
Closure Committee invited Grand Council Treaty Number Nine and a final member, Ed Faries 
Jr., joined the group. 
748
 Although the Committee’s report does not discuss if members were 
Indigenous or non-Indigenous, a Cabinet submission on the Joint Closure Committee’s report 
indicates that the members of the committee were “Treaty and Non-Treaty Indians, Metis and 
whites.” 749   
Closure Committee Activities 
One of the first activities of the group was to ensure that it received further comments 
from the public.  The committee instructed its secretary “to write each business and social group 
in both communities [Moosonee and Moose Factory] to this end.”750 The Joint Committee 
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considered a wide variety of ideas for how the radar base and its assets could be used. Two ideas 
were generated at the 28 January public meeting; these were a high school and an industrial 
park.
751
  Interviewees have indicated that the high school concept was considered a top priority 
by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents, especially since all high school age children, 
in Moosonee and Moose Factory, and indeed the entire James Bay area, had to travel south to 
complete Grades 9 to 13. In fact, interviewees said that this was one of the local issues on which 
everyone agreed on the potential solution. The Timmins Daily Press had also supported the high 
school concept, indicating that “The entire James Bay area could be facilitated by the station 
[high school].”752 By March, even the Toronto Star was recording support for a high school: 
Although residents have numerous ideas about what they’d like to see replace the base – 
ranging from a minimum security prison to a technical school – officials say most people 
agree that part of the facilities should be used as a high school…Currently the 300 or so 
high school age children from the area have to live in North Bay, Timmins or other cities 
to go to school.
753
 
The high school became the top priority in The Report of [the] Joint Committee re: Closure of 
Canadian Forces Station -- Moosonee (hereafter referred to as the Closure Report), which was 
submitted to the provincial government in March 1975.
754
 
 The goal of the Closure Report was clearly laid out by the Joint Committee: 
Purpose of Report: To set forth the ideas coming from the people of Moosonee, Moose 
Factory and surrounding area regarding the utilization of the Canadian Forces Station 
Moosonee such that the people living in these communities might reap the maximum 
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benefit from them both from the standpoint of employment of the residents, the economic 
welfare of the area, and improvement of social amenities.
755
 
It is significant that the Closure Committee referred to “ideas coming from the people.” The 
incorporation of public opinions had been absent from most prior activities in Moosonee as 
documented in preceding chapters of this thesis.
756
 The true intent of the report however, was an 
even more powerful statement, which was labelled as ‘Miscellaneous’ and subtly placed in a 
section at the end of the report’s preamble: 
Miscellaneous: …Throughout the period there has been much communication with the 
Provincial Government and to a more limited degree with the Federal Government. It 
appears clear that this committee must take the initiative in the project by exploring the 
best way to handle things then use its influence with both Provincial and Federal bodies 
to give assistance in attaining these goals. 
757
 
Clearly, the Closure Committee was a team; that is, it was “taking the initiative” and working 
together to benefit everyone in the area. Furthermore, it was exercising agency together by 
assuming that it had charge of the future use of the base. Finally, the Committee was prepared to 
stand either with or against governments to achieve what was needed. 
 The Closure Committee’s report laid out 8 recommended uses for the base.  These were, 
in order of priority: secondary school complex, utilization of housing from the base, use of the 
base recreation complex, local Native craft industries, community and social facilities (e.g. 
nursing home), tourist facilities, facilities for government (e.g. air sea rescue station), and ‘Other’ 
(e.g. garage and storage facilities for Ontario Hydro).  This discussion will focus on the leading 
two suggestions: a high school and housing, primarily because those were the ones that seemed 
the most urgent to the Committee. A secondary reason for focusing on these two items is that 
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they were the changes that were eventually implemented and that influenced the lives of local 
people. 
 The creation of a regional high school had been highlighted by the press as an appropriate 
use of the base facilities.  The Closure Committee emphasized that the area needed not only a 
local high school, but accommodation for students from outside Moosonee, and the base 
recreation facilities in order to be effective. The committee wrote that “the pleas for local high 
school facilities are very strong particularly from the Indian population in Moosonee and Moose 
Factory.”758  They also stated “This is by far the most definite and substantial proposal and its 
implementation would go a long way towards meeting the objectives of this committee.”759 At 
the end of its report, the committee reiterated: 
The Committee recommends first and foremost the establishment of grades 9 and 10 
High School classes … The strong bid for a High School by the Indian population of 
Moosonee and Moose Factory was impressive. The authorities should perhaps look upon 
the base closure as the ‘incident’ that brought the need for a high school to the fore rather 
than simply a suggestion for the use of the base. 
760
 
Although the Closure Report emphasized the support of local Indigenous people, interviewees 
said that the high school concept was strongly supported by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people, all of whom were tired of sending their children away for high school. Even those 
persons whose children were quite young at the time of the base closure said they were dreading 
the day that they would need to put their teenagers on the train south, to board with strangers in 
North Bay or Sudbury.
761
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 The Ministry of Education also supported the regional high school concept, which it 
indicated would serve “Moosonee and Moose Factory, as well as [students] from Fort Albany, 
Kashechewan, Attiwapiskat, Fort Severn and Winisk, on a boarding school basis.”762 It indicated 
that a high school would need most of the facilities on the radar base, including: 
The school [Henry Hudson School], the recreation centre, the church and social hall, the 
combined officers’ mess, the single barracks block, the administrative building, the 
skating rink and ice arena, the mechanical and civil engineering workshops and twenty of 
the houses [for teachers].
763
  
The assumption by the Ministry of Education seemed to be that students would be housed in the 
RCAF’s former single barracks and that all other structures would be needed for high school 
programs.
764
  
 While the high school request was the community’s top priority, the use of houses from 
the base was a close second in the closure report.  The report’s authors described the base 
subdivision and its housing as follows: 
Permanent married quarters (P.M.Q.s) – it seems generally agreed that the housing at the 
base is too crowded and that thinning to perhaps 50% would still leave 57 houses at the 
base. People from Moosonee, Moose Factory both on the Reserve and elsewhere – have 
expressed an interest. Some see a demand for them from places like Albany and 
Kashechewan. These buildings are movable having come in on wheels and fastened 
together to make a 20’ wide building …Thirty-eight applications for houses either to be 
occupied at the base or to be moved to sites elsewhere have currently been received by 
the committee. 
765
 
As this study progresses the feasibility of using the base as [a] subdivision of Moosonee 
becomes more and more practical. The lack of serviced lots [in town] and the high cost of 
servicing them contributes greatly to this position.
766
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The reference to high servicing costs would have referred primarily to water and sewer service 
costs in the townsite of Moosonee and in the area south of Store Creek.  
Although the Joint Committee did not highlight the base water and sewer plants within its 
recommendations, it referred to these facilities at the end of the report. The Committee indicated 
that the base’s sewage disposal plant was a “definite asset,” but suggested that 
Water supply from the base water treatment plant is considered at this point to be 
economically impractical because of high labour and material costs. Some who are 
knowledgeable on the subject feel that extensions of the Moosonee water mains to the 
base would be a sound move. This would seem to be a key to the utilization of the 
base.
767
 
 
Ontario’s Minister of the Environment, William Newman, concurred with the Closure 
Committee’s observations on infrastructure.  In his initial review of the Closure Report, the 
Minister wrote that “Many of the proposals contained in the Brief of the Joint Committee are 
contingent on the existing sewage and water facilities on the base and in the town.”768 Newman 
recommended that a consultant be retained to determine if “it would be more practical to 
continue operating the base and townsite services as separate units, or to expand the town 
services to serve the base and close the CFS water and sewage treatment facilities.”769 The 
integration of sewer and water infrastructure had been recommended by provincial staff during 
the original planning for the construction of the radar base.
770
 Now the concept of integrated 
services had come full circle and the province would be faced with a much more expensive 
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project: integrating the older base facilities, constructed in 1960, with the newer town structures 
and pipes, completed in 1969. 
771
   
Even as early as 1968, provincial government staff had been told that the radar base could 
possibly close by 1975.
772
  Staff had, at that point, noted that there were potential assets on the 
base that could be used locally if closure occurred. As one planner noted, “There are permanent, 
large buildings, used presently for offices, recreation centre, church, etc., the future use of which 
might be considered… [and] 114 housing units [which] are transportable aluminum homes – 
mobile homes.” 773 This illustrates how both government representatives and local people had 
been scrutinizing radar base’s assets for years before its closure.  
As the closure report was being deliberated by Cabinet, Commanding Officer Major 
Conn provided more detail in a guest editorial printed in Moosetalk in April 1975.  Conn used 
the opportunity to both describe the dismantling of the base and to say farewell to local people: 
During the last couple of weeks there has been a considerable amount of activity 
occurring at the base; helicopters flying over, many strangers arriving and leaving and 
perhaps most significantly, the change in the skyline with the dismantling of the 
radomes… On 1 April, 1975, as planned the radar stopped functioning and the air 
navigation beacon (TACAN) ceased, ending the operational role of this station…On 10 
April, 1975 a crew of technicians arrived from USAF to dismantle the radomes and … 
which will be returned to the U.S. … [This] is an immense task, especially when 
combined with the one hundred and twenty families which are leaving at the same time. 
As people depart, buildings have to be closed and prepared for whatever future the station 
may have.  
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As plans stand now, the station will be closed by 1 Aug.75 … Although many rumours 
are circulating, concerning the future, we at the station have had no news and we are just 
as concerned as the townspeople. 
Since the opening of the station in 1961, several hundred people have been posted here 
and many more have visited the area on business. All of these people will regret the 
closing of CFS Moosonee; since we have enjoyed the area and particularly the hospitality 
the townspeople have shown the station. The present members, all wish the Moosonee 
area well, in the future.
774
 
There is no indication in archival files that Major Conn was required to give this update to local 
people and it seemed to be a heartfelt parting message.  
 By June 1975 provincial government staff had reviewed the Joint Closure report, 
circulated it to twelve government ministries, and prepared a Cabinet submission.  Generally, 
provincial ministries were supportive of the recommendations by the Joint Closure Committee. 
The focus of the province shifted to implementation issues and to collaboration with the federal 
government to transfer the radar base to either the province or the town. 
Part of ensuring a good future for Moosonee was taking care of the radar base’s 
structures so that they would not deteriorate while the provincial and federal government 
deliberated on options for the base. In this regard, the Department of National Defence (DND) 
prepared a thorough report by April 1975 on “the requirements for the continued preservation of 
all useable buildings at CFS Moosonee after the 1 Aug 75 closure date.”775 The DND stated that 
it would be necessary to operate the heating and power plant, the water and sewage plants, and 
the MQ [likely PMQ] furnaces in order to avoid freezing the infrastructure. It also indicated that 
approximately 20 personnel, either civilians or military, would be needed to manage utilities, 
maintenance and security on the former base.  The estimated monthly cost of preserving the 
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condition of the base was $45,250, but the more pressing issue was that the DND expected there 
would be no military personnel and “few qualified civilians” available once the base closed.776 In 
addition, the DND report stated that “the present fuel contract terminates 1 Aug 75 [and] a new 
contract would have to be negotiated prior to that date.”777 The time for decisions was very tight 
but, other than the DND, the provincial and federal governments did not seem to realize the need 
to protect the base’s assets before they were divested. 
By June 1975 more facilities were closing on the base and people were moving away. 
The North Bay Nugget provided a description of the situation: 
The first of the regular facilities to close was the base Chapel …The next to close were 
mess facilities for the Officers and Junior Ranks. These were moved to a combined 
operation with the sergeants and became an All Ranks Mess…on June 1st. The next major 
closure of facilities came when the Canex (the base shopping centre), the Post Office and 
the Snack Bars closed.  
Personnel started leaving the Base at the end of March and the exodus continued. Each 
evening now the lighted windows of the married quarters get fewer and fewer. Personnel 
board the train daily with their families and head for new postings…. 
As of August 1, the Canadian Forces Station that was built in 1960 will be patrolled by 
two or three Commissionaires, a couple of Military Police and a whole bunch of 
blackflies and mosquitoes. They won’t be fogging the grounds anymore to keep the bugs 
down.
778
 
This North Bay Nugget article is one of the few archival records to give any indication of the 
status of buildings as the base neared its closure date. The only other document to refer to 
progress (or lack thereof) on the Joint Closure Committee report was a provincial staff memo 
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that indicated the high school proposal would likely proceed: “Understand Minister of Education 
and School Board have discussed. General agreement on need. Good possibility of utilizing 
C.F.B. facilities.”779 
 By early 1976, Moosonee’s residents must have been getting concerned about the slow 
pace of asset transition at the base.  The CBC picked up on this subject and broadcast a show on 
The Fifth Estate on 24 February 1976, which showed empty housing on the base, while some 
residents of Moosonee were living in shacks.
780
 The show generated a flurry of letters to Premier 
Bill Davis.
781
  All the writers were adamant that the province immediately deal with housing and 
other issues in Moosonee, as the following excerpts show: 
Yesterday I saw the program “The Fifth Estate” and I was appalled to hear about the 
closed base at Moosonee. The base is being heated without anyone benefitting, while the 
native population is spending huge sums of money to heat their primitive huts.
782
 
After watching …Fifth Estate…and their report on the living conditions of the people of 
Moosonee and Moose Factory area, the government red tape in trying to decide to sell 
them empty, government housing that my tax dollars are paying for, I am as a citizen of 
this province asking for your resignation. You are not man enough for the position you 
hold.
783
 
Do what you can to see that the ‘Liberal’ red tape and the ‘Conservative’ indecision in 
Ontario is circumvented so that the native people of the Moosonee district of Ontario are 
enabled to use NOW the abandoned C.F.B. Moosonee which is their right and our 
responsibility.
784
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The 114 houses, the school and the recreational facilities that are standing idle in this 
community while the residents are living in very substandard dwellings is a national 
disgrace.
785
 
Tonight I learned about what goes on at Moosonee and I’m appalled. … How your 
government can allow those poor Indian and Metis to live in such squalor with all that 
housing standing there vacant is past all understanding. It is a provincial and national 
disgrace.
786
 
LET THE TOWN IN NOW – work out your usual RED TAPE LATER.787 
Is this [Moosonee] an example of how democracy works? …Taxpayers are keeping114 
empty houses heated while children grow up resentful and bitter toward their country. 
Old people suffer and deteriorate in mind and body. … If Democracy can’t work …then 
let’s have Castro come up and straighten us out and teach us how to share our 
blessings.
788
 
These excerpts from letters written to Premier Davis are fairly representative of the complaints to 
the Ontario government.  Some letters were also sent to Prime Minister Pierre ElliottTrudeau. 
These letters may have been the impetus needed to get the province and federal governments to 
transfer the base to the MDAB.   
In the wake of this criticism Premier Davis responded. He agreed with some of the 
accusations but he also clarified that the province had been building infrastructure for some 
years, and housing more recently. Specifically Davis responded in his form letter: 
I admit that it has taken considerable time to make arrangements for the use of the 
housing and other components of the abandoned armed forces base. The determination of 
the best solution has involved complex discussions between several provincial agencies, 
the municipality, the Treaty Nine organization, several Indian bands, the Metis 
Association, the Indian community on Moose Factory Island and several federal 
agencies.… 
The Ontario Government has now authorized the Moosonee Area Development Board to 
negotiate with the Federal Government as to the disposition of the [housing] units. … 
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The Ontario Housing Corporation has built approximately 68 new housing units for 
Indians and Metis in Moosonee over the past few years. …The Province has spent a great 
deal of money over the past 10 years … [on infrastructure].789 
 
One month after the premier’s reply, the Provincial Secretary confirmed that all federal 
and provincial documents had been finalized “clearing the way for the final transfer of the assets 
of the former CFS Moosonee to the MDAB.”790  That same week, negotiations were underway 
with “the Indian Band [Moose Band] and the Métis and Non-Status Indian Association to 
purchase fifty houses from the D.N.D. Radar Base – 25 each.” 791 Interviewees indicated that the 
sale of these houses benefitted everyone. People who purchased homes on the base knew they 
would have more yard space since every second home had been removed, while people who 
purchased homes from the Métis and Non-Status Association could either live in those homes on 
the base or could move their new homes onto a site in the town.  Homes that were sold to Moose 
Factory Island’s residents were moved “over the ice” during the winter of 1976-77 helping fill 
the demand for housing on the island.
792
 
 Progress also occurred on the fledgling high school. By June 1976 a principal had been 
appointed for the James Bay Lowlands District Secondary School, and plans had been made to 
hire ten teachers, “three of which are native.”793 James Auld, the Chair of Management Board of 
Cabinet, had visited with the new principal and had observed “extensive repainting and 
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refurbishing … to the gymnasium/swimming pool complex and the school buildings.” 794 Auld 
also indicated that the Principal was anticipating 100 to 150 students to start at the school in 
September 1976. Additionally he mentioned that students from Moose Factory Island would 
need to be transported to and from the high school by helicopter during freeze-up and thaw 
periods.
795
  
Although a cursory sketch was attached to Auld’s memos, information from interviewees 
provides a much clearer picture of the amount of transformation that was occurring for the high 
school. One interviewee described the changes as follows: 
Twenty-one homes on the base were kept for teachers’ houses. These houses were 
scattered throughout the former base property.  
The barracks were kept for student housing.  Students from Moose Factory came over on 
Monday morning and returned home on Friday. They travelled by boat or helicopter 
depending on the season.  
The Junior Ranks Mess became the high school library and the Sergeants’ Mess became 
the Home Economics room.  The Officers’ Mess became the Art room and the combined 
mess cafeteria was retained as a high school cafeteria. 
The Henry Hudson School [now called H-block apartments] was used for high school 
classrooms. 
The ME building (Mobile Equipment & Supply building) was used for Automotive Shop, 
the Carpentry Shop, Drafting room and Electrical Shop. 
The Administration/Base Headquarters building was used for School Board offices. This 
was a brand new School Board since there had never been a high school in the James Bay 
area. 
The Recreation Centre on the base originally included a 94 seat theatre and a bowling 
alley. The students were still able to use the bowling alley. The seats were removed from 
the theatre and it was turned into a music room. The snack bar room was turned into 
offices. The base pool was maintained and is still the same pool that is in the current high 
school, although the pool closed about four years ago [2009] due to lack of funds for 
major upgrades. The gym in the current high school is the original gym that was 
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constructed on the base and that formed part of the Recreation Centre. This was the gym 
where the RCAF held its dances and balls.
796
 
 
The transformation of the radar base’s buildings into a high school campus was so 
comprehensive that it can only be described as impressive. Furthermore, what started as the 
exercise of agency by the town and regional representatives resulted in a full service high school 
and in new housing for Moosonee and Moose Factory. Both of these initiatives demonstrated 
how people from the town and the entire region seized the opportunity that the base closure 
represented. Additionally, the Closure Committee was unique because it was one of the few 
groups formed in this region, and in this era, which represented both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people. That is, the committee was locally empowered and it was representative. It 
was also not developed by the provincial or federal governments and the appointees were not 
government selected and approved individuals. Rather, all the appointees to the committee were 
selected by the communities that chose to be involved in the base’s transformation. This ability 
to choose its own representatives and partners added to the momentum, enthusiasm, and 
determination shown by the closure committee. 
Researchers who study community initiatives suggest that one of the components for 
community development is “finding a group that is passionate about the initiative.” 797 Wayne 
Caldwell et al. suggest that a passionate “community-based group is able to provide motivation, 
credibility, people power, and the resources to make change in a community.” 798 Moosonee 
demonstrated all the criteria for a successful community-based group.  The MDAB ensured that 
it had the support of the community before it acted; it ensured that it had a mandate to proceed. 
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Next, it sought the opinions of local residents and presented them to the Closure Committee. The 
Closure Committee itself prepared a comprehensive report on options for the radar base and then 
it ensured that the report was implemented. The Closure Committee represents a valuable 
example of change that reached both within and beyond the community of Moosonee, bringing 
together Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. The next chapter outlines the concepts of 
community development that were evident in Moosonee, not only during the transformation of 
the radar base, but from the first time the town experienced the Cold War’s impact.  
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Chapter Ten: Stages of Community Development, Impacts, and Change  
 
Change in Moosonee was not random. Rather, it was part of a system, or a series of 
interconnected changes. Some of the critical system elements or changes were population 
growth, environmental contamination of water and soil, employment, infrastructure 
development, and the evolution of local government. Change occurred in a system, but it was 
also a spatial, temporal and social process. This chapter starts by examining the stages of 
development in Moosonee and comparing these stages to the resource town development models 
discussed in Chapter Two. The second part of the chapter is an outline of the Cold War’s impacts 
on Moosonee and a discussion of the ways change was experienced differently depending on the 
social status of individuals and groups. Essentially, Chapter Ten describes the convergence of 
community development theory and personal experience as evidenced in Moosonee during the 
Cold War.  
 The key development stages or activities in Moosonee for the time period covered by this 
dissertation were: the railway and early 1950s construction phase (related to the Mid-Canada 
Line), construction and operation of the Pinetree radar base, the development of local 
infrastructure, the evolution of local government, and the closure of the radar base. 
 The railway development stage was touted by the ONR as an important element of 
northern economic growth, but this research suggests that the railway was most significant for 
setting the stage for development during the Cold War, rather than as a separate development 
activity.  Without the railway it is doubtful that the community would have been chosen as a 
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shipping centre for Mid-Canada radar bases.  It is also impossible to imagine that Moosonee 
would have been chosen as a radar base site without the existence of the railway.  
The planning and construction of Moosonee’s radar base was a significant stage for two 
reasons. The planning of the base demonstrated a failed opportunity to integrate the town and 
base’s infrastructure and services. However, the construction process provided training 
opportunities, at the Carter construction camp, for local people to be hired subsequently on the 
radar base itself.  The operation of the radar base was similar to the operation of a mine or forest 
industry mill near a resource community.  Local people were not only hired to work on the Base 
but they further developed career skills there and interviewees emphasized that they picked up 
skills through recreational activities that stayed with them throughout their lives and shaped the 
culture of Moosonee.  
 The development of new infrastructure in Moosonee was mandated due to the increase in 
its population and subsequent environmental degradation generated by the construction of the 
railway and the Mid-Canada shipping area, and by the construction and operation of the radar 
base.  Infrastructure installation served two purposes: providing clean water, sewage treatment, 
and roads – services that were vital to the growth of the town; and fostering a climate of public 
participation, or at least public demand for ongoing improvements to services. The infrastructure 
development phase was the ultimate basis for the evolution of local government in the 
community.   
The final local stage – development of voice and local government -- placed Moosonee’s 
citizens in the position to exercise agency in developing proposals for the future use of the radar 
base when it closed. Had local people not been voicing their opinions during the infrastructure 
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and local government phases, it is doubtful they would have reacted so quickly to the opportunity 
to control the future of both the assets and the land occupied by the base. This was particularly 
important because gaining the authority to use a former radar base was not something that 
occurred in all locations.
799
   
The dramatic increase or ‘boom’ phase in Moosonee, to use Robert Bone’s terminology, 
is demonstrated by Figure 10.1. The population growth in this figure shows only the change for 
the town itself, and so does not represent the residents of the radar base.
800
 Figure 10.1 illustrates 
that the population of Moosonee quadrupled in the early stages of military development (i.e. 
1956-1961). The figure also demonstrates that in 1976, the year after the radar base closed, the 
town did not experience any decrease in population. This shows that the town adapted to the base 
closure even though employees were laid off after the radar base closed. To be clear, 
approximately 450 residents of the radar base moved away but the town’s own population in 
1976 was 1,349 compared to 1,325 before the site closed. Ten years after the base closed, the 
town’s population was still over 1,300. 
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Note to Figure 10.1: All population data are from Statistics Canada, except for 1963 and 
1967. 
801
  
 
The stability of Moosonee’s population does not match what Robert Bone refers to as the 
“Classic Boom and Bust” cycle of resource towns.802  In resource town communities, when the 
resource company shuts down, be it a mine or a mill, there is generally a “bust” stage that occurs 
and this stage includes a sharp decrease in population in the adjacent local community. Bone 
states that towns like Pine Point, Northwest Territories and Uranium City, Saskatchewan are 
classic examples of “boom and bust” because populations returned to pre-development levels 
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after mine closures.
803
  Despite the contrast in population change compared to resource towns, 
Moosonee’s development stages still have some, but not all, of the model elements outlined by 
Robert Bone and Rex Lucas.
804
  The Bone and Lucas models are compared to Moosonee’s 
development stages in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: Moosonee’s Development Stages Compared to Bone and Lucas’s Models 
Bone Model Lucas Model Moosonee Development Stages  
Vacant Site  Early development includes fur trade (Revillon 
Freres-1905) and Railway (1932).  
 
Construction First Phase of Cold War Construction: Mid-Canada 
Line shipping and construction of airstrip, 1955-56. 
 
Sudden Growth Recruitment of 
Citizens 
First Phase of Migration: Construction Workers and 
Northern Cree travel to Moosonee.
805
 
 
Second Phase of Cold War Construction: Pinetree 
Base, 1960-61. 
 
Second phase of Migration: RCAF start to occupy 
radar base at Dec.1961 
Peak of Resource 
Production 
 RCAF military personnel numbers peak at Oct/Nov 
1962; civilian employee numbers peak in 1963. 
RCAF and civilians interact (employment, sports and 
social activities)  
Settlement south of Store Creek grows from a dozen 
homes to 114 houses. The majority of the properties 
(74) are occupied by Cree families from 
Attawapiskat and Fort Albany, seeking employment. 
806
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 Transition: Local 
services are 
developed and 
interaction 
occurs between 
resource 
industries and  
local government  
Transition or Adaptation to Growth: 
Major infrastructure (water/sewer) concerns in town 
and warnings of health hazards (1961-63).  
Housing south of Store Creek is described as ranging 
from “adequate to unfit for human habitation”807 
(1963) 
Construction of sewer and water begins (1966). 
Local Government begins to evolve. 
 
  
Maturity 
MDAB Act proclaimed (1968) 
Major part of infrastructure construction is 
completed by 1968, but the area south of Store Creek 
is not fully serviced for several more years. 
808
 
 
Mine 
Downsizes
809
 
 The number of military personnel and civilian 
employees remained stable throughout the life of the 
base, right up until the closure announcement. 
Downsizing of the radar base was a rapid process 
focusing on the Spring of 1975. 
Mine Closes  RCAF base closes (1975) 
 
Area reverts to 
Vacant Site 
 Adaptation to Closure: 
The RCAF site did not revert to a vacant site. Instead 
it was transformed into a high school campus and 
housing was completely utilized. 
 
Unlike the Bone and Lucas models, the Moosonee model has two construction stages and 
two stages of transition or adaptation.  Moosonee experienced and partially adapted to rapid 
growth. This adaptation is best demonstrated by the town’s recovery from infrastructure crises 
and by the evolution of local government. Moosonee also experienced adaptation in the 
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transition phase when the radar base closed.  I would argue that the first phase of adaptation, the 
adjustment to growth, was the most difficult for Moosonee residents, not only because of the 
immense issues involved in constructing water and sewer facilities after development had 
already occurred, but also because the construction of much needed works was initially restricted 
to the area north of Store Creek. This staging of infrastructure caused animosity within the 
community and between the community and the provincial government, as demonstrated in 
Chapter Eight. The second phase of adaptation, adjusting to the base’s closure, was almost a 
welcome challenge to the residents of Moosonee who were, by 1975, savvy participants in local 
governance processes.   
Figure 10.2 shows Moosonee’s key development stages as a new model of change. The 
figure begins with the two phases of construction and migration which occurred in Moosonee. 
The first phase, initiated in 1955, was the building of an airstrip to supply the Mid-Canada line’s 
radar bases located north of Moosonee. As discussed in Chapter Four, this phase generated 
migration to Moosonee from Cree communities on the western shore of James Bay. The second 
phase of construction and migration was the 1960-61 construction of Moosonee’s radar base, 
followed by the migration of 200 military personnel and their families. This phase is described in 
Chapter Five and is supplemented by Chapter Six’s discussion of life on the base.  
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Figure 10.2: Moosonee’s Model of Community Change 
 
 
The middle circle in Figure 10.2 highlights the Infrastructure and Services development stage. 
Chapter Seven describes the degradation of Moosonee’s environment and how the town required 
major infrastructure and services improvements in order to survive. The fourth circle in Figure 
10.2 represents the development of local government, a process spurred on by local people who 
had become discouraged and angry by the slow pace of desperately needed community 
improvements. This stage demonstrates how local people adapted to the two phases of 
construction and migration. They demanded more, not just in physical improvements to the 
community, but in the quality of local governance. In fact, the residents of Moosonee claimed 
their entitlement to governance and a real voice in their future, as discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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Once local government was in place, the town’s residents were positioned to be able to seize the 
moment when the radar base closed.  Thus the top circle in Figure 10.2, described in Chapter 
Nine, represents adaptation to closure and the transformation of the radar base.   
The arrow in Figure 10.2 sweeps upward, partly to represent positive change in 
Moosonee over time, but also to illustrate the power of what Stalwick et al. refer to as 
“community based action.” 810 These authors describe community based action as a way to 
understand community conditions, to be “in dialogue” within a community, and to become 
involved in change. 
811
  As an example of being “in dialogue” Stalwick et al. conducted study 
circles with Indigenous people in the early 1980s. At these sessions community residents 
indicated that they were the best people to identify community priorities and people also noted 
that “citizens will name their own service needs.” 812 Additionally, participants indicated that it 
was only possible to understand change if “the relationship to land use” was incorporated in 
solutions. 
813
 Moosonee’s residents fully understood what made their community function well 
and what did not, and as daily observers of change, they certainly understood their evolving 
landscape.  
What happened in Moosonee was community based action, not community ‘placed’ 
activity, which allows only limited public participation.
814
 Community placed development had 
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been attempted, unsuccessfully, in federal government initiatives on First Nations’ lands between 
1954 and 1968. 
815
 Hugh Shewell writes that, “despite the democratic principles inherent in 
community development, Indians were not consulted or involved in the development of [the 
program].” 816 Furthermore, he indicates that community economic development failed due to a 
lack of community control.
817
 Essentially, federal programs were not community based. 
Moosonee’s processes were the epitome of community based participatory activity, not as 
a research process, but as an ongoing implementation of the goals of local residents.  There were 
four components of community based activity which occurred in Moosonee. The first component 
was physical change, specifically the deterioration in Moosonee’s environment. The second was 
social change, the creation of jobs and recreational activities. One component was negative, 
while the other represented positive opportunities. These two components generated local 
feedback and community action, because in both cases there was an inequity, recognized locally, 
between the two settlement areas. People living in the town were able to access clean water and 
sewage facilities several years prior to people situated in the village. Similarly, a higher number 
of residents of the town, as opposed to the village, were employed on the base and were 
subsequently privy to recreational opportunities linked to civilian positions.  
Public participation represented the third component in community based activity. This 
component included the action of the town’s residents to demand services for others. These 
demands took the form of public participation in citizen’s groups and culminated in the eventual 
creation of local government in the community. Furthermore, residents not only voiced concerns 
locally, but they also became experienced at ensuring their voices were heard by media outlets, 
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and therefore by other residents of the province. The best examples of this connection to the 
media were the protests of local people when Minister Bill Davis arrived to open the JBEC 
complex (see Chapter Seven) and the Fifth Estate program on the delays in transformation of the 
radar base (Chapter Nine). These incidents of media reporting were not accidental and 
Moosonee’s residents likely requested, or at least hoped for, exposure in the media.818  Local 
residents were fully aware that their concerns would not be met unless the general public was 
aware of their situation.  Eventually the expressions of concern and demands for change resulted 
in the improvements to infrastructure, the creation of a regional high school and the ability to 
conduct local elections. Thus the third component of community based activity, public 
participation, included the powerful expression of community voices through local governance.  
The fourth component of community based action was the formation of a passionate 
group that crossed the boundaries of gender, race, and class. Local people demonstrated what 
Caldwell et al. refer to as “passion” when they formed the Closure committee and developed 
solutions to deal with the closure of the radar base. 
819
 Although Figure 10.2 illustrates 
development stages it does not pinpoint how development affected individuals.  The next part of 
this chapter helps to remedy this situation by discussing how the impacts of Cold War growth 
and change affected different groups of people. 
  Interviewees indicated that the Cold War’s impacts were primarily positive.  These 
impacts included the employment and training opportunities provided at the radar base, the 
ability to participate in social and recreational activities, and the opportunity to utilize the 
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infrastructure and buildings left in the community after the base closed. On the latter point, as 
discussed in Chapter Nine, the radar base’s facilities provided a huge benefit both to housing 
stock and to the ability to form a local high school complex. The high school complex did not 
just mean that classrooms and workshops were available. Rather it meant that high school aged 
children no longer had to move away for five years to complete their education.  
820
  
Although interviewees indicated that the Cold War’s impacts were positive, change in 
Moosonee was experienced differently depending on the social status of residents.  Impacts 
varied depending on where people lived, in the townsite or in the village, and their social status.  
The term “social status,” is used here in a broad sense meaning the combination of gender, race, 
and class. 
821
  
The first element of social status that demonstrates differing impacts is gender. Joy Parr 
explains that, when historians examine gender along with race and class, they assume that “in 
important ways, the experience of women was not like the experience of men, the experience of 
First Nations was not like the experience of colonizers [and] the experience of workers was not 
like that of bosses.”822  Parr has specifically examined how men and women experience local 
government differently.  In her study of two Ontario factory towns, Parr observed that, when it 
came to local decision making, for men “their assent was required if a community consensus was 
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to be formed.”823 However, she found, that in comparison, women were “neither functionally nor 
ideologically...fully citizens of the town. They were more considered than consulted in the public 
affairs of the municipality.”824  
Parr’s research on gender and local government is applicable to the situation in 
Moosonee. During the period studied here (1955-1975) women were, to borrow Parr’s words, 
barely “considered” by outside agencies. Furthermore, women were merely “noted,” and they 
were not consulted regarding infrastructure, local government and development issues. 
Provincial reports on public meetings show women as having been present, but they are 
generally dismissed as “only housewives” even though some of the women who pushed to have 
their voices heard were employees of local businesses. The dismissal of women’s roles inside 
and outside of the home was commonplace during the 1950s and 1960s as documented by Ruth 
Roach Pierson and Doug Owram.
825
 These authors illustrate how women were encouraged to 
leave the workplace after the Second World War and to devote themselves to marriage and 
family.
826
 As Owram states “Women remained in the home. Men worked. At mid-century this 
ideal was pervasive.” 827 Women were certainly not encouraged, during the postwar era, to 
become involved in the public sphere, particularly in politics. 
828
 
Possibly due to the dire local circumstances, Moosonee’s women did not conform to the 
prevailing norms noted by Roach Pierson and Owram. Instead, women in Moosonee participated 
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in citizen’s committees such as the Moosonee Townsite Development Board and the Moosonee 
Community Council Steering Committee.
829
 They were also leaders of community groups such 
as the Homemakers’ Club in which they gained experience in organizational roles.830 However, 
women were not considered for the initial appointments to the MDAB in 1968. As discussed in 
Chapter 8, women such as Ellen Morrison and Dorothy Wynne had been actively involved in 
lobbying for services for local people, particularly those who lived south of Store Creek.
831
 
Women also worked both in the town and on the radar base. 
832
 The lack of recognition of their 
work and their value to the community, which would have been remedied by appointment to the 
MDAB, must have irked women and the community at large. After all, it was the community 
that had nominated women for those initial positions. In effect, women were elected by the 
community but rejected by the province.  
The activity at the radar base did not encourage or enable women’s voices. As noted in 
Chapter Six, military documents recorded women if they had babies, and if they were involved 
in sports teams. References to women were also often combined with children, to form the group 
called “dependents.” Women were referred to as “the distaff side,” or the ‘other.’ There was, 
however, still a positive impact of having women on the base.  Although not present until several 
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years after the base opened, women’s sports teams were formed and were active.  This meant 
that women who were spouses of civilian employees could participate in a range of sports, 
including curling, bowling and baseball, and that single women who were civilian employees 
could join teams and benefit from the social and physical aspects of sport. 
The second element of social status that demonstrates variation in impacts is race. 
Provincial government reports from departments such as Welfare and Social and Family Services 
tended to categorize Moosonee’s residents as “White, Status Indian, Non-Status Indian, Metis, 
and White-Status Indian.”833  These reports also indicated that almost all the residents who lived 
south of Store Creek were Indigenous peoples.
834
  This is the area that had to wait longer than the 
town for water, sewer and fire services. It would be simplistic to attribute the lack of services 
solely to race. The most expensive properties in Moosonee, the industrial lots, were also denied 
water and sewer services despite lobbying by their owners to the provincial government. 
Provincial planners indicated that both the Village (south of Store Creek) and the industrial area 
were outside Moosonee’s main downtown area, and that the focus of Stage One of water and 
sewer construction was the original built-up area of Moosonee (i.e. the original townsite). 
Despite the planning rationale, the delay in services for the Village was dangerous for 
Indigenous people. As indicated in Chapters Six and Seven, it was Indigenous people who 
returned to inadequate shacks, or even tents after receiving health services, and it was Indigenous 
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people who were more likely to experience house fires.
835
 In effect, the consequences of lack of 
services were dire in the village compared to other areas of town. As indicated in Chapter Eight, 
it was these dreadful impacts which inspired Indigenous residents like Tom Archibald, Ellen 
Morrison, and Dorothy Wynne to constantly lobby for improvements.
836
  
Race was not overtly noted in any archival materials on military or civilian positions 
within the radar base’s archival records. The RCAF used only two categories – military and 
civilian – in their annual historical reports.  Initially, I considered that this represented an effort 
to ignore the heritage of Indigenous employees.  However, further reading of the RCAF’s 
records determined that, to the military, there were only two distinctions that were important.  
The RCAF was in the town solely to defend Canada from nuclear attack. Base Commanders and 
other officers only cared whether someone had completed military training and could handle 
radar or other equipment; or whether the person could handle the essential civilian employee 
functions.  Interviewees did note, however, one digression from the RCAF’s records. They 
indicated that the distasteful, and potentially dangerous, job of applying creosote for walkways 
fell to the Indigenous civilian employees.
837
 What this indicates is that further research, and 
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particularly interviews, might provide a more enhanced picture of racial aspects of employment 
on the base. 
Race and class are closely entwined and that is why it is imperative to examine class as a 
third element of social status that demonstrates different impacts. Class can be a difficult aspect 
to measure or categorize, especially for a dissertation that does not include an analysis of 
income.  However, in Moosonee as in other communities, the type of housing that people lived 
in was an indicator of class. The following description of housing demonstrates the class 
distinctions that existed in Moosonee. Wendy Thomas, a Department of Welfare worker, 
assessed housing in Moosonee during 1963.
838
 She indicated that the town’s homes tended to be 
“well-built and spacious,” but that two-thirds of the village’s homes, which were occupied by 
Indigenous people, were either “inadequate” or “unfit for human habitation.” 839 A few years 
after the Thomas report, another provincial employee, J. K. McAully, provided housing excerpts 
from a land use planning report on Moosonee which described the town’s housing as “average” 
and the village’s housing as “sub-minimal.” 840  The combination of the Thomas and McAully 
reports provide a use beyond structural assessments. That is, the reports provide a picture of a 
divided community – Moosonee’s townsite versus the village. Residents of the town were 
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perceived as primarily white and of a class that could afford reasonable housing while residents 
of the village were described as primarily Indigenous people who did not have decent housing.  
 Despite housing conditions, employment at the radar base crossed the boundary between 
the townsite and the village. For example, Tom Archibald, the first chairman of the Moosonee 
Townsite Development Board, told the press in 1965 that he was a full-time employee at the 
radar base but that he lived in a ‘shack’ in the village.841 For civilian employees of the base, 
seeing a modern community (the base) every day, on the job, meant that they knew change was 
possible, and they were not going to be content with living a substandard life.  Most of the 
civilian employees hired at the radar base lived in town, but there were at least seven people 
employed from the village area.
842
 Interviewees emphasized that civilian employees, from both 
the village and the town, wanted more of what they saw daily at the base, especially clean water, 
better roads and adequate housing. 
Both residents of the town and the village crossed social boundaries and worked together 
to effect change in Moosonee. The best example of the mix of men and women, Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people, and residents of the town and village was the initial Moosonee Townsite 
Development Board described in Chapter 8.  Provincial health inspectors had described this 
group of 15 residents as “8 white status Indians, two of which are women, 6 whites, [and] 1 
Indian.” 843 As noted in Chapter 8, while this labelling of individuals would be unacceptable 
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today, it is recorded here to indicate how provincial staff at the time identified the diversity of 
citizens involved in forcing changes in Moosonee.   
Also, although Moosonee’s residents experienced change in different ways, they 
sometimes spoke as “one voice” when it came to demanding improvements. First, the Moosonee 
Townsite Development Board has already been mentioned above as one example of the shared 
purposes of people who were from different backgrounds. A second example of demanding 
change was the action sought by the first members of the MDAB in 1968.  This new board was 
made up solely of provincial appointees who were male and primarily white (3 out of 5 members 
were non-Indigenous).  Three days after their first meeting, the MDAB told their provincial 
advisor that their top priority was to get clean water for people living south of Store Creek. 
844
 
The members understood that people living south of the creek had not benefitted as much as 
town residents from employment and recreation at the radar base and from plans for sewer and 
water construction. 
Thirdly, the formation of the Joint Closure Committee, which formulated the 
recommendations for transforming the radar base, bridged social differences in order to effect 
change.  This Committee was made up of both men and women who lived not only in various 
areas of Moosonee but also in other neighbouring communities, and who were “Treaty and Non-
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Treaty Indians, Metis and whites.” 845  This demonstrates that, not only did Moosonee’s citizens 
bridge gender, race and class differences, but they also crossed geographic boundaries. 
The development that occurred in Moosonee provides a new model of multiple stages of 
community change and adaptation. It also shows that change and adaptation were socially 
complex. Additionally, the model demonstrates how even small changes in Moosonee caused 
both structural (infrastructure) issues and personal changes, for example losing access to clean 
water. Furthermore this model adds to our knowledge about the ways that small, northern 
communities have been impacted by rapid military or resource development. As indicated 
earlier, only one planning text, by Ira Robinson, mentioned that military towns were being 
developed throughout the north.
846
  Resource planners that published after Robinson, like 
Bradbury and St. Martin, failed to continue his discussion on military communities.
847
 Initially 
the goal of this research was to examine and discuss physical or community change separately 
from human or personal impacts. However, this study shows the way that physical and human 
changes are completely entwined and how it is not useful to artificially separate the physical 
environment from the bodies that occupy it.  
 This case study has not solved a specific problem for the community of Moosonee, but it 
adds to our knowledge about the ways that small northern communities adapt to adjacent 
development. Furthermore, research on Moosonee increases our understanding of what makes a 
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study of Schefferville. See “Winding Down in a Quebec Mining Town: A Case Study of Schefferville,” Canadian 
Geographer 27, no. 2 (1983): 128-144. 
 
 244 
better community, that is, a community based on quality of life, adequate services, and positive 
personal experiences. Such an understanding could inform development not only in new towns 
but also existing communities, particularly in northern Ontario as we approach the “Ring of Fire” 
era and consider questions of resource claims and local control.  
The ‘Ring of Fire’ is a multi-billion dollar mining development north of Longlac, Ontario 
(and west of Attawapiskat) that encompasses a huge geographic area.  Some researchers are 
already discussing the potential for the construction of a new resource town in this area.
848
 The 
nine First Nations in the Ring of Fire area have jointly signed, as the Matawa First Nations, a 
framework agreement with the Province of Ontario. This agreement is intended to ensure that 
local peoples are part of decision making throughout the environmental assessment and 
development stages of mines in their area. A provincial news release from March 2014 indicated 
that part of the framework would include “regional and community infrastructure.” 849 However, 
the Moosonee model demonstrates that it is the use of infrastructure after closure which can also 
be a very beneficial result of a development process. As is common in resource town 
discussions, there is little thought about closure because there is an assumption that a mine will 
last forever. This research has shown that it is not appropriate to assume longevity, no matter 
how large the mineral supply or how imminent the threat at a military base.   
Three development components need to be addressed. First, Indigenous peoples must be 
asked for their input about a ‘New Town’ in the Ring of Fire area. Their voice will be essential in 
discussions about new development and infrastructure. Indigenous peoples will want to comment 
on how closely their communities are integrated with a new town.  Integration, in this instance, 
                                                 
848
 The potential for a new settlement and the anticipated impacts on existing indigenous communities, 
were discussion points at a Ring of Fire symposium held at Laurentian in February 2012. 
849
 Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, news release, “Ontaro, First Nations to Work 
Together on Ring of Fire,” 26 March 2014. 
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does not mean of peoples, but of infrastructure and services. For example, there has been no 
discussion on the sharing of local education facilities with a new town. As the model developed 
here demonstrated, any discussion on education, health, recreation, or other facilities must 
include First Nations’ knowledge. The issue of integration of facilities was a major aspect of 
early planning for Moosonee, but Cold War urgency took precedence. This was unacceptable. 
Secondly, although environmental assessment is now a legislated process in Ontario, the 
First Nations will require assurance of meticulous planning for waste management, and for 
disposal of hazardous materials, should the mines close. This study shows that military planners 
ignored waste management during the heady days of the Cold War. This gap caused 
environmental issues for decades after closure of bases in two of the radar lines (DEW and Mid-
Canada Line), and only further research will show the environmental issues that linger for the 
third line, the Pinetree. My study shows that this environmental degradation needs to be explored 
and remedied to deal with the health and social consequences that it causes. Finally, people 
migrate to development sites. Therefore, contingency planning and funds to deal with population 
growth are necessary. Despite the current isolation of communities like Webequie and Marten 
Falls, the development plans for the Ring of Fire include the construction of a road and/or 
railway system. People who come as job-seekers will need housing, health care, educational 
facilities, and recreation.  They will demand these services whether or not they are hired at the 
chromite mine. The Moosonee model demonstrates how population growth, caused by migration 
for employment, disrupts existing communities and results in demands for local improvements 
and governance. The Moosonee model illustrates these realities. We should learn from it. 
This study shows that the creation of the Moosonee Development Area Board was not an 
orderly or staged transition.  Moosonee needed structural and legislative change because it was a 
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migration centre and because people, who had hoped to find work on military construction 
projects and later at the radar base, were living in slums or squatter camps. Provincial 
involvement, through infrastructure funds and legislation, was a reaction, not an action in itself. 
It was a reaction to vigorous lobbying of local citizens and to serious health and environmental 
issues. Furthermore, the issues that Moosonee faced and overcame are still relevant to small 
northern communities, even those that are not facing proposed development. There are daily 
concerns expressed by northern Indigenous residents across Canada, particularly those who have 
limited or no access to clean drinking water or fire protection services.
850
 Fifty years after 
Moosonee lobbied for changes, it is difficult to comprehend why basic services are something 
that must still be demanded, rather than provided outright. 
Returning to the question about why an interdisciplinary approach was the best way to 
conduct research on a specific theme, I contend that reversing the question sheds as much, or 
more light on the value of interdisciplinary work.  That is, the question could be rephrased as: 
Would a land use planning approach have provided the necessary research sources to fully 
examine Cold War change in Moosonee?  While the field of planning can be quite broad and is 
appropriate for problem-solving and investigation in a number of fields, had I used solely a 
planning approach I would have missed inquiry into fields and topics such as anthropology, 
indigenous studies, gender studies and history as explained in Chapter Two and throughout this 
dissertation. 
                                                 
850
 For examples of recent service issues see CBC radio “Up North” for 2016 commentary on a major fire 
in Pikangikum due primarily to the lack of firefighting services, the cycles of flooding in Attawapiskat, and the 
student suicides in Thunder Bay which have occurred as high school students from northern reserves spend their 
teenage years away from home.  Also see Health Canada’s website (www.hc-sc.gc.ca) for the high number of boil 
water advisories on First Nations lands.  
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Planning literature on the stages of resource town development that trace the “boom and 
bust” stages of both resource towns and military towns prove inadequate to explain the case of 
Moosonee. A new model is required to depict adaptation or change in communities that remain 
in place after the key resource (in this case, the radar base) closes, particularly where local 
governance is proposed. My work included the development of such a model within the context 
of an interdisciplinary approach in order to link both community and personal change.  
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APPENDIX ONE: MAP OF WESTERN JAMES BAY COMMUNITIES 
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APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS, AND INTERVIEW CONSENT FORMS 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVAL FOR CONDUCTING RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
Research Ethics Board – Laurentian University 
 
This letter confirms that the research project identified below has successfully passed the 
ethics review by the Laurentian University Research Ethics Board (REB). Your ethics 
approval date, other milestone dates, and any special conditions for your project are 
indicated below. 
 
TYPE OF APPROVAL / New X / Modifications to project / Time extension 
Name of Principal Investigator and school/department 
Sue Heffernan 
Title of Project The Impact of the Cold War on Moosonee: A Case Study 
of a Northern Ontario Radar Base 
REB file number 
2012-08-11 
Date of original approval of project: September 23, 2012 
Final/Interim report due on September 23, 2013 
Conditions placed on project Final report due on October 30, 2014. 
 
During the course of your research, no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol, 
recruitment or consent forms may be initiated without prior written approval from the REB. If you 
wish to modify your research project, please refer to the Research Ethics website to complete the 
appropriate REB form. 
 
All projects must submit a report to REB at least once per year. If involvement with human 
participants continues for longer than one year (e.g. you have not completed the objectives 
of the study and have not yet terminated contact with the participants, except for feedback 
of final results to participants), you must request an extension using the appropriate REB 
form. In all cases, please ensure that your research complies with Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS). 
 
Also please quote your REB file number on all future correspondence with the REB office. 
Congratulations and best of luck in conducting your research. 
 
Susan James, Acting chair 
Laurentian University Research Ethics Board
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 APPENDIX TWO (continued): INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
1. When did you live in, or visit, Moosonee?  Where did you live? (Please describe all 
locations/moves within the town and/or the airbase). 
 
 
2. What was it like to live in the town: before, during and after the radar base stage? 
Please describe an average day. 
 
 
3. Here are air photos of Moosonee from 1940, 1962 and 1989.  Can you tell me what 
you notice in the photos.  (Discuss the air photos together). 
 
 
4. How do you think life in Moosonee changed over the years? 
 
 
5. Please describe what kind of employment was available to town residents during 
the Cold War (especially between 1955 and 1975).  
 
 
6. Can you describe access by town residents to everyday necessities, such as clean 
drinking water, food supplies, and medical services? 
 
 
7. Were local people able to visit all areas of the town? (That is, if someone lived on the 
base, did they ever visit in town and vice versa?)  
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APPENDIX TWO (continued): INTERVIEW CONSENT FORMS 
 
 
Study Title:  The Impact of the Cold War on Moosonee: A Case Study of a Northern Ontario 
Radar Base 
 
Researcher:  Sue Heffernan 
 
 I am a graduate student in the Human Studies Department at Laurentian University 
in Sudbury.  I am studying the Town of Moosonee during the Cold War era (mainly 
1950’s to 1970’s) and the construction and operation of a radar base (Royal Canadian 
Air Force base) in the town during the years 1961 to 1975. This research is intended to 
help provide a clearer picture of how Moosonee changed during the Cold War.  For 
example, part of the research will look at the way the land itself was modified by 
structures such as the radar domes and the construction of an entire community north 
of the townsite of Moosonee.  Another part of the research hopes to shed light on what 
everyday life was like both for people who lived in town and for people who worked or 
lived at the radar base. 
 
 Moosonee Town Council has been consulted prior to any interviews in the Town 
and will be provided with a summary of findings at the end of this research.  However, 
Town Council will not be provided with a list of interviewees or with any material 
which might affect your confidentiality. 
 
 The study will take about an hour of your time and will involve general questions 
about your time in Moosonee and what you observed.  As part of the interview, you will 
be asked to comment on air photos of Moosonee from the time before, during and after 
the radar base existed.  
 
 Your participation is strictly voluntary.  You have the right to withdraw at any time.  
Also, if you would rather not discuss a particular topic that arises during the interview, 
please feel free to say so. This consent form includes in the Appendix a list of 
confidential counselling agencies which you can contact if you wish to seek counselling 
at anytime after this interview. 
 
 Your identity will not be revealed at any time during the research or as part of the 
writing of the final paper, unless you wish to be identified (see Addendum).  You will be 
provided with transcripts of any material containing potentially identifiable 
information (e.g. quotes from your interview which might affect your confidentiality). 
This material will be provided to you in writing prior to any use in the thesis or in 
published material.  Such material will only be used if you provide an additional 
consent. Any confidential identifiable information you provide about other individuals 
(i.e. third party information) will not be included in the thesis or in publications in 
order to protect the privacy of both yourself and third party individuals. 
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 Recording of the interview will be conducted, to assist me in compiling interview 
results, however, recording will only take place if you indicate in writing (below) that 
you permit this procedure. 
 
 If you have any questions or concerns about the study or about being a participant, 
you can email me at sheffernan@laurentian.ca .  You may also call my thesis supervisor, 
Dr. Linda Ambrose (705-675-1151, ext. 4204 or toll-free 1-800-461-4030, ext 4204) or 
the Laurentian University Research Office, telephone# 705-675-1151, extension 3213 
or 1-800-461-4030, ext. 3213. 
 
 
 
I agree to participate in this study and I have received a copy of the consent form. 
 
______________________________Participant’s Signature                ______________________Date 
 
______________________________Researcher’s Signature              ________________________Date 
 
 
 
I agree to have this interview recorded.  Yes____ No____ 
 
_____________________________Participant’s Signature                _______________________Date 
 
______________________________Researcher’s Signature              ________________________Date 
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Appendix One to Consent Form: CONSENT FORM: Addendum  (Primarily for Technical 
or Government Staff). 
 
To Participants:  If you decide that you wish to have your quotes attributed to you, 
then please sign both the main Consent form and this Addendum. 
 
 
Study Title:  The Impact of the Cold War on Moosonee: A Case Study of a Northern Ontario 
Radar Base 
 
Researcher:  Sue Heffernan 
 
  
 
I agree to participate in this study and I have received and signed a copy of the consent 
form and of this Addendum. 
 
______________________________Participant’s Signature                ______________________Date 
 
______________________________Researcher’s Signature               ______________________Date 
 
I give permission to the researcher to reveal my identity in the written report.  
 
 
______________________________Participant’s Signature                ______________________Date 
 
______________________________Researcher’s Signature                ______________________Date 
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Appendix Two to Consent Form: List of Counselling Contact Numbers for Interviewees 
who wish to contact a Counsellor. 
 
 
For Residents of Moosonee: 
 
 
James Bay Community Mental Health Program: Weeneebayko Area Health 
Authority: 
 
1. 705-336-2164 or 
 
2. Telemedicine: call 705-658-4544 (ext. 2248 or 2360) to book an appointment. 
 
OR call the Moosonee Health Clinic at 705-336-2341 and talk with the duty 
nurse about  
booking you an appointment with a counsellor. 
 
 
For all Interviewees (whether residents or non-residents of Moosonee) who wish to 
contact a  
counsellor : 
 
Call the Provincial Mental Health Helpline at 1-866-531-2600 or 
 
Check the Mental Health Helpline website at:  
 http://www.mentalhealthhelpline.ca for other options (e.g. email service). 
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APPENDIX THREE: AIR PHOTOS OF MOOSONEE, 1960 
 
 
Sources:  
 
1. Map 5.1: Moosonee Settlement Areas (circa 1962) is included with this Appendix to 
facilitate the comparison of the three air photos that follow (also see Chapter Five for 
discussion of this map).   
 
2. Three air photos follow Map 5.1 in sequence from south to north.  These photos were 
sourced from Directorate of History and Heritage, Joint Photographic Intelligence Centre 
(PLT) fonds, File 79/347, Box 39, C-44, Moosonee (PLT), RCAF air photos, October 4, 
1960.
853
 
 
 
Description of Photos: the photos are numbered as Air Photo 3.1, Air Photo 3.2 and Air Photo 
3.3. The horizontal white line that is shown through the middle of each of the photos was Second 
Avenue (now Bay Road). This road was constructed by the RCAF in 1960 from the radar base to 
the centre of the Town of Moosonee, as discussed in Chapter Five. Other features shown on the 
air photos are as follows: 
 
Air Photo 3.1:  This photo shows the south end of Moosonee that is, the Village and the Town. 
The white area at the far left of the map was identified by interviewees as a storage site for sand 
and gravel used in construction of the radar base. Near the top of the photo can be seen the ONR 
train station and directly above that the air strip constructed in 1955, as discussed in Chapter 
Four. The construction camp on Moosonee’s main street can be seen at the bottom of the photo, 
just to the right of Store Creek. (Note: As indicated above, please view Map 5.1 for the location 
of settlement areas and Store Creek). 
 
Air Photo 3.2: This photo shows the continuation of Second Avenue (Bay Road) between the 
Town and the radar base. 
 
Air Photo 3.3: This photo shows initial clearing for the construction of the radar base. The three 
dome sites can be seen at the far right of the photo. The rectangular site in the middle of the radar 
base became the barracks. The light lines on the curved road at the bottom end of the radar base 
became the streets for the PMQ subdivision. The creek to the right, or north, is Butler Creek. The 
creek to the immediate left, or south, of the radar base is Sasakipao Creek. 
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 The air photos in Appendices Three and Four are included here per Department of National Defence 
copyright guidelines at http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/terms-conditions.  
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Air Photo 3.1: South End of Moosonee, October 1960 
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Air Photo 3.2: Area Between Moosonee Townsite and Radar Base, October 1960 
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Air Photo 3.3: Radar Base, October 1960. 
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APPENDIX FOUR: MOOSONEE RCAF BASE, Air Photo dated August 14, 1962. 
 
Source: Directorate of History and Heritage, Joint Photographic Intelligence Centre (PLT) fonds, 
File 79/347, Box 39, C-44, Moosonee (PLT), RCAF air photos. 
  
This photo shows the radar domes at the bottom left of the image. The water plant is directly to 
the left of the domes beside a dam constructed by the RCAF on Butler Creek. The power plant is 
directly to the right of the domes and the diesel fuel storage area is at the far right of the image. 
The two large buildings between the power plant and the diesel storage are maintenance and 
equipment structures.  
 
The Private Married Quarters’ (PMQ’s) subdivision is at the top of the image. The building to 
the top left of the PMQ’s is the sewage treatment plant. The grade school is the “H” shaped 
building on the right hand side (Henry Hudson School). Below the grade school is the recreation 
building and to the right of the recreation building (across the road on a diagonal) is the chapel. 
The barracks appear in the image as three joined rectangles. To the right of the barracks is the 
joint Messes building. To the right of the Messes is the administration building (see the “L” 
shaped building). The gatehouse is a small structure between the administration building and the 
chapel. 
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APPENDIX FIVE: CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN MOOSONEE: 1966-69 
 
Start of 
Construction 
and 
Completion*  
 
Location Cost Construction Details 
1. Sept.1966 to 
July 1967 
 
First Street 
(downtown 
Moosonee) 
$164,000 Sanitary sewers, storm 
sewers, watermains and road 
restoration. 
2. 1966 to 
March 1967 
n/a $167,000 Stockpiling granular material 
[gravel] for construction 
3. 1967 to 
September 
1968 
Remainder of streets 
in main townsite 
$643,500 Sanitary sewers, storm 
sewers, watermains and road 
restoration 
4. Fall 1967 to 
July 1968 
Various locations in 
townsite (sewage 
treatment plant 
placed south of Store 
Creek) 
$763,000 Water treatment plant and 
dam, sewage treatment 
plant. ** Note: both plants 
were prefabricated.  
5. Nov. 1968 to 
October 1969 
Extension of services  $ 245,000 Sanitary sewers, watermains 
and roadways 
6. 1968  Store Creek crossing $46,000 
(estimated) 
Roadway and culverts 
crossing Store Creek 
 
*Key completion dates are bolded.  
** This chart was developed from the Annual Reports of OWRC for the years 1967 to 1969.The 
OWRC reports indicate that the plants were finished in July, 1968. The Ontario Housing 
Corporation reported that the sewage plant was completed and the water plant was in operation 
by August, 1968. 
854
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 AO, RG 19-77, B354517, File 119.6 Moosonee 1969. H. Pullen, Ontario Housing Corporation to Martin 
Sinclair, Department of Municipal Affairs, Re: “Moosonee-Possible Additional Family Units,” 6 November, 1969. 
Also see AO, RG 19-77, B354517. File 119.4, Moosonee 1969 and AO, RG19-6-5, B269883. File “Minister’s Tour-
Moosonee 1970.” G. C. Hewson to McKeough, 14 July 1970. 
